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P RE FACE. 
My aim in this thesis has been to try to show how English and Scottish. 
aestheticians in the eighteenth century drew upon certain ideas prominent 
in the writings of Hobbes, Locke, andBerkeley, and used them in formulating 
solutions to problems facing them. In doing this, I have tried to exclude 
all issues, even closely related ones, which might distract attention from mfr 
principal theme. .- uestions of such moment as the influence of Bacon on 
Hobbes, the relation of eighteenth century aesthetic theory to ancient aesthetic: 
the influence of French philosophers and aestheticians on their English 
counterparts, and the effects of the work of Shaftesbury and Hume have 
therefore received no special attention. 
The field I have tried to coaxer is a large one, and is still 
relatively speaking unexplored, though there has been a re- awakening of 
interest in it in the last fifteen years, chiefly in the United States and in 
Italy. But an enormous amount of work remains to be done, and I can claim 
to have done no more than touch upon the many outstanding problems. 
The scheme I have adopted is as follows. The first part I hve devoted 
to individual problems ,:hich may be classed as psychological in nature, and 
sdme at'least of which had to be investigated before any aesthetic could be 
developed. The second part deals with questions more purely philosophical - 
the nature of perceptions, ideas, and language. Finally, in the third part; I 
have tried to trace the growth of two of the most important schools of aesthetic 
hive 
thought, both of which seem town out of suggestions made by Hobbes and 
Locke. An all too short introduction is provided in the hope of supplying 
11. 
what is necessarily lacking in a thesis of this nature - an over -all view 
of the period concerned, such as can not unfortunately be found in any other 
book in English. The nearest approach to a history of eighteenth century 
English aesthetic theory is Dr. Rossics introduction to his recent work, 
L'Estetica dell'Empirismo Inglese. 
INTRODUCTION 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AiSTHETIC .THEORY IN ENGLAND 
AND SCOTLAND IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
1. 
Although Aesthetic is a branch of philosophy, it is not easy to regard 
most of the eighteenth century aesthetic theorising in England and Scotland as 
such. The reason for this is not very hard to find: the leading philosophers 
did not often display very great interest in aesthetics, and the leading 
aestheticians were not, on the other hand, often qualified to consider 
their subject in a philosophic manner. The truth is that interest was in 
artistic questions rather than in aesthetic philosophy; and that this is 
so is amply confirmed by the examination of any one of the eib liographies 
of the subject published subse,;uent to the pioneer work of Professor Draper 
in 1931. Books on a wide variety of subjects all contain references to 
problems that can, sometimes with perhaps a little stretch of the imagination, 
be classed as aesthetic in nature. Consequently we find such different 
works as Nettleton's Treatise on Virtue and Happiness, Ferguson's History 
of Civil Society, and Henniker's Two Letters on the Origin, Antiquity and 
History of Norman Tiles stained with ,armorial Bearings all finding their 
way, at one time or another, into bibliographies of eighteenth century 
aesthetics. 
If any preliminary conclusion can be dra n from the study of such 
iv. 
bibliographies, it is that interest in certain aesthetic problems must have 
been very widespread during this period. In the second half of the 
eighteenth century, there is hardly one writer or artist of note who has not 
left a pronouncement on one or other aspect of these problems. It is 
scarcely less striking how few of these men ever tried to work out anything 
in the nature of an aesthetic system of their own.: and most of those who 
did attempt to do so, accepted almost without ouostion the assumptions and 
even the methods of their predecessors. There is therefore about the 
development of eighteenth century aesthetic something of atjig -saw puzzle' 
quality. The pieces remained the same: and they were tried sometimes in one 
position, sometimes in another, yet somehow never managing to form a ciplete 
and satisfactory picture. 
It is interesting, and almost certainly rio coincidence, that the growth 
of interest in aesthetics should overlap one of the great ages of British 
philosophy, which lasted roughly from 1650 -1750, and during which appeared 
nearly all the principal works of Hobbes, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. Their 
work aroused a new interest in and awareness of philosophy that made possible 
the steady growth of an aesthetic based on many of the principles which they 
had tried to establish. The attention paid by all four philosophers to 
questions of psychology was in itself of considerable importance for the 
development of aesthetic theory, which had perforce to consider the 
reactions of the individual to beautiful or sublime objects. When we 
add to these factors the increasing interest in art criticism of every sort 
which manifested itself during the eighteenth century, it becomes clear that 
conditions were unusually favourable for the consideration of aesthetic 
problems, and that the widespread interest in such cuestions was under the 
circumstances a natural development. 
v. 
2. 
The history of aesthetic theory in England may be said to start with 
Shaftesbury, who was certainly the first writer consciously to develope 
anything approaching an aesthetic system of his own. Shaftesbury's 
aesthetic ideas appeared in a series- of short treatises which were later 
collected under tale title of Lharacteristics. The source of these ideas has 
been the subject of some controversy, but they certainly derive ulti.ately 
from ancient philosophy, and are in some points similar to Platonic and 
neo- Platonic theories. Shaftesbury insisted on the suostantial identity of 
the true, the good and the beautiful, and accounted for man's ability to 
perceive the beautiful and the good by the supposition of a sense of beauty, 
and of a moral sense, between which he did not however distinguish. 
Shaftesbury's aesthetic suffered to some extent from its constant conjunction 
with his system of ethics, of which it formed an integral part: it is probable 
that Shaftesbury saw this himself, for his Second Characters, unpublished 
until 1912, show that he was moving towards the formulation of a purer 
aesthetic which his early death prevented him from working out in detail. 
Shaftesbury's theory of a sense of beauty was adopted by Fr:.ncis 
Hutcheson (1694- 1746), who made use of his knowledge of Locke's philosophy 
to develop the conception of a number of internal senses, including the 
moral sense and the sense of beauty, which enable man to perceive iimaediately 
cetain non -sensible qualities in external objects. According to 
Hutcheson, a beautiful object causes an instantaneous reeling of pleasure in 
an observer, and he suggested that the only objects capable of rousing this 
pleasure were those in v1üch there existed a "compound ratio of uniformity 
vi. 
and variety :ul he also however allowed of a second class of relative beauty, 
or beauty of art, when the pleasure Tis caused by man -made imitations of objects 
in nature. 
The theory of an internal sense of beauty became popular almost at once, 
and is adopted by Nettleton writing as early as 1729 and by Stubbes two 
years later. !ivisan, one of the first men to write a treatise on the 
aesthetic reactions. to music, made it the basis of his explanation of the 
pleasure given by music, and Gerard in his Essay on Taste made it an 
important constituent of the faculty of taste. The theory was aleo accepted, 
in one form or another by Duff, Ogilvie and Stedman, all of wham held with 
certain reservations that taste was an internal sense, by Monboddo, who 
preferred to talk of an "intellectual sense," and by Reid, who divided it into al 
instinctive part and rational part. Hume also allowed the existence of an 
internal sense of beauty, but argued that it consisted in man's ability 
to perceive that relationship between his faculties and certain external 
objects in which beauty consists: and this view was also held by Lancaster and 
Karnes. 
Most supporters of the t gory however agreed with Hutcheson_ that the 
sense perceived a beauty which depended on certain sensible qualities of 
the object, and many different opinions were advanced as to the properties 
concerned. Hutcheson's original suggestion of uniformity amid variety 
found a good deal of favour, and Hartley, Gerard, Kanes, Blair, Alison and 
Mangin among others admitted that it was a source of aesthetic pleasure, 
though few were ready to agree that it was the only principle of beauty. 
1 Beauty and Virtue, p.17 
vii, 
Many other principles of beauty were proposed, and in his _,nalysis of Beauty 
Hogarth lists as chief among them fitness, simplicity, intricacy, and 
quantity: and to these we may add utility, symmetry, proportion, and 
regularity. Hogárth himself tried to explain. beauty by what he called the 
line of beauty; that is, a line, serpentine in shape and possessing a certain 
degree of curvature, which gives rise to beauty, wherever it is perceived. 
This however, obviously the solution of a working artist, did not prove 
acceptable to most of his contemporaries, though Hogarthts authority was 
sufficient to lead many to include the 'curving line of beauty' in their 
lists of the qualities giving rise to the perception of the beautiful. 
An interesting case is that of Burke, who tried to shift the emphasis 
from the sentimental to the physiological, by proposing a theory that 
perception of beauty was accompanied by a certain relaxation of fibres in the 
body. This part of his theory however attracted less attention than his 
listing of such qualities as smoothness or delicacy as characteristics 
of beautiful objects, and when Jeffrey e'ly in the following century 
claimed that the sense of beauty was supposed in all theories that 
attributed the perception of beauty to the e :dstence of certain sensible 
qualities in the objects concerned, he clearly had Burke foremost in his 
mind. Jeffrey also refers to the doctrine of relaxation of fibres, but 
it does not seem to have occurred to him or to any of his predecessors 
that Burke was trying to develop(' a theory of beauty more in accordance 
with the physiological aspects of sensation. Burke's Inquiry has nary 
merits: it is far more painstaking than most contemporary aesthetic treatises 
which tended to confuse aesthetic, moral, altical and philosophical questionsr 
largely because of the failure to perceive that aesthetics was in itself a 
viii. 
separate department of philosophy. Burke tried to set certain limits to 
his enquiries, and took considerable trouble to pick out the qualities 
which he considered to be causes of the feeling of tdelightt or aesthetic 
pleasure. The result is that his work remained influential, f or many years 
after publication, and Price writing forty years later could still 
talk of the system of Burke as a livi.ne influence. 
3. 
Though in modern times the sense of beauty was first proposed by 
Shaftesbury, credit for the subsequent popularity of the theory is generally 
given to Hutcheson. Other aspects of Shaftesbury's aesthetic however had 
an influence which can be more directly traced to him as source. Notable 
among these is the moralistic tendency by which the beautiful and the good 
were considered as essentially the same. Many of those who dealt with 
aesthetic questions were interesed primarily in moral philosophy, and it 
was only this identification of the good with the beautiful that justified 
them in paying any attention to the ] after. Thus we find Fiddes attributing the 
beauty of external objects to their power to give expression to beauty of mind, 
while both Nettleton and iirbuckle insist on the importance of moral beauty. 
This had its effect on the general attitude to aesthetic questions, which was no 
altered to any extent by Hutcheson's tr:l:Lment of beauty and virtue as 
separate subjects. Consequently most treatises on aesthetics which had 
any pretensions to completeness included a section on moral beauty, and - 
this is reflected in Blair's view of taste as a moral and purifying influence. 
The ethical system of Shaftesbury was formulated very largely in reaction 
to the then popular 'selfish' philosophy of Hobbes, ì to counter jAwñich 
ix. 
Shaftesbury advanced the theory that there is common to all mien a feeling 
of universal benevolence which prompts them to sympathise with the feelings 
of others whether it is in their interest to do so or not. This idea 
was taken up and propagated by Hutcheson, who made it a part of his ethical 
teaching, thus helping to popul:.:rise the idea that positivo pleasure could 
be obtained from sharing the emotions of others. The possibility of a man 
feeling for the joys and sorrows of others through some form of sympathy 
was admitted by Dr. Johnson and by Hume, who suggested sympathy as a 
probable explanation of the beauty men perceive in inanimate objects. Burke 
too held that it was by means of sympathy that such arts as poetry and painting 
were able to cause emotion in those contemplating them. 
The doctrine of sympathy received its fullest expression in The Theory 
of Moral Sentiments of Adam Smith,who made use of it to explain many forms 
of human emotion, among them the pleasures received from music and from 
tragedy. This work at once became extremely popular and may have helped 
to weaken the hold of the internal sense theory. It should be noted 
however that there are strong similarities between the doctrines of sympathy 
and the internal sense; and neither was able to solve at once the two problems 
that prove so baffling to the eighteenth century - the varie ty of tastes, and 
the universality of beauty. It was however often employed as an 
explanation of single aesthetic difficulties; Campbell explained by sympathy 
the orator's ability to work on the passions of his audience while Blair 
declared that it was by sympathy that we are able to appreciate figures of 
speech expressive of the passions or emotions of others. 1ìs late as 1805 
a writer in the Edinburgh Review accounts for the pleasure taken in 
dramatic performances by an extension of our sympathy from real emotion to 
that represented before us on the stage. 
X. 
4. 
Addison's papers on The Pleasures of the Imagination which appeared 
in 1712 were, though perhaps lacking in profundity, of great importance . 
to the subsequent development of aesthetic theory. Addison left unanswered, 
and in some cases unasked, many of the questions that were to engage the 
attention of later aestheticians, but his division of the objects giving 
aesthetic pleasure into the beautiful, the great, and the uncommon had 
considerable influence on his successors, and gave rise to the threefold 
classification of beauty, sublinity, and novelty. Many of Addison's 
theories were accepted by Hutcheson who, hoever, did not consider the sublime 
and the new, and instead referred his readers to _';daisonts Spectator paper 
on the subject. Addison's classification, along with most of his other 
theories, was adopted by Akenside in his poem on The Pleasures of Imagination, 
the very title of which was taken from Addison. _jkenside thus helped to 
establish the three categories in the popular mind. 
The sublime was the subject of quite a literature of its own, and 
therefore deserves separate consideration. Interest in the sublime was 
largely due to the re- discovery of L41inus in the 17th century, and more 
than one translation of him appeared within measurable distance of the turn 
of the century. Addison certainly knew Longinus, and drew on him to some 
extent in his remarks on grandeur. The first treatise devoted exclusively 
to consideration of the sublime was that by John Baillie, which appeared 
in 1747, and thereafter most considerable works on aesthetic dealt with 
the sublime as distinct from beauty. Burke, Priestley, Kames, and Blair 
were among those who considered the subject, but of their theories the most 
StrlICín 
mitsmEtiag is undoubtedly thi c of Burke, who held that the sublime was not 
inconsistent with ugliness, and that it gave rise to no positive pleasure. 
Thus to Burke the sublime becomes what is almost the antithesis of beauty, 
and in view of this it is interesting to note that Burke considered novelty in 
itself no source of aesthetic pleasure.8onsequently for Burke only two 
opposed categoñes, the sublime and the beautiful, remain; and this twofold 
division later became classic through the work of Kant. 
The attitude to novelty varied very considerably. Hartley held that 
it was continually necessary even to beauty, since without it all beauty 
tended to become insipid, but Dr. Johnson while admitting that it ma.s necessary 
to the pleasures of sense, argued that mere rarity or novelty had in itself 
no value. Hume _.greed that novelty was pleasing, but added that it could 
increase the force of painful as well as pleasurable emotions. Reid classed 
novelty as a mere relation: anything seen for the first time is new, and 
need not on that account give to us any pleasure. A,ikin on the other hand, 
writing in 1793, considered that the pleasure we take in art and nature has its 
source in novelty, mhich he considered as "practically ultimate, "1 and 
capable of arousing a desire that nothing else can satisfy. 
In the second half of the century a new category known as the 
"picturesque" was evolved, largely by bringing together objects which 
iyere'pòpularly: regarded as beautiful, but did not possess the qualities which 
Burke had laid down as giving rise to beauty. The new category was probably 
the result of increased interest in romantic scenery, but the founder of the 
"picturesque" school of aestheticians was William Gilpin, who published a 
series of travel books between 1768 and 1791: Gilpin was not however interested 
primarily in aesthetic problems, and therefore the clearest exposition of the 
1 Essays, vol.i,p.65 
ideas which he had helped to- popularise is found in the Essays on Picturesque 
Beauty of Sir Uvedále Price. Price adopted a more extreme attitude than 
Gilpin by arguing that picturesque objects formed a class wholly distinct 
from those which are beautiful, but he received little support, though as late 
as 1811 a writer in the Critical Review referred to the picturesque as a 
`minor subli e ". 
The classifications mentioned above are a clear sign of the tendency 
to regard beauty as purely objective, for they are based on the idea that there 
ae certain qualities in objects that render them beautiful, or sublime, or 
picturesque. The objective attitude prevailed for a large part of the 
century, and the first sign of revolt a_ :ainst it was probably Humets view 
of beauty as arising out of the relation between the object and the subject. 
Eventually however, as will be seen, the subjective view triumphed, and the 
categories established by Addison at the outset of the period were abolished. 
5. 
The rise of the theory that beauty is subjective is chiefly attributable 
to the steady growth of the doctrine of association of ideas, different aspects of 
which were considered by both Hobbes and Locle, and which made its first 
appearance in an aesthetic treatise in the works of Hutcheson. Hutcheson 
a 
found k rw association /useful ally to the internal sense of beauty, as it 
allowed him to account for variety of tastes as well as the universality of 
beauty. Hutcheson saw that the most telling argument against his aesthetic 
was the undeniable fact that tastes for beauty differ; and he explained 
the difference as the effect of associated ideas, which deceive the mind, 
and lead it away from the true beauty to some form of false beauty. 
Associationist doctrine received considerable development in the 
hands of Hume, who did not however apply his theories in his few essays 
on aesthetic subjects. Hume laid down certain laws which governed, though 
not invariably, the succession of thoughts in the mind: and then proceeded 
to extend associationism to make it provide an explanation for man's emotions and 
passions. hume also accepted the internal sense of beauty, and it is 
perhaps a little surprising to find him nevertheless deciding that the only 
possible basis for a standard of beauty isthe recognition of an object as beauti- 
ful by men of different countries and periods, all of whom must however be 
qualified judges. This none too satisfactory solution received a certain 
amount of support later in the century, and appears again in the writing of 
Beattie and Blair, and also in the Discourses of air Joshua Reynolds, who 
concluded that the standard of beauty must therefore be established in 
the very nature of things. 
Meanwhile, the associationist doctrine continued to find favour, and 
was propagated zealously by Hartley and his follower Priestley, both of 
whom used association to explain a variety of facts, many of which were 
connected with artistic, and literary matters. association was opposed 
in rather a half- hearted may by Burke, but was made increasing use of by 
aestheticians to evade difficulties in the application of the internal 
sense theory. It is found in one form or another in the works of Karnes 
and Gerard, and became almost central in the works of Beattie, who, however, 
despite the fact that he had evolved a theory of association sufficient to 
account for all the phenomena which he considered, retained the theory '.. 
of an internal sense of beauty. 
It was at about this time (1770 -90) that what is often called the 
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"common sense" school grew up in Scotland. It was headed by Reid, who held 
that as the philosophy of Locke, Berkeley and Hume had led to sdepticism, 
a new foundation for philosophy would have to be sought. This Reid found 
in a series of invariable first principles, which allowed him to assume as 
fundamental truths dogmatic solutions of many of the problems uhich had so 
puzzled the minds ofphilosophers during the past century. Common sense 
meant in fact a common judgment based on the first principles, and it had many 
of the features of the intLrnal sense. Reid was thereby enabled to consider 
taste as an original powerin mañ, and he ;rent on to explain beauty as an 
expression of the original perfections of mind. 
Reid's theories, despite their obvious weaknesses, had at least the 
merit of directing attention towards the reactions of the mind rather than the 
qualities of the object, and may therefore have had some influence on 
the Essays of Alison, which appeated in 1790. Alison held that the 
perception of beauty results from the exercise of imagination caused 
by the arousing of a train of closely related thoughts, consequent on 
the presentation of certain objects to the senses. The train of thought 
always originates in some idea connected with the object by association, and 
so the object concerned, though it may be referred to as beautiful) has in 
itself no claim to be called so. Beauty is therefore the result of a 
certain activity of mind in the percipient, and is . purely subjective. 
Alison's doctrine is carefully and methodically worked out, and may be 
described as the culmination of nearly a century of flirtation between 
aesthetics and associationism. 
Alison's theories obtained some suport from Knight, Mangin, and 
Dugald Stewart, but their most enthusiastic advocate was Francis Jeffrey. 
xv 
Jeffrey first noticed :'1isonts Essays in an article in the Edinburgh Review 
on the appearánce of a senond edition in 1810, and he then acclaimed them as 
quite the best aesthetic theory known to him. Fourteen years later he wrote 
an article on Beauty for the Eickelopaedia Britannica, and though the source 
of his ideas is clearly and avowedly :_lis on, Jeffrey has now worked out a 
slightly different theory of his own. Beauty is the emotion roused in the 
observer by an association between the object and one of the simple human 
emotions, as the result of a connection established between them by 
experience. Beauty remains subjective and the "substantial identity" of the 
sublime, the picturesque, and the beautiful is proved: we are left however 
without a really satisfactory explanation of the universality of beauty, 
Thus eighteenth century aesthetic ends, much as it had begun, with two 
irreconcilable facts which cannot be made to harmonise - the problems of the 
universality of beauty, and the diversity of tastes. Sometimes one 
is explained, sometimes the other, but there is no one aesthetic treatise 
which appeared between 1700 and 1825 of which it can be said that it provides 
an even superficially unanswerable solution to both problems. 
6. 
Dr. Rossi has given English aesthetic theory in general the title of 
the "Aesthetic of English Empiricism," and I think that it would be very 
difficult to find a better title to cover the period under review. The 
emphasis is placed from first to last on the interpretation of observed 
facts, whether .these facts are the distinguishing qualities of objects 
called beautiful, or the sentiments felt by á human being on the perception 
of what is known as beauty. :`;hen interest is directed primarily towards the 
former of these facts, we get what is known as objective aesthetics: when the 
xvl.. 
latter attracts more attention, we have subjective aesthetics. Between 
the two extremes are many intermediate grades, most of which received notice 
at one time or other in the course of the eighteenth century. Always 
however the problems remain the same, and what is more extraordinary so 
do the examples quoted. It is by no means rare to find the same case 
brought forward to support opposing points of view. 
Perhaps the greatest weakness of the empiricist aestheticians was 
their inability to escape from the particular instances which they always 
felt it their duty to consider. The result was that they seldom or 
never succeeded in agreeing upon general principles which might have formed 
the basis of a more philosophical aesthetic. Most of them seem to have 
regarded aesthetic as a branch of art 'criticism, and there is consequently 
a lack of proper method in their approach to the problem. As Bosanquet 
has pointed out in his History of Aesthetic, they tried to work up to 
aesthetic by observing the trained artistic sense. The result is that 
they approach the problem from countless different aggles without ever 
managing to see it as a .whole. Their remarks are often acute and their 
treatises interesting, but they never wholly succeeded in shaking off the 
bonds imposed upon them by their empirical view of aesthetics. 
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1 published. 
Periodicals are given opposite the year in which they were first/ 
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PART I 
THE PSYCH O LOGI CAL FOUND_,TI ON S 
CHAPTER I 
HOBBES AND THE IMAGINATION 
1. The Function of the Imagination. 
Hobbes can fairly claim to have been the first English thinker to 
attempt to analyse the imagination and its workings. It is true that some 
of the functions which he attributed to the imagination had already been 
suggested by Burton and Bacon, and had probably existed in the popular 
consciousness for some time before that, if we are to accept Shakespeare's 
famous lines in A bidsununer Night's Dream as representing a prevailing view 
of the imagination. Hobbes however in his several descriptions of man and 
all his faculties did what none of these men had ever attempted. He tried to 
show how the imagination gathers its materials, and how it is able to make 
use of them: and in the course of his philosophical and critical writings 
he gr,.dually'f ormulated a comprehensive and on the whole consistent theory 
of the workings of the imagination. 
Hobbs theories of the imagination, like all the other departments 
of his philosophy, were based on the assumption that everything in the 
universe, including the processes in the mind of man, could be explained on 
a purely mechanistic basis. For Hobbes the imagination was, like everything 
else in the universe, capable of being reduced to a system of laws to which 
it was in the nature of things subject. The dangers which obviously threaten 
such a conception of imagination are in practice very often avoided by Hobbes 
3. 
because of his interest in artistic questions, which led him to make 
deter-r9in15 -6C 
allowances that we might not expect to find in such system. 
The result is that we have, if not exactly an aesthetic which is "clear and 
logical throu;hout," 
1 
a tentative mental philosophy which considers many questions 
that must be answered in some way before any aesthetic at all can be developed. 
The definition of imagination given by Hobbes does not differ 
substantially from that found in his English predecessors; he considers it 
as "sense decaying or weakened by the absence of the object.r2 Hobbes 
believed that there could be no ideas in the mind unless they had first 
been introduced into it by external objects acting upon the organ i of sense: 
such action causes an impression on the sentient which remains there even 
after the object itself is no longer present to sense. This remaining 
impression is memory or imagination, which Hobbes considers as "but one thing 
which for divers considerations hath different names."5 The difference 
between them is that when we consider an impression as something which has 
already happened in the past, with relation to the circumstances which then 
accompanied it, it is called memory: if on tie other hand we consider the 
impression as it is in itself, abstracted from its concomitant circumstances, 
it is called imagination. Thus despite the view just quoted memory can be 
regarded as in a sense subservient to the imagination, and Hobbes seems to 
recognise this when he states that "memory begets judgment and fancy.r4 
This explanation suggests another problem. In memory, since ideas 
are remembered with relation to the past, they must recur in the order in 
which they were originally imprinted on the senses. But there can be no 
1 'Spingarn: Critical Essays of the 17th Century. Introduction, D. xxxii 
2 Elements of Philosophy; '.ïks. vol. i, IV, xxv, 7(p.396) 
3 Leviathan I, ii, p. 10 
4 Answer; ks. vol. iv, p. 449 
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such regularity in the ideas of the imagination if the distinction just 
made is valid. Hobbes was again ready with a solution. It is true that 
imagination is not confined to the exact original order of events, but 
nevertheless we can "have no transition from one imagination to another 
whereof we never had the like before in our senses. "1 This is not so 
severe a limitation as may at first appear; for as we may have the same 
idea more than once, but on each occasion followed by a different idea, a 
time will soon cane when "there is no certainty what we shall imagine next: 
only this is certain, that it shall be something that succeeded the same before, 
at one time or another. "2 It follows that there is some form of connection 
between the ideas of the imagination, and Hobbes goes on to try to analyse 
this connection. 
The succession of ideas in the imagination, which Hobbes calls a "train 
of thoughts or mental discourse,72 may be either regulated or unregulated. 
The latter is that "ranging" of the mind when the thoughts seem to wander 
from one idea to another, and are governed only by their "first coherence 
or consequence at ttat time when they were produced by sense,i3 or by "the 
conception of cause and effect "a succeeding one another in the imagination 
as in sense. A regulated train of thought is given direction by some 
dominating desire or purpose, for "the thought or phantasm of the desired 
or- pltppeeey -4e end brings in all the phantasms that are means conducing to 
that end, and that in order....But this supposes both appetite and judgment 
to discern what means conduce to the end, "4 and constitutes for Hobbes 
"nothing but seeking or the faculty of invention. "5 Hobbes thus recognises 
1 Leviathan, I,iii,p.13 2 ibid. p.14 
3 Human Nature; Wks. vol. iv: IV, ii, p.15 
4 Elements of Philosophy; Wks. vol. i: IV, xxv, 8(p.398) 
5 Leviathan, I,iii,p.15 
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a certain conscious control over the imagination, and he is at all times 
careful to stress the need for judgment to exercise a restraining influence 
on the imagination. 
Hobbes also notes that the imagination is able to give pleasure and pair 
and may thus have suggested, directly or indirectly, the title of Addisonts 
Spectator papers on The Pleasures of the Imagination. According to Hobbes, 
"anything that is pleasure to the sense, the sane also is pleasure in the 
imagination, *1 though as he points out elsewhere the pleasure given by 
imagination is weaker than that given by sense. It should here be noted 
that Hobbes accepted the traditional belief that the real object of perception 
is always a sense -image or phantasm in the mind, caused by the effect of 
external objects on the organs of sense and eventually on the sentient. Only 
when we realise this can sue understand fully the significance of the definition 
of imagination as "decaying sense," and the attempts made by certain eighteenth 
century aestheticians to confine the imagination to phantasms of objects of 
sight. This explains Addisonts desire to limit the pleasures of the 
imagination to "such as arise from visible objects. "2 
In the first quarter of the eighteenth century, there was curiously 
little discussion of the theories of Hobbes as to the workings of the 
imaginative faculty. Occasional echoes of his ideas are found in some of 
the late seventeenth century writers, but there was no effort made to criticise 
his conclusions or to carry his investigations further. The first real attemr 
at re- defining the imagination did not cams until 1724, when Zachary Mayne 
published his Two Dissertations, and even Mayne has little to add to what HobbE 
has already said. Imagination presents to the mind the images of external 
1 
Leviathan I,xi,p.65 2 Spectator. no. 411 
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objects, whether these objects are themselves present to sense or not, and it 
may therefore be considered as a kind of "secondary sense",' which represents 
all the other senses to the mind. It is however subject to decay, and is 
therefore quite a distinct faculty from sense. This theory is clearly founded 
upon the philosophy of Hobbes, although certain innovations indicate that 
Mayne was also influenced by the work of later philosophers. The same may 
be said of the theory of James Harris, who considers sense and imagination as 
complementary faculties of the soul, sense being "its receptive power, imaginai 
its retentive "2 power. We may therefore, he concludes, "call sense a kind of 
transient imagination; and imagination on the contrary a kind of permanent 
sense.i2 Harris goes on to distinguish between imagination and memory in 
terms that show clearly his acquaintance with the philosophy of Hobbes. 
Hartley too was probably indebted to Hobbes for his definitions of 
imagination and memory. According to his theory, in memory ideas recur in 
the same order as they had in sense; but when "ideas or trains of ideas occur, 
or are celled up, in a vivid manner, and without regard to the order of 
former actual impressions and perceptions, this is said to be done by the 
power of imagination or fancy. "3 Gerard likewise considers imagination 
and memory together, and finds that "recollection is very akin to the exercis( 
of the imagination in producing a work of genius. "4 Recollection he 
attributes to man's power of recalling ideas by means of their associations 
with other ideas, for "we search as if for something lost, we know not where. 
This last passage is very reminiscent of the Hobbesian concept of "seeking" 
for ideas in invention. 
The belief that images were "lively pictures of the things which they 
represent "5 was far too widely held to be put forward as a sign of the 
1 Two Dissertations, p.70 2 Hermes: Wks. p.219 °fToh -, Dennis 
3 Observations on Man, vol. i,p.3 4 On Genius: p.259 5Critioal 
7, 
influence of Hobbes. It is nevertheless interesting to find in Gerard 
the statement that "all the objects which affect taste and excite its 
sentiments are certain forms or pictures made by fancy."' Taken in 
conjunction with other aspects of Gerard's doctrine of the ff actions of the 
hypothesis 
imagination, it lends added probability to the thamw that Gerard may have 
been directly influenced by the philosophy of Hobbes. 
Most aestheticians writing after 1750 accept the theory that the 
imagination has the power, subject to certain laws or principles, of 
associating ideas. It is true that the doctrines of association had been 
considerably developed during the first half of the eighteenth century, but 
the chief developments were made in following up the initial suggestion made 
by Hobbes that the operations of even the imagination are in some way 
regulated. It would therefore be less than just ce to deny that the later 
extensions of this theory owed a great deal to the pioneer work done by Hobbes. 
This particular aspect of the problem will be more fully dealt with at a 
later stage. At present it is sufficient to note that Hobbes's doctrine 
of association, however elementary, formed an intrinsic part of his theory 
of the imagination, and must therefore be taken into account when we come to 
estimate the extent of his influence on the ideas of imagination current in 
the eighteenth century° 
2. Imagination and Fancy. 
One of the less satisfactory parts of Hobbes's account of the 
imagination is his use of the word fancy, which at one moment he seems to 
regard as synonymous with imagination, and which elsewhere seems to have a 
1 On Taste, III,i,p.169 
8. 
a distinct meaning of its own. In Leviathan when describing man's power of 
retaining the image of an object after the object itself has been removed, 
Hobbes talks of the faculty that "the Latins call imagination from the image 
made in seeing; and (they) apply the same, though improperly, to all the other 
senses. But the Greeks call it fancy; which signifies appearance, and is as 
proper to one sense as to another."' Here Hobbes gives us ito grounds for 
supposing that he himself draws any sharp distinction between the two terms. 
In the Answer to Davenant however he recognises as a special function of the 
fancy the provision of ornament for a poem; and Professor Thorpe has pointed 
out that at other times hé seems to regard fancy as an image- forming faculty, 
aIF image- retaining faculty, and a constructive faculty.2 It is therefore 
extremely difficult to say for certain whether Hobbes wanted to identify fancy 
and imagination, or to keep them apart as separate powers of the mind. 
A like failure to distinguish clearly between the two words is 
observable almost throughout the following century. Dryden, perhaps 
remembering a hint given in Hobbes, had talked of fancy as a "part of the 
poetts imagination, "3 which implies the recognition of sane peculiar 
function. Few later writers however committed themselves even to this 
extent, and Addison,who himself claims to use the word "promiscuously ", 
complains that "there are few words in the English language which are 
employed in a more loose and uncircumscribed sense than those of the fancy 
and the imagination.i4 The general tendency in the first half of the 
eighteenth century was to use the words indiscriminately, but it soon becomes 
apparent that there was an uneasy feeling abroad that they should be in some 
1 Leviathan, I,ii,p.9 
2 The Aesthetic Theory of Thomas Hobbes, p.40 
3 Essays, vol.i,p.14 
4 Spectator, no. 411 
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way distinguished from one another. This revealed itself, as has been pointed 
out in a recently -published article', in the usage of certain writers who 
gave fancy a semi-derogatory and imagination a complimentary sense. 
The basis for a proper distinction between fancy and imagination was 
at last supplied by Duff when he noted as the characteristics of the imagination 
vigour, extensiveness and plasticity, and of the fancy -quickness and liveliness.2 
As the writers of the above - mentioned article point out, this would seem to 
attribute wit to fancy and genius to imagination; and the same distinction is 
clearly in Beattie's mind when he writes that "a witty author is a man of lively 
fancy: but a sublime poet is said to possess a vast imagination. "3 The may 
was thus prepared for Dugald Stewart's view of fancy as the power of 
"summoning up at pleasure *4 the materials required for the work of artistic 
creation. According to Stewart, fancy is subordinate to the power of 
imagination, for "the latter power presupposes the former, while the former 
does not necessarily suppose the latter. "4 
It is thus evident that credit for first distinguishing clearly 
between fancy and imagination, long supposed due to Coleridge and then more 
recently to Dugald Stewart, belongs largely to Duff and Beattie. It is 
not extravagant to suggest, however, that even these earlier aestheticians 
did little more than give definite expression to what had long been half - 
recognised by nearly all writers on the subject. The whole history of the 
two words during the eighteenth century can moreover be traced back to the 
original vagueness of Hobbes on this point, and it is significant that the 
solution eventually arrived at should be consistent with the distinction often 
1 Modern Tanguage Notes, LX(1945),p.8 
2 Original Genius, p.58 
3 
Dissertations, p.194 
Human Mind, V.i.l(p.258) 
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implied by him in books written over a century earlier. 
3. The Creative Imagination and Genius. 
Another and perhaps the most important aspect of Hobbests theory of the 
imagination is his conception of it as a creative or inventive faculty. This, 
like many other features of Hobbes's aesthetic theory, came to be regarded almost 
as a commonplace in the eighteenth century. It is therefore necessary to keep 
in mind that the significance of Hobbes's doctrine of the creative imagination 
lies not so much in his developing a new theory, as in his providing an 
acceptable philosophical basis for what was already to a large extent a 
popular belief. Hobbes showed that invention could be accounted for by an 
examination of the processes of the mind, and went on to relate his theories 
to artistic creation, thus giving sane justification to those who consider 
him the first Englishman to develop0 an aesthetic theory of his own. 
Hobbes considers the imagination as simple or compound. Simple 
imagination is the recalling of a whole object just as it appeared to sense: 
compound imagination is the piecing together of parts or wholes of past 
imaginations so as to conceive of an object never before perceived, which 
may have goo real existence. Thus a fabulous creature such as a unicorn is 
the work of the compound imagination, made by abstracting certain qualities from 
known objects, and re- uniting them in something entirely new. Hobbes further 
points out that we are not limited to the mere imagining of things never 
seen in nature. We can also make material representations of them in }`wood, 
clay, or metal. ,ald these are also called images....for the resemblance of 
some fantastical inhabitants of the brain of the maker. But in these idols, 
as they are originally in the brain, and as they are painted, carved, moulded 
or molten in matter, there is a similitude of the one to the other, for which 
11. 
the material body made by art may be said to be the image of the fantastical 
idol made by nature, "1 
How Hobbes related his theory of the connection of ideas to his conception 
of the imagination as an inventive faculty has alraady been very briefly 
touched upon. 'Ahen the trains of thought passing through the mind are 
directed or regulated by a design or end, we h :ve what is known as the faculty 
of invention. The regulated trains of the thoughts are of two kinds: the first 
is when "of an effect imagined we seek the causes or means that produce it;'2 
and the second is "when imagining any possible thing whatsoever, we seek all the 
possible effects that can by it be produced.i2 This has clearly a possible 
application to the theory of art, and Hobbes has himself related it to the 
process of artistic creation in his Answer to Davenant. In a most interesting 
paragraph on the relation of judgment to fancy, Hobbes shows that imagination 
depends ultimately on strength of memory. It is memory that by amassing 
cn_strasgth thé materials provided by education and experience, provides 
something for the creative fancy to work on when it comes to select its images. 
Hobbes points out the necessity for supervision by the judgment, but nevertheless 
insists upon the primacy of the fancy, especially in poetry; for although both 
it and the judgment are necessary to good poems, fancy is the more so, because 
poems please "f or the extravagancy. u3 
But it is not only in poetry that fancy takes the lead. "All that 
is beautiful or defensible in building, or marvellous in engines or instruments 
of motion ... and whatsoever distinguisheth the civility of Europe from the 
1 Leviathan, IV,xlv,p.426 
2 ibid. I,iii,p.15 
3 ibid. I,viii,p.44. 
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barbarity of the American savages, is the workmanship of fancy, but guided by 
the precepts of true Philosophy, "1 or sound reason. This is quite clearly 
a conception of imagination that differs in more than degree from that which 
Shakespear found common to "the lunatic, the lover, and the poet." It does no 
less than allow to imagination the highest place among the human faculties. 
Such a conception could scarcely fail to attract notice, if only for its 
originality; it did in fact do more, for like the other aspects of Hobbs 
theory of imagination already discussed, it was taken to be true in 
essentials, and so came in tiii!e to be accepted almost generally as the 
traditional view of the offices of the creative imagination. 
The comparative neglect of the problem of the creative imagination is 
probably due largely to the difficulty in reconciling the theories of 
imagination proposed by Hobbes with the determinism of his philosophy. There 
are references to the faculty of invention in the critical essays of Dryden, 
but while these indicate an acquaintance with the theories of Hobbes, there 
is no attempt to follow any further the lines of thought proposed by him. 
The case of Dennis is more complicated, for his theory of genius is composed 
of such diverse elements that it is difficult to say how far when forming it 
he drew upon th:: philosophy of Hoboes. Professor Hooker, in his edition of 
Dennis's Critical Works, and Professor Thorpe agree that Dennis was influenced 
by Hobbes, but differ as to the extent of his indebtedness. Shaftesbury at 
no time tries to work out a comprehensive theory of the processes of artistic 
creation, and Addison's interest is rather in the pleasure given to the 
imagination by nature and works of art than in the active imagination. 
Once again therefore Mayne's Two Dissertations is the first work in which 
it is possible to discern clearly the influence of the theories of 
1 
Answer; ks., vol.iv,p.449 
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Hobbes. Mayne attributes to the imagination when under the control of reason 
"that noble faculty of the mind called invention, "1 and adds that, though men's 
ideas of external objects are in all probability the same, "there is no end of 
the changes and variations that may be made in ideas by men's imaginations 
operating differently in them. "2 Mayne accepts almost without examination 
the exalted position given to the imagination in the system of Hobbes. "tl 
lively or sprightly imagination....when it hath great natural parts joined 
with it....is what denominates a genius for poetry....or any other performances 
that require a quick and lively invention, and where imagery is made use of. "3 
The identification of imagination and artistic genius brings together 
became 
the Hobbesian conception of the imagination, and the idea of genius which vas 
current at the beginning of the eighteenth century, and which may fairly be 
represented by Sir William Temple's definition of it as "the pure and free gift 
of heaven and of nature. "4 Temple had also, it is true, observed that a 
"sprightly imagination or fancy" and an "universal genius *4 were qualities 
necessary to a poet, but he did not identify them. Mayne then has same claim 
to be considered the first to assign genius to the imagination, though he did 
so almost casually, and did not try to analyse genius as a separate faculty as 
did Duff and Gerard later in the century. Both these writers worked out 
theories of genius which could still in all essentials be reconciled with 
the fundamental positions of Hobbes, and which therefore deserve special 
attention. 
Duff held that genius consists in the combination of the three powers 
of imagination, judgment, and taste; no one of the three taken by itself 





aks. vol. i,p.236 
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constitutes genius, but imagination is the most essential, for all discoveries in 
science and art, except such as`are made by chance, are due to its exertions. 
Duff defines imagination as that faculty which "assembles the various ideas.... 
treasured up in the memory....and which by its plastic power of inventing new 
associations of ideas and combining them with infinite variety, is enabled to 
present a creation of its own. "l This agrees with the theories of Hobbes 
to a4 remarkable extent, and almost certainly derives from them. How 
but 
Duff came to inherit these ideas is less evident, amid direct knowledge of the 
Wk;c.h 
works a Hobbes, certain &y cannot be ruled out . The task of tracin; such ideas 
to their sources is made no easier by the fact that eighteenth century 
aestheticians do not abound in a.cknauledgments of their debts to other writers. 
Gerard, in his Essay on Genius, considers genius as a "distinct 
intellectual power, "2 and identifies it with the faculty of invention, or 
"the capacity of producing new beauties in works of art, and new truths in 
works of science.i3 This capacity is, according to Gerard, generally 
referred to the imagination as one of its sources: and there are obvious 
similarities between Gerard's idea of genius and the earlier conceptions of 
the creative imagination. His view of the power of genius in collecting 
materials for its ends and disposing of them in an effective way differs little 
from Hobbes's idea of imagination working under the supervision of judgment. 
Gerard does however introduce a new factor by making these powers work 
together, for "genius arranges its ideas by the same operation, and almost at 
the same time that it collects them. "4 This keeps genius quite distinct from 
imagination, and provides some justification for Gerard's recognition of 
1 Original Genius, p.6 
On Genius, , p.6 
4 ibid. p.27 
ibid. p.63 
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genius as a gift from heaven. 
Other writers too define genius in terms of the creative imagination, 
though all do not attach the same importance to the need for a controlling 
judgment. Shenstone considers that men of genius are those possessed of 
a "true and genuine fancy....whether assisted or not by cultivation, "1 and 
contrasts them with men of understanding, in whom "sound judgment" 
predominates. Bethune writes that "the joint exercise of the understanding 
and the imagination, exploring the region of possibilities, and collecting 
materials for accomplishing or facilitating some end, otherwise unattainable, 
is called invention, "2 and adds that an exceptional natural capacity for 
invention is called genius. Sherlock believes that anyone who has enough 
strength of imagination to produce something new, however small, deserves 
the name of genius, which consists in the "union of a sound judgment and a 
superior imagination. "3 
It is not however only in the development of a theory of the creative 
imagination par excellence, or genius, that traces of Hob bests doctrines 
can be found. Váhenever the imagination is recognised as a distinct faculty 
with creative powers, we shall find that the conception is consistent with, 
even if it is not always based on, Hobbests analysis of the powers of 
imagination. As early as 1724, Fiddes refers to the creative power of the 
imagination, which he attributes to its capacity for "painting" in the mind 
representations of objects, and supposing things that have no existence: thus 
the imagination "makes new worlds and annihilates them again at pleasure, in 
a moment. e4 Burke too considers that imagination can "represent at pleasure 
1 
üalcs. vol. ii, 
2 a Short View 








the images of things in the order and manner in which they were received by 
the senses, "1 or can combine them in a "new manner, and-according to a different 
order, "1 It is therefore the source of "whatever is called Nit, invention, 
fancy, and the like. "1 When Dr. Johnson writes that "imagination selects 
ideas from the treasures of remembrance, and produces novelty only by varied 
combinations, "2 he is adding nothing to Hob bests "memory begets fancy, and 
fancy begets the ornaments of a poem. "3 Lord Monboddo says much the same 
thing in a new way 'when he divides imagination into a retentive part, which 
keeps the ideas which we h_:ve received from sense, and an active part which 
calls up ideas, unites them in various combinations, and presents them to 
the mind on particular occasions.4 Beattie considers that, in the language 
of modern philosophy, imagination may be either the "power of apprehending or 
conceiving ideas as they are in themselves, without any view to their reality: 
and secondly, the power of combining into new forms....those thoughts, ideas, 
or motions which we have derived from experience or information. ßr5 And 
Harpur, writing in 1810, believes that imagination "actively combines the 
various images suggested by the senses and treasured in the memory, and thence 
creates numerous objects, entirely original."6 
If it is justifiable to hold that the attribution to the imagination 
of the ability to make discoveries in both art and science has its source in 
the doctrines of Hobbes, there is further cause to see in his theory of 
imagination the basis of nearly all speculation on the subject during the 
eighteenth century. Thus Hartley defines the faculty of invention as the art 
1 Wks. vol.ii,p.71 
2 Idler no.44 
3 Answer: Wks. vol.iv,p.449 
4 
Ancient Metaphysics; vol.ii,p.259 
5 Dissertations, p.74 
6 Essay, p.240 
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of producing new beauties in works of imagination, and new truths in science, 
and Reid notes that it may be applied to mechanics, science, life, poetry, edit 
or the fine arts. The unknown author of Letters to a Young Nobleman held that 
as the genius of Newton could not be explained by "depth of judgment" alone, 
"the strongest imagination must have been necessary. "1 Dugald Stewart 
remarks that the faculty of invention in the arts and sciences has a striking 
resemblance to the powers of wit and fancy, and Harpur defines genius as a 
power which may either invent something new or discover something unknown, and 
then refers ti-.e two capacities to the arts and sciences respectively. 
A quotation from Dugald Stewart conveniently sums up the results of much 
of this speculation in a way both interesting and significant& 
"Imagination is a complex power. It includes conception, or simple 
apprehension, which enables us to form a notion of those former objects of 
perception or of laio-wledge, out of which we are to make a selection; 
abstraction, which separates the selected materials from the qualities or 
circumstances which are connected with them in nature: and judgment or taste 
which selects their materials, and directs their combination: and.....we may 
add fancy, which presents to our choice all the different materials which are 
subservient to the efforts of imagination, and which may therefore be 
considered as forming the groundwork of poetical genius. "2 
Dugald Stewart was not a notably original thinker, and h -s views may fairly 
be taken as representative of general opinion on the subject at the end of 
the century. This passage shows, therefore, how very little the basic 
positions of Hobbes had been altered by over a hundred years of aesthetic 
1 Letters to a Young Nobleman, p.198 
2 Human Mind, V,ii,p.206 
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speculation, and reinforces my argument that Hobbes's conception of 
imagination is accepted, implicitly or explicitly, by nearly all inquirers into 
relevant aesthetic subjects during the eighteenth century.1 
1 
It is important to remember that the steady growth of romanticism during 
the eighteenth century may have had much to do with the contemporary 
attitude to imagination. It has not been possible to discuss this 
problem here, as to do so might have distracted attention from the main 
argument. 
CHAPTER II 
HOBBES, LOCKE,, AND TEE FUNCTIONS OF JUDGMENT 
1. The Rational Control of Fancy. 
As we have already seen, Hobbes considered that "fancy without the help 
of judgment is not commended as a virtue.i' This view was unquestioningly 
accepted by the vast majority of eighteenth century writers, who tended to 
believe in the absolute supremacy of reason, and therefore insisted that 
imagination should be subordinated to it. The qualities of imagination have 
already been dealt with, and I now propose to try to isolate the complementary 
and restraining faculty which is considered along with imagination in all the 
aesthetic speculation of this period, and which is called at different times 
judgment, understanding, and reason. This again involves discussion of a 
theory that was in popular circulation long before it was expressed in terms 
of mental philosophy, and again Hobbes is the first to consider the faculty 
concerned from a philosophic angle. 
One of Hobbes's clearest definitions of this particular aspect of the 
functions of judgment is to be found in the weil -known passage beginning, 
"Memory begets judgment and fancy: judgment begets the strength and structure 
and fancy begets the ornaments of a poem. "2 In Leviathan too however he deals 
1 Leviathan, I,viii,p.44 
2 Answer; ;ÿks., vol.iv,p.449 
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with this subject at sane length in a passage in which he gives to his theories 
a more general application. The arguments there adv need point out the 
extreme danger of ungoverned fancy, which can at times be little better 
than madness. The judgment must always be at hand to save it from such 
extravagance; sometimes, as in the writing of History, it must be allowed to 
take complete control, but at other times it must serve rather as a restraint 
on the imagination, and must prevent it from indulging in what Hobbes calls 
"indiscretion. "l Finally, in the introduction to his translation of Homer, 
written a quarter of a century later, Hobbes again defines the function of 
judgment in writing poetry. "Fancy flies abroad swiftly to bring in both 
matter and words, but if there be not discretion at home to distinguish which are 
fit to be used and which not....their delight and grace is lost. "2 
Thus Hobbes insists on the constant co- operation of imagination and 
judgment in the creative artist; sometimes the one will predominate, sometimes 
the other, but both are always necessary. As Professmr Thorpe has sho-;n.,3 
this theory was at once adopted by Hob-Jests contemporaries, as for example by 
Walter Charleton, who often uses almost the same words as Hobbes when 
repeating that the judgment must maintain control over the fancy. Dryden, in 
his Dedication of the Spanish Friar, says that no really great play can be 
"produced at a heat, or by the force of fancy, without the maturity of 
judgment, "4 and Sir William Temple considers that as well as the power of 
invention, there is necessary "a great calm to judge and correct.r5 Thus 
by the end of the seventeenth century the need for imagination and judgment 
to work together in the work of artistic creation was widely acknowledged. 
It is at this point necessary to note that Hobbes is not wholly 
1 
Leviathan, I,viii,p.44 
3 op. cit., , p.179 
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consistent in his use of the word judgment. It is frequently employed 
in the sense in which we are now considering it - that of a faculty possessing 
discretionary powers which may be invoked in cases of imaginative extravagance. 
But he also uses it on occasion for man's ability to distinguish clearly 
between ideas which seem identical to the casual observer; and in this sense 
it will be considered more fully when we come to deal withmit. It is in this 
latter sense, however, that the word is generally used in the philosophy of 
Locke, by whom judgment is clearly regarded as of less importance than either 
understanding or reason. 
The place of honour among the human faculties, alldted to imagination 
in the system of Hobbes, is given by Locke to the understanding. "Whatsoever 
faculties (a man) employs, the understanding with such light as it has, well or 
ill- informed, constantly leads; and by that light, true or false, all his 
operative powers are directed.r' For Locke the chief instrument of the 
understanding is reason; by it alone can we set about enlarging our stock of 
knowledge. Locke classes the operations of reason under four heads or 
"degrees"2; these are the discovery of truths, the regular and methodical 
disposition of them when discovered, the perceiving of their connections, and 
the drawing of correct conclusions from them. As Locke showed little interest in 
aesthetic matters, we find no specific attempt on his part to apply his 
analysis of the understanding to the arts. It would nevertheless be surprising 
if Lockets emphasis on reason had not in some may affected speculation on 
the relations between judgment and imagination, and traces of such influence 
are undoubtedly found. But on the whole the basic relationship between th two 
2 Essay, IV,xvii,3 
Conduct of the Understanding, 1. 
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yb aesthet clans 
faculties as it had been defined by Hobbes remained unchallengedAthroughout 
the century, with only very occasional deviations in one direction or another. 
One of the more unusual theories is that advanced by Leonard vdelsted, 
one cf the earliest translators of Longinus. Welsted, a firm believer in 
the primacy of reason, had the original idea of representing imagination as 
a component part of reason. He begins by laying down that "everything depends 
on reason and must be governed by it, "1 but adds that "reason operates 
differently when it has different things for its object: poetical reason is 
not the same as mathematical reason. "1 Having thus prepared the way, Vielsted 
proceeds to consider the specia 1 case of poetry. "Poetry depends much more 
on imagination than the other arts; but it is not on that account less 
reasonable than they: for imagination is as much a part of reason as is memory 
or judgment, or rather a more bright emanation from it; as to paint and throw 
light upon ideas is a finer act of the understanding than simply to separate 
or compare them. "1 This rather extreme statement can certainly not be 
attributed to the direct influence of Locke, but it may fairly be argued that 
it represents an attitude, that of tryingto reduce all mental activity to the 
operations of reason, which may have found some encouragement in the rationalist 
parts of his philosophy. 
Welsted's theory was an isolated phenomenon without parallel in the 
eighteenth century, and Richard Fiddes, writing in the same year as Welsted, 
expresses the more orthodox view that imagination should be laid under some 
"wholesome and convenient restraints if we would not suffer ourselves to be 
carried away with it, with a blind impulse,....beyond all bounds.i2 This is 
also the opinion of Ldward Young, author of Night Thoughts, who in his short 
l Epistles, Odes, etc., p.xxii 
2 Of Morality, p.187 
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essay On Lyric Poetry argues that judgment, "that masculine power of the 
mind;1 should reign supreme over all poetical composition, for only when the 
imagination is thus subordinated can we look for "the fairest offspring of the 
human mind. "1 . The same idea recurs in David Hume who says, less 
picturesquely than Young, that "without judgment as well as taste and invention 
a poet cannot hope to succeed. "2 
first 
It is just after the middle of the century that the /Clear signs of the 
influence of Locke are to be found. John Brown, perhaps better known as 
'Estimate' Brown,comes in his Essay on Ridicule to consider the relation 
between reason and imagination, and though he distributes his favours fairly 
evenly, he eventually decides that the reason is the superior faculty, for 
it alone is the "detector of falsehood and the test of truth. "3 Reason 
cannot however attain to any degree of perfection unless it is united with a 
strong imagination, for alone it "can not search out new ideas, but only 
compare and distinguish those which sense and imagination present to her. "4 
Therefore, Brown concludes, just as some form of rational control is necessary 
to the "perfection of works of imagination: so....it is evident that a full 
union of imagination is necessary to the perfect operations of reason. "5 
That this is not a mere change in terminology involving the substitution of 
reason for judgment seems apparent from the functions Brown has allowed to 
reason, all of which are consistent with Locke's definition of it: once ideas 
are presented to it, reason can compare and distinguish them, and arrive at 
truth. 
Duff's description of the functions of judgment in composition also samess 
1 
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RIM seems to derive from Lockets reason rather than from the more usual 
conception of judgment, for Duff holds that, in addition to comparing the 
ideas collected by imagination and observing their "agreement or disagreement, " 1 
the judgment must "determine the truth and utility of the inventions or 
discoveries produced by the power of the ins. gination. "1 It is therefore 
"5n every respect a counter -balance to the r 'ambling and volatile power of 
imagination.. "2 This tendency to amalgamate the functions of judgment, 
-r 
reason, and understanding is her illustrated in Ogilvie, who allots to the 
understanding the work of disposing the parts of a composition:in an orderly 
manner, and adds that it must also "curb even the most eccentric imagination 
with so strong a rein as to fix it to one place as long as may be expedient."3 
Later in the same work, Ogilvie argues that "there is no surer test of a good 
judgment in composition than when a comprehensive memory and a luxuriant imaginatim 
are subordinate to the understanding. "4 The' direct influence of Locke seems 
again probable in the case of Stedman, who defines judgment as "that faculty 
of the mind by which it discriminates its ideas, discovers their agreements, 
their differences, and relations to one another, and thereupon draws conclusions."5 
Stedman regards the imagination, whose task it is to collect materials for this 
faculty, as the "handmaid to the genius and to the judgment.i6 
An even more determined attempt than any of these to bring the Lockean 
reason within the ambit of the almost universally accepted "judgment and 
imagination" formula is found in Gerardts Essay on Genius. Gerard eatiEsida- 
attacks Lockets statement of the four degrees of reason, and re- allocates two 
Original Genius, p.8 
2 ibid., p.9 
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two'of them, the discovery and the disposition of truths, as functions belonging 
more properly to the imagination. This leaves to reason the offices of 
connecting truths and drawing conclusions from them, and on the basis of this 
new division Gerard establishes the relation between reason and imagination 
in cases of genius: reason when alone "implies not genius but capacity; 
without it, no inventions can be completed; but without imagination they can 
not be begun."1 Thus even the declared doctrine of Locke is converted to 
conform with the old division of labour by which imagination provides the 
materials and judgment disposes them. 
This part of the problem is easily sum,ed up. The union of judgment 
and imagination was one too popular not to receive a good deal of attention, 
and if the credit must go to Hobbes for first expressing it philosophically, 
it is well to remember that these faculties had been considered as 
complementary for some time before he did so. Their interdependence Was 
almost unanimously recognised by the eighteenth century aestheticians, and 
it provided for that rational control of imagination that was demanded in 
what has came to be known as the "Age of Reason." Lockets influence did not 
dtturb this already -established harmony, although it did at times encourage 
a change of emphasis by making men take a slightly different view of the 
relationship between the two faculties. But it is interesting to note 
that Harpur, writing more than a decade after the appearance of the Lyrical 
Ballads, still considered that "reason is therefore the supreme faculty, by 
whose superintendance the other two (i.e. memory and imagination) are guided, 
and on whose influence their utility depends. "2 This proves, if anything, that 
Jeffrey was by no means alone in adopting a strictly commonsense attitude in 
literary criticism. 
1 On Genius, , p.35 
Essay, p.241 
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2. The Rational Element in Taste. 
Vhen at the beginning of the eighteenth century aestheticians first 
tried to answer the difficult question 'hdhat is taste ? ", the recognised 
conjunction of taste and imagination suggested a possible solution too obvious 
to be entirely overlooked. Addison found himself faced by the problem in a 
form that was to cause his successors a considerable de:l of perplexity; 
we find one transported with a passage which another reads over with coldness 
and indifference."' As he could assume the e1;.istence of a standard of taste 
with an ease that would sc:. :rcely have been possible fifty years later, Addisen 
was able to propose a solution based simply on the union of judgment and 
imagination. "This difference in taste must proceed either from the 
perfection of imagination in one more than in another, or from the different 
ideas that several readers affix to the same words....The fancy must be warm, 
to retain the print of those images it hath received from outward objects, 
and the judgment discerning, to know what expressions are most proper to clothe 
and adorn them to the best advantage."' If taken out of its context, this 
might well be misinterpreted as a reference to the creative rather than to the 
receptive faculty. This is not altogether surprising, as this is what had 
been intended by Hobbes when he first defined the relationship between 
imagination and judgment; and he can therefore claim some of the credit for 
Addison's attempt at analysing taste. But it can net be said with any 
certainty that Addison got the hint direct from Hobbes, and it is at least 
equally probable that it came to him from one of the writers who had 
accepted and made use of the connection suggested by Hobbes. 




followed Addison's example of trying to explain taste on the basis of the 
union of judgment and imagination. There are however exceptions. One of 
these is Gerard, who considered that taste "consists in certain excellences of 
our original powers of judgment and imagination combined. "1 Stedman holds 
that in "acquiring, correcting, or improving taste,.....the senses, the 
judgment, and the imagination have their shares; "2 and an anonymous essayist 
writing in 1785 argues that though taste is composed of all the human 
faculties, "its perception seems to be shared between the judgment and the 
imagination. "3 A partial exception may also be made in the case of Burke, 
whose introductory essay On Taste is largely derived from Addison's theories, 
which are frequently referred to throughout. After a good deal of preliminary 
discussion Burke, having rejected sense and imagination, selects judgment as 
the essential characteristic of taste; he does however add that a "degree of 
sensibility is requisite to form a good judgment. "4 Thus for Burke wrong 
taste can be due only to defects in the judgment arising from natural weakness 
of understanding, want of practice in judging, or pervzrsian of the judgment 
frani either ignorance or prejudice. 
Burke's emphasis on judgment finds an echo in certain of the accounts of 
taste which appeared in the second half of the century, and it is interesting 
to set beside it Hume's view, published in the same year, that "reason if not 
an essential part of a good taste is at least requisite to its operations. "5 
Sherlock considered that taste was "a combination of judgment and feeling, "6 
and Reid too held that judgment was a necessary constituent of taste. On 
1 
2 Laelius and Hortensia, p.36 
On Taste, II,iii,p.l04 
4 
Enquiry concerning the Principles of Taste, p.35 
Wks., vol.ii,p.79 




the whole, however, opinion tended to favour the view that taste was a form of 
sensibility. This was a not unnatural consequence of the popularity of the 
theory of an internal sense of beauty which had been developed by Hutcheson and 
others, and not until this theory vas show,. to be untenable do we get a serious 
attempt to re- define taste in terms Of judgment. Thus though many writers 
note that taste is subject to the control of reason, judgment plays a far 
smaller part in the many theories of taste than might have been expected. 
3. Judgment as opposed to Wit. 
Professor Thorpe has rightly said that "Hobbes's use of terms is often 
tantalizing. "1 This is in certain cases so true as to be a serious defect 
in Hobbes's expression of his philosophy, but fortunately the terms concerned 
are often used in such a way as to make the sense apparent on closer 
examination. This may be said to be the case in his use of the word judgment, 
and we are seldom left in much doubt as to whether Hobbes is employing the 
s ecif ic 
word in its 
looms 
P or in is more ' sense. The latter use is 
defined very clearly by Hobbes himself when he says that men who "observe their 
differences and dissimilitudes (i.e. of phantasms), which is called 
distinguishing, and discerning, and judging between thing and thing, in case 
such discerning be not easy, are said to have a good judgment. "2 Elsewhere 
he repeats that "he who thinketh, compareth the phantasms that pass, that is, 
taketh notice of their likeness or unlikeness to one another. And as he that 
observes readily the likeness of things of different natures....is said to 
have a good fancy: so he is said to have a good judgment that finds out 
the uillikenesses or differences of things that are like one another."6 Here 
1 m . cit., p , p.116 
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the judgment is placed in direct opposition to the fancy, and the definition 
of it is at the same timo a narrowing -doom of the functions of the faculty 
that 'begets the strength and structure of a poem, or w:ich after examining 
all the parts of nature, is acle to register oy letters their order, causes, 
uses, differences and resemblances."' The function of judgment when taken 
in the more limited sense is clear: it is the faculty whose duty -it is to 
discriminate between seeming similitudes discovered and submitted to it by 
the fancy, and which rejects those figures or images which it considers 
extravagant. 
This conception of judgment became almost immediately popular, and 
was common currency before the end of the seventeenth century. It is found in 
both Dryden and Sir William Temple, the latter of wham sums up a discussion as 
to the respective functions of wit and judgment by remarking that "it is the 
true wonder of poetry that such contraries must meet to compose it."2 Nor is 
it surprising to find the same definition of judgment in Locke, for a faculty 
with functions thus limited could be made to servo a very useful purpose in 
his doctrine of the understanding. Hence Locke takes judgment as man's 
ability to have ideas which are unconfused, and "to distinguish one thing from 
another where there is but the least difference; "3 and he goes on to emphasise 
the fact that it is naturally opposed to wit, which he defines in terms similar 
to Hobbes's description of fancy. This distinction, which will be examined 
in more detail in the next chapter, was approved and adopted by Addison, 
.and owing to the long- continued popularity of the Spectator in the eighteenth 
century, was thus given even more prominence than it might otherwise have had. 
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and fancy is interesting, because out of it, alongside the generally accepted 
idea that judgment and imagination worked in comparative harmony, there grew 
up an opposite school of thought which held that these two faculties were 
in fact irreconcilable, and worked against each other mather than together. 
Hence we find Sir Hildebrand Jacob lamenting that the "fancy and judgment are 
differently employed: while the first is busied in throwing things together, 
the other is perpetually dividing them again. "1 Burke too in his introductory 
essay notes that "the judgment is for the greater part employed in throwing 
stumbling blocks in the way of imagination, in dissipating the scenes of its 
enchantment, and in tying us down to the disagreeable yoke of our reason. "2 
It is no doubt the acceptance of this point of view that led him to maintain that. 
"ho work of art can be great but as it deceives: to be otherwise is the 
prerogative of Nature. "3 The same opposition is pointed out by a writer in the 
Gentleman's Magazine for November, 1787, but in this instance the more popular 
view eventually triumphs. "The offices of imagination and judgment are not 
only distinct, but contrary to each other. It is the business of imagination 
either to collect ideas already adopted, or to create new images: but the 
work of judgment is to separate what may have been collected, and to reject 
many conceptions of a productive genius. Yet....where they both unite, there 
is excellence. "4 
The opinion that imagination and judgment are opposed one to the other 
is, admittedly, held rarely. The interesting thing is that it should have 
been held at all wten the majority of writers accepted unhesitatingly to 
more usual view that, imagination and judgment were necessary and mutually 
helpful constituents of man's power to create by means of art. The survival. 
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of the contrary idea may well be connected with an earlier distrust of the 
imagination, seen to a certain extent in the works of Locke, and expressed with scare 
emphasis by Mayne. "The imagination is almost continually, in some degree or 
other, hurtful and prejudicial to the u4derst_:.nding, "1 and, Mayne, adds, "the 
mind suffers very much in its moral capacities from the imagination. "1 In 
general, hovrever, the attitude to judgment and imagination varies remarkably 
little from that of Hobbes. Opinions often differ as to the exact role to be 
played by judgment, and there i5 a good deal of confusion over the question of 
the spheres of fancy and imagination; but imagina.tion.remains the venturesome 
and creative power, and judgment has always the task of either superintending 
or restraining its op_:rutions. 
1 Two Dissertaions, p.82 
CHAPTER III 
HOBBES LOCKE, AND THE THEORY OF THE COMIC 
1. The Nature of Wit. 
Though Hobbes is clear enough in his definition of wit, it is perhaps 
unfortunate that the rather overworked terms fancy and judgment had to occur 
again. Both words are used in the limited sense referred to at the beginning 
of the third section of the last chapter, as will be quite obvious from the 
following passage: 
"The contrary hereunto (t.e. to dullness) is that quick ranging of 
mind which is joined with curiosity of c anparing the things that come into the 
mind, one with another: in which comparison, a man delighteth himself either 
with finding unexpected similitudes of things otherwise much unlike, in which 
men place excellency of fancy....or else in discerning suddenly dissimilitude 
in things that otherwise appear the same (judgment) -and both fancy and 
judgment are commonly comprehended under the name wit. *1 
The definitions of wit in Leviathan do not differ materially from this, but it 
is emphasised that the similitudes discovered by fancy must be "such as are 
rarely observed by others, "2 and that judgment is good only if "such discerning 
be not easy. "2 The gist of what follows is that fancy, unless tempered with 
discretion,is not wit; but that judgment, which presupposes such discretion, 
1 Human Nature; 'irks., vol.iv :I,x,p.4 
2 Leviathan, I,viii,p.43 
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may be a source of wit without the help:of fancy. 
At the same time, while the above probably represents the considered 
view of Hobbes, it must be remembered that id one passage in "Leviathan he 
seems to identify wit with good fancy. As Hobbes may have assumed that a 
"good" fancy included a measure of discretion, this is not necessarily an 
inconsistency, and Hobbes in ,other places refers to the opinion that wit 
consists in fancy rather than in any other "intellectual virtue" as being 
a popular one. It is interesting tò note that in his early criticism, at 
any rate, Dryden seems to have inclined to the popular theory, for in 1667 
he states that written wit is "no bther, than the faculty of imagination in 
the writer, "1 and illustrates his point with a metaphor which is manifestly 
a borrowing from Hobbes. 
Locke too has left us a definition of wit, and by doing so has given 
Professor Thorpe an opportunity to compare his acumen in aesthetic matters with 
that of Hobbes, much to the latter's advantage. Wit, according to Locke, consists 
chiefly in assembling ideas, and putting them together with quickness and variety 
when they resemble each other, so as to make agreeable pictures in the fancy. 
Thus Locke, like Dryden in the passage just quoted, makes wit consist solely 
in what Hobbes would have called fancy - that is, in the ability to find 
similitudes, but omits the important proviso that such similitudes must be 
unexpected or rare, and must occasion a feeling of delight in whoever perceives 
them. 
The absence of these qualifications from Locke's definition lends a 
particular interest to _',ddison's treatment of wit in the Spectator.2 Addison 
opens his paper by quoting Locke's "admirable reflection upon the difference of 
1 
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wit and judgment" in its entirety, and praises it as the "best and most 
philosophical account" of wit that he knowsi but hastens to point out that 
though wit gen rally consists in the resemblance and congruity of ideas, such is 
not always the case. He then adds to Locke's account, "by way of explanation, 
that every resemblance of ideas is not that which we call wit, unless it be 
such an one that gives delight and surprise to the reader." Whether or not 
this most important modification in Locke's theory is due to the influence of 
Hobbes is a very open question; but I cannot believe that Addison had not 
in mind the passage from Human Nature quoted above.l It must be remembered 
that less than three weeks earlier, in his paper on laughter, Addison had 
claimed familiarity with Hobbes's Human Nature, and had indeed referred to it 
as "much the best of all his works. "2 In view of this, it is highly 
probable that the credit for Addison's "explanation" of Locke's account of wit 
is due to Hobbes. 
Moreover, Addison concludes his paper on wit by admitting that "not 
only the resemblance but the opposition of ides does very often produce 
wit." This may be a concession to Hobbes's judgment, or the discerning of 
dissimilitudes between ideas: and taken with the other details which Addison has 
added to Lockets definition of wit, makes the latter so like that of Hobbes 
as to be almost indistinguishable from it. The importance of t:i.s as regards 
the extent of Hobbes's influence on eighteenth century views of wit is very 
considerable. If Addison had been content to accept Locke's ideas as they 
stood, it is certain tht wit as conceived by Hobbes would have been paid 
far less attention than it in fact received, though open acknowledgments of 
1 See page 32 note 1 
2 Spectator, no. 47 
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such influence are very rare. As it is, we may say with some truth that 
eighteenth century specuhtion on the subject of wit owed much to the work 
of both Hobbes and Locke; but that their theories were, more often than not, 
known through the intermediacy of Addison's papers in the Spectator, though 
there were no doubt cases of writers who went straight to the original sources. 
There are two other points in xddison's account which deserve some notice. 
The first is his approval of Lockets dictum that men who h,ve great wit and 
prompt memories have not allays the clearest judgment or deepest reason, for 
"wit lies in the assembling of ideas, while judgment is known in separating 
them carefully." The other is his refusal to allow that any form of verbal 
wit is true wit; plays on words, or quibbles, are unhesitatingly classed as 
false wit. The only correct form of wit is that whose objects are ideas. 
This too in all probability derives from Locke, who had insisted that words 
in themselves were meaningless unless they stood for distinct ideas. 
The doctrines provided by the efforts of Hobbes, Locke, and Addison 
were the starting -point for most of the theories of wit advanced during the 
eighteenth century. when Sir Rich:.rd Blackmore, writing as early as 1716, 
defines wit as "the accomplis#ment of a warm, sprightly and fertile 
imagination, in which is a great variety of ideas," and which "always conveys 
the idea in a pleasing but foreign dress, "1 he has clearly benefitted from 
the analyses made by his predecessors; and his support for the view that 
wit is the work of the imagination was echoed by many other writers. Likewise, 
when Dr. Johnson holds that wit is a "combinaticn of dissiiilar images, or 
discovery of occult resemblances in things unlike, "2 he is not really adding 
anything to what has already been said on the subject. 
1 Essays, p.193 
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The importance of the elements of surprise and delight received 
varying emphasis. Hartley accounts for the pleasure arising from 
figurative language as due to the surprise consequent on the sudden 
discovery of propriety in ghat was at first sight an example of impropriety. 
Karnes, in his definition of wit, argues that it should occasion some degree 
of surprise by singularity,1 and Beattie too stresses the fact that the 
relation discovered by wit must be an unexpected one.2 Sherlock agrees 
with Addison that delight and surprise are both essential, and expresses the 
opinion that delight is "more particularly necessary. "3 Dugald Stewart 
also insists on the necessity for surprise, and suggests that it is to a 
large extent caused by the "unusual command which a man of wit has 
acquired over a part of t:-_e constitution which is so little subject to the 
will. "4 Campbell is more explicit than any of these: the end of wit, he 
says, is "to excite in the mind an agreeable surprise, "5 which may arise 
either "from the imagery she employs, or the strange assemblage of related 
ideas presented to the mind. "5 
Recognition of the need for surprise is found even in conceptions of 
wit which in other respects are beginning to develop along new lines. 
Thus Jackson considers wit as "the dexterous performance of a legerdemain 
trick, by which one idea is presented and another substituted. In the 
performance of this trick, an opposition of terms is frequently though 
not always necessary. The effect produced is an agreeable surprise, 
arising from expecting one thing and finding another, or expecting nothing 
and finding something. "6 And Mangin, writing in 1809, considers that 
1 Wks. (1617), vol.iv,p.342 
2 Dissertations, p.586 
3 Letters, vol.i,p.60 
4 Human Mind, V,i,4(p.270) 
5 Philosophy of Rhetoric, vol.i,p.4 
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"wit consists in combining apparently incongruous objects by means of 
unexpected relations. "1 These examples show that the quality of unexpectedness,. 
with the consequent production of surprise, received adequate notice in 
Addison's successors, and this may justifiably be traced back to Hobbes's 
insistence on this element in all his definitions of vit. 
On the other hand, Hobbes's attempt to unite fancy and judgment under 
the common name of wit does not seem to have found much favour, perhaps 
because Addison paid no attention to it. There may be a reminiscence 
of this idea in Berkeley's "wit without wisdom, if there be such a thing, 
is hardly worth finding; "2 but there is no reason to connect it with Hobbes. 
Sherlock, writing in 1781, thinks that before any resemblance discovered 
by the fancy can be considered just, it must be examined by the judgment, 
for "otherwise the fancy will act at random, and for one just trait of wit 
will produce ten false ones."3 Jackson quotes Sterne, with whom he agrees 
on this point, as saying that wit and judgment go together in that wit 
is often governed by judgment, though the converse is not true.4 These 
are however such isolated instances that we can safely assume that Lockets 
distinction between wit and judgment was more influential than Hobbes's 
partial identification of them. 
Confirmation of this may be found in the support given to the contra- 
distinction made by Locke. Blackmore considers that wit and discretion are 
rarely found together, and that it is only with great difficulty that 
both can ever be "incorporated in the constitution of any individual. "5 
1 Pleasures from Literary Compositions, p.363 
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Burke refers with approval to Lockets distinction, and adds that wit and 
judgment are so different that a union of them is "one of the rarest things 
in the world."' This view is accepted by Kames, who says that wit and 
memory go together, but not wit and judgment : "wit....is in a good measure 
incompatible with solid judgment; which neglecting trivial relations, 
adheres to what are substantial and permanent. "2 Finally Knight, whose 
Principles of Taste appeared in 1805, expresses the old opinion that the two 
faculties are opposite, because wit is concerned with resemblances and 
judgment with differences; and he appeals to both Locke and Burke as 
supporters of this view. 
A natural outcome of the recognition of an opposition between the 
functions of fancy and judgment is the tendency to confine wit to the 
discovery of resemblances between ideas. Hence Nettleton says that "wit 
by happy allusions shows us a surprising agreement between things which are 
thought to be quite different. "3 Me]moth, without making use of the word 
wit, refers to the pleasure given to the ima.;ination by "comparing distinct 
ideas and discovering their various resemblances.r4 Burke prefers wit - 
to judgment because "by making resemblances we produce new imnges: we unite, 
we create, we enlarge our stock. "1 Beattie who like Burke, refers to Lockets 
definition with approval, defines wit as the "unexpected discovery of 
resemb Lnce between ideas supposed dissimilar,r5 and agrees with Locke that 
it consists chiefly in the assemblage of ideas. Stedman also quotes Locke 
as an authority, and considers that wit "readily discovers the relations and 
1 Wks., vol.ii,p.72 
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resemblances of things; and by collating these, and framing from their 
assemblages....figures, thus suggests new and pleasant ideas to the imagination. "l'. 
After so much ready and often uncritical acceptance of Locke's opinion, it is 
quite refreshing to find Knight pointing out that wit, if tarn in the sense 
proposed by Locke, means "not merely pleasantry but the power of imagination 
in general. "2 
Despite Knight's criticism, it is clear that Locke had far more direct 
influence on the eighteenth century conception of wit than had Hobbes, and 
this despite the fact that of the two views that of Hobbes has a far sounder 
psychological basis. Few of the critics and aestheticians were unaware of 
Locke's views, even if only at second -hand through the passage quoted by 
Addison in the Spectator. At the same time, the adoption by Addison of 
certain of Hobbes's theories as explanations meant that the older 
philosopher too influenced speculation on this subject. Perhaps the fairest 
way of summing up would be to say that though Locke's idea of wit provided 
a basic and widely accepted definition, the survival of these Hobbesian 
ideas served as a corrective that was very frequently applied. 
2. Hobbes's Theory of Laughter. 
It is safe to say that no other single feature of Hobbes's philosophy 
attracted so much interested attention in the eighteenth century as did 
his theory of laughter. Although an intrinsic part of the "selfish 
philosophy" which proved so unpopular in that century, it provided a 
coherent and logical explanation of the phenomenon of laughter which no 
one examining the question could afford to overlook. Moreover, Hobbes's 
1 Laelius'and Hortensia, , p.72 
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theory was noticed and, -,vhat is more, upheld by Addison in the Spectator, 
and that alone was almost sufficient to ensure that it would not be ignored. 
The most complete account of laughter given by Hobbes is to be found in 
his Human Nature, and the later passage on the same subject in Leviathan 
adds nothing essential to it.. Hobbes begins by noting that every case of 
laughter can be accounted for by the same basic fact, which is a sudden and 
unexpected realisation of some superiority in ourselves. This realisation 
may come to us in various ways, but it always involves an act of comparison 
with a past or even imagined weakness of our own, or with the infirmities 
of other people: jokes please only in so far as they tell of absurdities in 
others which rouse such a feeling of superiority in our minds. Hobbes 
therefore concludes that "the passion of laughter is nothing else but a 
sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves 
by comparison with the infirmities of others, or with our awn formerly. "2 
This is so clear that it is unnecessary to enlarge upon it; the following short 
extract from Leviathan serves only to emphasise the stress Hobbes lays on 
unexpectedness. "In all cases both laughter and weeping are sudden motions, 
custom taking them both away. For no man laughs at old jests, or weeps 
for an old calamity. "3 
Addison's comments on Hobbes's theory are favourable,4despite his 
opening remark that in the light of what Hobbes has said we should, when 
1. Hobbes has also a passage on laughter in his De 
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we hear a man laugh excessively, tell him not that he is merry, but that he 
is very proud. In what follows, Addison ignores Hobbes's insistence on 
"suddenness," and we must concludd either that he failed to realise the 
importance attached to it by Hobbes, or that he considered it a relatively 
unimportant point. Addison adds very little to what Hobbes has said: his 
chief contributions are, first, that we may laugh at our superiors in matters 
in which they compare unfavourably with us; and second, that no man is 
regularly made a butt by others unless he has "a good deal of wit and 
vivacity, even in the ridiculous side of his character." In support of 
the latter contention, Addison brings forward as example Sir John Falstaff, 
who had thus described himself: "I am not only witty in myself, but the 
cause that wit is in other men." 
The first real opposition to Hobbes came from Hutcheson in a series of 
three letters which first appeared in the Dublin Journal in 1725, and were 
republished four years later in a collection called Hibernicus's Letters, 
made by James Arbuckle. Hutcheoon's principal argument was that men often 
laugh without comparing themselves to anything at all, so that "sudden glory" 
could not be a sound basis for an explanation of laughter. He put forward 
an alternative theory of his oval, which was very probably suggested by his 
reading of Hobbes, and instead of rejecting Hobbes's ideas outright, 
Hutcheson admitted that the-,): might explain cases of ridicule, which he 
considers as merely one species of laughter. 
Hutcheson's theory was based on the idea of contrast or incongruity. 
He began by pointing out that by associations of ideas made early in life we 
come to connect certain abstract ideas such as beauty or meanness with 
objects or actions to which they have no re..l relation. Hutcheson then 
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discloses his own theory of laughter. "Any little accident to which we 
have joined the idea of meanness, befalling a person of great gravity, 
ability, dignity, is a matter of laughter. "1 From this it follows that 
men's ideas of the ridiculous will vary greatly, with respect to both 
actions and characters, according to their ideas of what constitutes 
dignity. Hutcheson then goes on to consider ridicule in particular, but 
his remarks on this aspect of the subject will be considered in the next 
section. 
Hartley, too, dealt with the problem of laughter, but unlike Hutcheson he 
emphasised the necessity of surprise. Thus children laugh by wa,; of relief, 
when "a momentary fear occasioned by surprise "2 is removed. Adults laugh 
"only at such strokes of wit and humour as surprise by same more than 
ordinary degree of contrast or coincidence, and have at the same tine a due 
connection with pleasure and pain "2 and their various associations, as 
for example fitness or absurdity. Thus Hartley's theory- is, like Hutchesons's, 
a. modification of Hobbes's system rather than an essentially new one, for 
it retains the s :une basic features of comparison and surprise. 
Karnes distinguishes between the ludicrous, which includes everything 
that is sportive or jocular, and the risible, which causes laughter, and is 
only a species of the ludicrous. He points out the tart played by 
imagination, which multiplies without end the objects which cause laughter. 
According to Karnes, an object must fulfil two conditions before it can be 
classed as risible : it must appear trivial, and it must be in some way 
deforme& by excess or defect. Nothing that is beautiful or becoming can 
1 Hibernicus's Letters, p.91(1734ed'n) 
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be a fit subject for laughter. Improper actions, on the other hand, not 
only raise in us contempt, but also cause us to think'more highly of 
ourselves; and this is a fruitful source of the pleasure that we take in 
ridiculing others. From this Karnes deduces that "those who have most vanity are 
most prone to laugh at others."' Here again the theory advanced modifies 
the previous explanations instead of. putting forward sonething new. 
The next exhaustive treatment of the subject was Beattie's Essay on 
Laughter (1776). Beattie carefully distinguishes laughter from the emotion 
giving rise to it, and at once rejects the view that it can be due to a 
feeling of pride or superiority. He emphasises the difference between 
animal laughter, such as that caused by tickling, and sentimental laughter, 
to which he confines his inquiry, and which is the expression of an emotion 
excited by certain objects or ideas when they are presented to the mind. 
Beattiets investigations lead him to the conclusion that "an uncommon ' 
mixture of relation and contrariety exhibited or supposed to be united in 
the same assemblage "2 will provoke laughter unless a more powerful emotion 
is also felt at the same time. 
The subject of laughter was considered in two other books which 
appeared in the same year, namely Campbell's Philosophy of Illetoric, and 
the third volume of Lord ionboddo's Origin and Progress of Language. 
Monboddo holds that laughter is always caused by sane kind of deformity, 
and he related it to the feeling of contempt: pleasure in laughter proceeds 
from a conviction that we ourselves are free from the defect which we 
laugh at in others, and that we are therefore, in that respect at least, 
superior to them. Thus Monboddo has in effect restored Hobbes's 
1 Wks., vol.i,p.311 
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explanation, but he goes on to make one or two interesting remarks. 
Natural deformities, whether physical or mental, are no proper subjects for 
laughter; a deformed thing, to be laughable, must not have the power todo 
mischief; a deformed person is ridiculous only if he is vain and affected. 
Campbell's view is just the contrary. Laughter arises, not from contempt, 
but from the perception of oddity: and as this is only occasionally mixed 
with a feeling of contempt, there must often be laughter without contempt 
and contempt without laughter. Campbell attributes the "error" of 
Hobbes to his failure to realise that laughter may exist independently of 
contempt, and he concludes that the genuine object of laughter is always a 
group of things "in which there is some striking unsuitableness. "' 
Priestley, in a course of lectures published in the following year, has 
nothing new to suggest. "An object that is purely and simply risible, 
is anything in which there is perceived a great incongruity or disproportion, 
provided the object at the same time that it is of some consequence, be not 
capable of exciting a more serious emotion.i2 He allows that laughter may 
be mixed with contempt, and that when it is so the man who laughs does have 
an agreeable sense of his own superiority. But like Hutcheson he considers 
that when there is an admixture of contempt, the feeling is to be classed as 
ridicule and not pure laughter or mirth. 
The theory of Hobbes is once again revived and upheld by 'illiam 
Preston, in a paper read to the Royal Irish Academy in 1788. Preskton considers 
Hobbes's findings "conformable to the definition â' ,;ristotle ", and "founded 
in nature; "3 and he underlines the use of the word sudden in Hobbes's 
1 Philosophy of Rhetoric, vol.i,p.93 
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Then, after advancing a theory that laughter is caused by 
same actual irritation of the nerves, Preston goes on to consider the sources 
of the ridiculous: these in no way differ from the usual explanations of defect, 
disparity, disproportion, and mischance which is not of a serious nature. He 
allows contempt to be a principal source of the pleasure we receive from mirth 
(the emotion accompanying laughter), thus disagreeing with Hutcheson and 
Campbell who have, Preston considers, very improperly confounded mirth with 
laughter. 
Knight, writing in 1805, also seems to accept Hobbes's explanation; 
laúghter.is, according to him, "an expression of joy and exultation, which 
arises not from sympathy but triumph; and which seems therefore to have its 
principle in malignity. "l If this is Hobbes's "glory," his "suddenness" too 
may be found here: "all ludicrous combinations must be new and uncommon, 
though just and natural. "2 Still later, in 1809, iíangin supported 
Hutcheson's theory "that the ludicrous consists in the contrast of dignity 
and meanness, "3 and held that neither Campbell nor Beattie had made any 
real improvements in it. He added that laughter raised by an exhibition 
of quizzing is quite consistent with Hutcheson's theory. 
What has been quoted from eighteenth century speculation on the 
subject of laughter should suffice to show that most writers were content 
to keep within the bounds marked out by those who first dealt with the 
problem. Hobbes's "sudden glory," the subsequent discussion of it in 
Addison's paper in the Spectafnr, and the modifications made in Hobbes's 
theory by Hutcheson provided the material drawn upon in all later 
investigations; and very little that was new wad added during the eighty 
1 Principles of Taste, p.410 
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year period that vre have just been considering. 
3. Ridicule, 
We have seen that Hutcheson considered that Hobbes's theory of 
laughter w;s applicable only in cases of ridicule. The position accorded 
to ridicule in Shaftesbury's Characteristics had already given rise to a 
certain amount of discussion. Shaftesbury had believed that before 
anything could be :accepted as genuine, it should have undergone the test 
of ridicule to prove that there was nothing false in its composition. 
"Where an unnatural humour has .crept in, ridicule is the best -weapon against 
it, and if it is ill- placed at first, it -;;ill certainly fall at last where it 
deserves. "1 This assertion was the cause of the controversy as to whether 
or not ridicule is a proper test of truth, that went on for the next half - 
century, and considerably complicated the discussion of ridicule during 
that period. 
Hutcheson was a follower of Shaftesbury, so it is not surprising that 
their views of ridicule should be similar. Hutcheson held that "when any 
object, either good or evil, is aggravated and increased by the violence 
of our passions, or an enthusiastic admiration or fear, the application of 
ridicule is the readiest way. to bring down our high imaginations to a 
conformity to the real. importance of the affair. "2 It is to this method of 
ridicule that Hutcheson wants to limit the application of Hobbes's theory 
of laughter, and the problem thus raised was by no means a merely theoretical 
one, for, as Akenside was to say later, "ridicule....is the foundation of 
the comic manner in all the arts. "3 Hence Hutcheson's remark that the 
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smaller vices "are often more effectually corrected by ridicule than by 
grave admonition" has an obvious significance for Comedy; and it is not 
hard to see how the identification of Hobbes's "sudden glory" with ridicule 
can be made to serve moral purposes in comic theory. If perception of the 
weaknesses of others can give a man a feeling of moral superiority, we have 
almost ready -made a justificatio4f comedy. 
Akenside's theory of ridicule, which is set forth in a very long note 
in his Pleasures of Imagination, is based on the idea of incongruity. 
Objects are ridiculous when they reveal an excessive disproportion either 
between intrinsic excellence and accidental meanness, or between intrinsic 
meanness and accidental excellence. Akenside makes a few interesting 
additional remarks. The inconsistent properties may exist "either in the 
objects themselves or in the apprehension of the person to whom they relate;" 
they must belong "always to the same order or class of being," and must 
imply "sentiment or design;" and they must excite "no acute or vehement 
emotion of the heart. "1 This theory has very obvious affinities with the 
speculations of Hutcheson with regard to laughter, and probably derives 
from them. 
The next positive contribution was made by John Brown in his Essay 
on Ridicule. Brown connects ridicule with the passion of contempt, which 
he describes as 'mixed ", that is, partaking of both pleasure and pain;2 
but ridicule has the special aim of exciting contempt with laughter.3 In 
doing this, however, it must be subject to reason, whose duty it is to 
decide whether contempt be just in the particular circumstances. Brown then 
classes ridicule as a species of eloquence,4 because it applies wit to the 
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end of persuasion. In working out this system, it is probable that Bro,n. 
had Hobbes in mind, and that "contempt" is his name for the "sudden glory" 
that men feel when they see the infirmities of others. 
Certain of Brown's ideas were taken up and developed in another Essay 
on Ridicule, which appeared anonymously in 1753, and which has since then been 
attributed to Allan Ramsay. Ramsay divides ridicule into two classes, which 
have either matters of enquiry or actions and inners for their respective 
provinces. The first is "the art of showing to be ridiculous what is imagined 
to be so," and is called argumentative ridicule; the second is simple ridicule, 
and its task is to expose the ridiculous.1 The latter is therefore to be 
considered along with the mimic arts, and its merit lies in such exact 
imitation as will raise laughter against actions that deserve to be ridiculed.2 
This does not however depend on awakening a feeling of contempt; when people 
laugh at vice or folly, they do so because they feel pleasure at the art 
displayed, and want to applaud the artist. 
Ramsay's theory has clearly not been directly influenced by that of 
Hobbes, although it probably derives from it. Both Karnes and Priestley, 
however, go back to the idea of a feeling pf personal superiority, and make 
use of it in their theories of ridicule. Karnes, who was probably 
influenced also by Hume, finds that ridicule generally rises from the selfish 
passion of pride, and classes it as a gross pleasure which will not satisfy 
refined tastes. Those who have a talent for it are quick to see improprieties 
and to expose them. 
3 
Priestley, too, finds that a certain self -esteem 
"enters into the feeling of ridicule, "4 and as proof of this he adduces our 
peculiar pleasure in repeating diverting incidents in company. "4 He then 
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considers the popular distinction between the risible and inanimate, on the 
one hand, and the ridiculous and active, on the other; and suggests that 
even in the case of risible objects, laughter may be due to our personifying 
the objects concerned. This, by indicating a possible means of uniting the 
risible and the ridiculous, opens up an interesting avenue of thought; but 
Priestley does not explore it further, having attained his immediate end of 
discrediting ridicule as a test of truth. 
It was left to Blair to formulate what had been implicit in the 
theories of many of his predecessors. Ridicule is the "chief, or rather the 
sole, instrument" of candy, which treats of the follies and minor vices of 
men, and "those parts of their character which raise in beholders a sense of 
impropriety, which expose them to be censured, and hughed at by others, or 
which render them troublesome in civil society. ill Blair stops at this point, 
making no effort to work out a comprehensive theory at" comedy; and his 
treatment is in many ways less satisfactory than that given to the subject 
in Preston's paper on Wit and Humour. Preston defines ridicule as "that 
branch of the fine or mimetic arts which proposes to excite the emotion of 
mirth, "2 and remarks -that while its effect is more forcible in poetry and 
painting, whose imitations are more general and more pointed, it may be found 
in the other arts, including even music. Preston then classifies the 
sources of the ridiculous in a way that could provide quite an interesting 
basis for a discussion of eighteenth century comic theory. There is nothing 
of outstanding originality in Preston's classification, but it brings usefully 
together many earlier suggestions, and on the whole provides a far greater 
stimulus to further research than does the account of Blair, who is content 
to rest in his definition without speculating further. 
1 Lectures, vol.iii,p.332 
2 Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy, vol.11(1788), p.69 
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Enough has been said to make it clear that both Hobbes and Locke had 
considerable influence on the course of eighteenth century discussion of the 
comic. Hobbests theories of wit and laughter and Lockets definition of wit 
were all widely known, and their later history is a subject worthy of a more 
detailed examination than I have been able to give it here. 
CHAPTER IV 
HOBBES, LOCKE, AND PLEASURE. 
1. Hobbes, Pleasure, and Passion. 
Hobbes's doctrine of the passions is a logical extension of his 
mechanistic philosophy, and is one of its most consistently developed 
branches. Hobbes opens his account of the wassions in Leviathan by laying 
down that all our animal or voluntary motions are but the carrying out of 
conceptions which already exist in the mind, and that all our actions 
therefore originate in the imagination. An external object when presented 
to our sensés can affect us in one of three ways; it may attract, it may 
repel, or it may fail to interest us in any way. In either of the first 
two cases, scene form of animal motion results. This motion, if it be 
towards an object, is called appetite or desire, and the object is described 
as good; if it be away from an object, the motion is called aversion, and 
we say that the object is bad. Consequently, according to Hobbes, nothing 
is "simply and absolutely" good or evil; "for these words....are ever used with 
relation to the person that useth them. "l' If a thing is evil, it causes us 
is 
pain; and if it good, it causes us pleasure, so that "all appetite, desire, or 
love is accompanied with some delight, more or less. "2 Hobbes then 
distinguishes between pleasure of sense, or love, which arises from the sense of 
an object present; and pleasure of mind, or joy, which arises from the 
1 Leviathan, I, vi, p . 3 2 
2 rbid., I,vi,p.33 
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expectation that proceeds from foresight of the end or consequence of 
things; whether those things in the sense please or displease.i' 
Hobbes goes on to draw the very lokgical conclusion thttemporal 
happiness "consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. "2 The mere 
attaining of an object of desire does not make a man happy; by man's very 
nature, fresh appetites are continually rising and calling for satisfaction, 
"nor can a man any more live, whose desires are at an end, than he whose 
sense and imaginations are at a stand. "2 We find happiness only in the 
¡'continual progress of the desire from one object to another, the attaining 
of the former being still but the way to the latter. "2 When therefore Hobbes 
says that pleasure is "the appearance or sense of good, "3 he means that it 
consists in the desire for what seems at that time good to ourselves; that 
is, in our appetites. And, as he points out elsewhere, appetites so 
affect the mind that it instantly calls up in order all the phantasms that 
can serve as means to gaining the desired end. Thus the passions and 
appetites are of prime importance in Hobbes's scheme of things; they are 
conditions rather than accompaniments of living, and their position in his 
psychology is fundamental. 
It is evident that Hobbes's theory of the fassions is capable of 
application, and that in a most interesting way, to aesthetic questions. 
The extent to which Hobbes has in fact made such application is comparatively 
so 
small, for he does/specifically only in the case of Rhetoric, and for the 
other arts we have to rely on a few hints scattered through his works. The 
most important of these last is in Human Nature, when Hobbes states that «not 
1 Leviathan, I,vi,p.34 
2 ibid., I,xi,p.63 
3 ibid., I,vi,p.33 
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truth but image maketh passion: and a tragedy affecteth no less than a 
murder if well acted.il Here, as Professor Thorpe.has pointed out, Hobbes 
definitely attributes the pourer of raising passion to the imagination. 
Elsewhere, Hobbes notes that the ability to speak powerfully consists in an 
acquired habit of "putting together passionate words, and applying them to 
the present passions of the hearer.i2 Finally, he defines Rhetoric as "a 
commotion of the passions of the mind, such as are hope, fear, anger, 
pity,....(which) derives from a metaphorical use of words fitted to the 
passions.i3 These few utterances indicate a consistency on this subject that 
makes it all the more regrettable that Hobbes did not see fit to try to 
evolve a more comprehensive philosophy of art. 
The first English critic to show the influence of Hobbes's theories 
was John Dennis. This has already been pointed out by Professor Thorpe, 
who has treated this aspect of the subject very fully; but, more recently, 
Professor Hooker has suggested that Dennis may also have been indebted to 
Pascal and Ira Rochefoucauld, and hags uttered a caution against "attaching too 
much weight to the effect of Hobbes. "4 As regards Dennis's views of passion 
and pleasure, however, there can be no doubt that the influence of Hobbes was 
strong, and also in his aesthetic taken as a whole it was probably reinforced 
by ideas from Aristotle, Longinus, and Tilton, Dennis's defence of the 
stage in his first reply to Collier seems to be very largely deduced from 
tOe theories of Hobbes; for his argument is based on the assumption that 
happiness consists in pleasure, and is the result of passion. Since man is a 
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to reason; and according to Dennis this can nowhere be done so well as in 
fulfils all the necessary conditions. "To be happy 
tragedy, wh±eI is to be pleased; and to be pleased is to be moved in such 
a manner as is allowed of by reason....Tragedy moves us thus, and consequently 
pleases us."' 
Dennists critiscism displays a strongly religious bent, and by adopting 
the theories just quoted, and relating them to man's destiny of eternal felicity 
Dennis found himself with a satisfactory starting -point for the aesthetic 
doctrine he proceeded to build up. "The soul was created by God to find its 
happiness in him: and all happiness consists in pleasure and all pleasure in 
passion.i2 Dennists merit is that he worked ideas taken from Hobbes and others 
into a system which he can justly claim to be one of the first attempts in 
English to explain poetry on an aesthetic basis. He accepted from the first 
what were then almost unanimously considered the two chief ends of poetry, to 
delight and to instruct. Instt±uetion makes man better, so is the final end 
to which delight, which makes him happier, is subordinate. Both these ends are 
to be achieved by exciting passion, which thus becomes the characteristic mark 
of poetry: and even passions which disgust in life please in poetry.3 
Dennis finds that either action or contemplation, so long as they please, 
can rouse passion. This would seem to correspond to a similar, though only 
implicit, division in Hobbes; that which puts in one class both tragedy and 
murder, and in another joy from the foresight of the end of things. Dennis 
goes on to parallel this division by distinguishing passions into those that 
are vulgar and those that are enthusiastic; of those, the former are "'moved by 
the objects themselves, or by the ideas in the ordinary course of life, "4 and 
1 
Critical orks of John Dennis: 
3 
ibid., vol.i,p.366 
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are therefore preferable because they appeal to a wider public. They tend to 
prevail in tragedy, and Dennis su.,;gests that this may explain why Aristotle 
prefers tragedyïto epic. Enthusiastic passion, or enthusiasm, is moved by 
"ideas in contemplation, or the meditation of things that belong not to common 
life; "1 it is more subtle than vulgar passion, and most men are unable to 
appreciate it. It is seen to most advantage in great religious poetry, and 
is therefore the source of the epic and the noblest achievements of poetry. 
This is turn links up with Dennis's conception of poetic genius, which is 
highest when inspired by enthusiastic passions, and manifests itself in the 
adequate expression of a great thought, or the sublime. 
The same fundamental conception of pleasure, which he may have inherited 
from Dennis, though it may equally well came direct from Hobbes, probably 
lies behaind an early attempt to account for varieties of taste, made by 
Jonathan Richardson in 1715. Richardson first lays down that "all created 
beings seek pleasure....as their chiefest good,"2 and from this he deduces 
that as men find pleasure in widely different things, there must be an 
infinite variety of tastes for pleasure.' This Richardson considers, is no 
bad thing, as it prevents us from being perpetually at variance with one 
another, and he goes on tö develop. a not very original theory of the sublime 
as "the perfection of human nature. "3 
A more fruitful example of Hobbests influence may be seen in Hutchesonts 
friend, James _,rbuckle, who certainly knew the work of Hobbes, and probably 
. accepted some of his theories on the passions, though modifying their general 
spirit. For example, he agrees that all our passions and faculties are 
calculated to promote the happiness of the individual, but insists that they 
also contribute to the universal good of the whole intellectual system, which 
1 
Critical rVor h/; voli,p.338 
Wks.(1773), p.119 
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3 ibid., p. 14-4- 
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may be an echo of Shaftesbury. Appetites, of no matter what kind, are man's 
first motive to action, and we can have no happiness without appetite; but the 
satiety often consequent on their gratification shows that they .are not the 
ultimate principle of pleasure. Arbuckle goes on to affirm that all our 
rational pleasures come fr an either "the contemplation of beauty, the 
endearments of society, or self-approbation."' Elsewhere, Arbuckle agrees that 
the passions of all men are alike,2 then goes on like Dennis to attribute the 
power of poetry to its design,and ability to work on the passions. 
After such a promising start, it is rather disappointing to find that the 
lead given by Hobbes and Dennis was not followed by later aestheticians, and 
there are very few attempts to show a relationship between passion and art. 
In 1760 Daniel Webb writes that the pleasure we receive fran painting "is 
itself a passion, founded on the love of what is beautiful, and the delight we 
feel in having our passions moved ; "3 and more than twenty years later Jackson 
argues that man's greatest pleasure arises from the gratification of his 
passions. T e are however isolated opinions and it would be difficult to 
show that they derive.. from either Hobbes or Dennis. The truth probably is 
that Hobbes's doctrine of the nssions failed to survive because it ran 
counter to the spirit of an age of reason. Even Dennis had felt the necessity 
of trying to make passionate pleasure subject to reason, and if his successors 
felt that this last contention was unjustifiable, it is easy to understand 
their looking askance at Hobbes's view of pleasure as the result of indulging 
passion. 
1 Hibernicus's Letters, p.40 
cf. Leviathan, Introduction p.6: "passions....are the same in all ]non." 
Beauties of Painting, p.37 
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2. Hobbes and the Pleasure of Novelty. 
As Professor Thorpe has shown, novelty is an important factor in Hobbes's 
aesthetic theories, and indeed in his Wide system of psychology. According 
to Hobbes, the desire for novelty is natural to man; but this is a novelty 
very different from the ordinary conception of it which prevailed in the 
eighteenth century. It derives from Hobbes's belief that knowledge 
originates in experience: whence it follows that new experience, or novelty, 
gives new knowledge by awakening a hope of future knowledge which may be 
either a passion, in which case it is called admiration, or an appetite, when 
it is called curiosity. "And from this beginning is derived all philosophy, "1 
and the degrees of knowledge among men. It is small wonder that Hobbes 
concludes that "because curiosity is delight, therefore also all novelty is 
so. "1 Alongside this it is interesting to set Shaftesbury's remark that 
the love of novelty and surprise is a stronger passion than the love of truth, 
which expresses an idea more in keeping with what we now mean by novelty. 
Hobbes's conception of novelty, therefore, is a far more exalted one than 
69 
was current at the beginning of the ammenteenth century, and it is surely here 
that we are to seek Addison' s reason for rAnking it along with the beautiful 
and the sublime as one câ the three supreme pleasures of the imagination. 
This receives confirmation in Addison's explanation of the final cause of the 
pleasure we receive from novelty. (God); has annexed a secret pleasure 
to the idea of anything that is new or uncommon, that he might encourage us 
in the pursuit after knowledge, aid engage us to search into the wonders of 
his creation; for every new idea brings such a pleasure along with it as 
1 Human Nature, Wks., vol.iv:IX,xviii,p.50 
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rewards any pains we have taken in its acquisition, and consequently 
serves as a motive to put us upon fresh discoveriés. "1 This comes closer 
to Hobbests ideas than anything else of the period that I have'read, and seems 
to justify Addison in giving novelty the important place which it has among 
the pleasures of the imagination. 
At the same time it must be recognised that ::ddison included in his 
idea of tnovelty' certain features of the more popular conception, which 
tended to become .-are and h.ore closely identified with variety. In his 
original account of novelty, Addison says that "Everything that is new or 
uncomnon raises a pleasure in the imagination, because it fills the soul with 
an agreeable surprise, gratifies its curiosity, and gives it an idea of which 
it was not before possessed.i2 Further on he claims that it helps to give 
variety to life, by providing an occasional relief from our ordinary everyday 
entertainments. "It is this that bestows charms on a monster....that 
recommends variety, where the mind is every inst.nt called off to something 
new....that improves what is great or beautiful, and makes it afford the mind 
a double entertainment. "2 Thus although like Hobbes he has given to novelty 
a more import nt place than was usually allotted to it, Addison has in a 
sense also started the urocess of debasing it from that eminence. His successom 
on 
were many of them re..dy has his authority to allow novelty to hold its place 
beside beauty and the sublime; but very few were re-dy to attribute to it such 
important functions as those caum.on to the aeccunts of hobbes and _ddison, 
though Blachnoret s remark that "novelty is the parent of admiration " may 
indicate knowledge of Hobbes. This is made ,: ore probable by the fact that 
Blackmore was born before the Lestoration, and therefore belonged to a generation 
1 Spectator, no.413 
2 ibid., no.412 
3 Essays, p.36 
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entertain, and himself answers that it is novelty. "Practically, it is 
ultimate, and the desire it excites nothing else can satisfy. "1 4ie seek it 
in both nature and art, and are at last compelled to withdraw from the 
material world into an imaginary one where we can satisfy our appetite 
for novelty. Aikin sums up his critical doctrine by attributing a great 
share of our pleasure in both art and nature to novelty. 
The importance attached to the effects of novelty in the speculations 
of aestheticians natur,:lly led them also to examine it from the standpoint 
of the creative artist. !ai early example of this is Hume's complaint that 
authors' attempts to please by novelty lead them to abandon the simplicity of 
nature for affectation and conceit; and Blair, in a lecture on The Eloquence 
of the Pulpit admits that "nothing within tae reach of art is _more difficult, 
than to bestow on what is comr.on, the grace of novelty. "2 Beattie agrees 
with Hume that the chief danger is that new ideas may "seduce from Nature,i3 
but feels that novelty is to be sought as it is a help to fancy. The 
obvious solution to this difficulty is eventually proposed by Knight; "as long 
as the restless desire of novelty can restrain itself, in imitative art, to 
the imitation of real genuine nature, it will only tend to real improvement. "4 
The tendency already indicated to identify novelty with variety often 
o 
led writers to enter upon discussions as to the means of producing novelty 
when they were considering beauty as a compound ratio of uniformity and 
variety. Thus Gerard explains the need far variety by saying that in some 
measure it gratifies man's sense of novelty, and Shenstone attributes a 
large part of the effect of variety to novelty. On the other side, 
IiIonboddo argues that desire for singularity may corrupt the taste of an 
1 Letters, vol.i,p.65 
2 Lectures, vol.ii,p.278 
3 Dissertations, p.169 
4 Principles of Taste, p.434 
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artist, and Reynolds utters a warning against carrying the pursuit of 
novelty.and variety too far, sometimes to the extent of destroying the 
pleasure from uniformity and repetition. This all fives to show that t:e 
question of novelty continued to figure prominently in aesthetic speculation 
throughout the century. The extent and manner in which it did so can be 
attributed largely to the emphasis laid upon it in the systems of Hobbes 
and .;ddison. 
3. Locke and Ple.asLire.. 
The importance of the part played by pleasure in Lockets system can be 
estimated by the fact that he makes not only happiness but also good depend 
on it. Happiness he defines as the "utmost pleasure we are capable of, "1 
and he considers that "things are good or evil, only in reference to pleasure 
or pain.i2 This does not mean however that Locke is to be classed as a 
hedonist: for pleasure was to him but a means by which man is helped towards 
his ultimate end. God has given to certain "objects, and the ideas which 
we receive from them, as also to several of our thoughts, a concomitant 
pleasure, and that in several objects, to several degrees....i3 If it 
were not for this, men would have no way of establishing the relative values 
of thoughts, actions, or even the objects surrounding them: as it is, thanks 
to this act of divine wisdom, we are enabled to choose those things which 
tend to our good, for from the "very first instances of sense and perception, 
there are some things that are grateful, and others unwelcome "4 to us. 
Finally Locke points out that although we may speak of pleasures of mind and 
pleasures of body, all pleasures are "only different constitutions in the 
1 
II,xxi,42 
2 ibid., II,xx,2 
3 ibid., II,vii,3 
4 ibid,, I,iii,3 
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mind, "1 whether their causes be pysical or mental. 
Locke's conception of pleasure differs radically from t_at of 
Shaftesbury, who considered it changeable, and therefore "no rule of good. "2 
Hutcheson,however, who derived most of his ideas from either Locke or 
Shaftesbury, chose in this instance to follow Locke by making pleasure 
an act of divine providence, helping man to choose more easily between 
objects which would otherwise be indifferent to him. Hutcheson's views 
on pleasure are of great importance in his own aesthetic system, and 
indeed in the history of aesthetics in this country during the whole 
eighteenth century, for he may be regarded as one of the leading 
exponents of what Croce has called the hedonistic aesthetic. Hutcheson 
agrees with Locke that nearly every object is a necessary occasion of 
either pleasure or pain, but adds that this pleasure or pain arises from 
"the contemplation of the idea, which is then present to our minds, with 
all its circumstances. *3 Moreover contemplation of the complex idea is 
a far more fruitful source of pleasure than is contemplation of a simule 
idea, and as an exam_: le Hutche son suggests that the enjoyment obtained 
from musical harmony is greatly superior to that given by single notes. 
Elsewhere, he adds that the sense of pleasure is the foundation of self - 
interest, for when a man desires something, he does so because of the 
pleasure that he knows he will receive from it. 
Hutcheson bases i:is theory of the internal senses on a wholly new 
conception of the senses as "determinations to be pleased with any forms 
or ideas "3 which occur to them and he then distinguishes the sense of 
beauty, or the capacity of receiving pleasure from beauty, from the external 
senses by calling it an internal sense. ±s he cs.n find no necessary 
1 Essay, II,xx,2 
3 
Beauty and Virtue, p.xiii 
2 Characteristics, vol.i,p.309 
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connection between the objects and the ple:.sures of the internal sense, 
Hutcheson concludes that there must be some "great moral necessity "1 
behind the divine constitution by which uniformity amidst variety is made the 
occasion of the pleasure man receives from beauty. For our present purpose, 
however, the most significant feature is that "the presence of some objects 
necessarily pleases us, and the presence of others as necessarily displeases 
us....By the very frame of our nature the one is made the occasion of 
delight and the other of dissatisfaction. "2 Hutcheson thus states clearly 
his belief that there is a certain quality inherent in objects which 
gives rise to the pleasure which accompanies perception of the beautiful; 
though it is important to note that he at no time confuses the pleasure 
with beauty. 
The same conception is found in Hume when he canes to consider the 
difference between beauty and deformity. This can, he holds, be best 
stated by defining beauty as "such an order and construction of parts, 
as either by the primary constitution of our nature, by custom, or by 
caprice, is fitted to give a pleasure and satisfaction to the soul. This 
is the distinguishing character of beauty, and forms all the difference 
betwixt it and deformity, whose natural tendency is to produce uneasiness. 
Pleasure and pain, therefore, are not only necessary attendants of beauty 
and deformity, but constitute their very essence. "3 This is one of the cost 
uncompromising statements of the identity of beauty and pleasure to be met 
with in the Whole Century, and is probably reflected in Baillie's 
recognition of a natural aptitude to give pleasure "from a certain harmony 
and disposition of....parts" as one of the two sources of delight in 
1 
2 
Beauty and Virtue, p.104 
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beautiful or sublime objects. Baillie here exemplifies a common tendency 
to discuss beauty purely in terms of pleasure, and this is also seen in 
Hartley's references to the pleasures given by "gay colours of all kinds "1 
or by "the beauties of nature." 
Daniel Webb expressed the same point of view in his treatise on The 
Beauties of Painting, but adds what might be interpreted as a caution 
against the danger of confusing beauty and pleasure. "As it is the nature 
of beauty to excite in the beholders certain pleasing sensations, we 
apply indiscriminately the same title to everything which produces a like 
effect. "2 Usher,too,holds that we generally consider beautiful that which 
gives us pleasure, but like ';;ebb seems to utter a warning against 
identifying bec;uty and pleasure -when he remarks that "complaisance, that is 
so engaging, gives an agreeableness to the whole person, and creates a 
beauty that Nature gave not to the features. "3 Arthur, writing some 
twenty years later, insisted on the necessity for distinguishing between 
beauty and "everything else that excites agreeable sensations, "4 but 
otherwise differs little from .ebb and Usher. His main thesis is that 
if certain objects give rise to a feeling of pleasure, "there must be certain 
qualities in these objects fitted for exciting agreeable sensations in the 
mind, "5 and in the case of beauty, he believes those qualities to be 
"colour and figure alone. "6. Jeffrey, on the other hand, does Liot seem too 
confident on the question of beauty and pleasure, at least in his earlier article 
1 
Observations on Lan, .an vol.i,p.207. Elsewhere Hartley notes gay colours 
as one of the sources of the pleasure afforded by beauty. 
2 Beauties of Painting, p.134 
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on aesthetics. He allows that "mere organic or physical delight....appears 
in some cases to procure the appellation of beautiful to the objects that 
produce it, "1 and quotes as examples certain combinatiL ns of sounds or 
colours. 
It is therefore clear that the insistence of Locke and Hutcheson 
on the annexation of pleasure to certain objects, when combined with the 
view that beauty was objective, tended to encourage a view that beauty 
was a mode of pleasure. More important, hovtiever, is the fact that the 
same theory had much to do Frith the popularity of the theory of the 
internal senses; and this in turn strengthened the view that beauty is 
objective. Beauty could not, in fact, be easily conceived of as 
objective until the internal sJnse theory and its iuplications - which 
will be examined in a, later chapter -had been rejected, and in view of 
this Jeffrey's later disavowal of the views quoted in the previous 
paragraph has an obvious significance. 
1 Edinburgh Review, XVIII,no.35(1811),pp.35 -36 
PART II 
T H E P H I L O S O P H I C A L I N F L U E N C E S 
CHAPTER V 
LOCK, BERKELEY, AND THE QUALITIES OF MATTER 
1. Locke and Primary and Secondary Qualities. 
Although the distinction between the "primary" and "secondary" qualities 
of matter had already been made by Descartes and indicated by Hobbes, it 
became known to eighteenth century England chiefly through the medium of 
Lockets Essay on the Human Understanding. Locke approached the problem of the 
limits of human knowledge very gradually, and devoted his first two books 
to an investigation of the nature of ideas, which he considered the only 
objects of knowledge. But if nothing can be known but ideas, it follows 
that external . objects are known only in so far as they have power to 
produce ideas in the minds of men. "Thus a snowball having the power to 
produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, the powers to produce 
those ideas in us, as they are in the snowball, I call qualities; and as 
they are sensations or perceptions in our understandings, I call them ideas."' 
Locke then went on to distinguish between the primary and secondary 
qualities of material objects. Primary qualities are those which are 
inseparably and essentially present in the object, and which remain in it, 
no matter what changes it may undergo, and whether it is perceived or not. 
As examples of primary qualities, Locke gives bulk, number, figure and 
motion. Secondary qualities are "nothing in the objects themselves but the 
pourers to produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities; "2 
1 Essay, II,viii,8 
2 ibid., II,viii,l0 
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examples of these are colours, sounds and tastes. Further, there is no 
property inherent in the object which resembles the ideas we h >.ve of 
secondary qualities, and these ides are produced in our minds simply and 
solely by the action of an occult power in the body. Our ideas of primary 
qualities, on the other hand, correspond to real and existing properties of 
objects, and therefore resemble the powers producing them. Thus when we 
see a blue ball, the "blueness" being a secondary quality is but an idea: 
in our minds, and has no corresponding existence in matter. The ball, 
however, does really exist in the bulk and shape perceived by our senses, 
and under certain conditions possesses the power of conveying to us the 
idea of "blueness." Our knowledge of bodies is moreover severely limited 
by. our inability to discover any "conceivable connection between any 
secondary quality and any primary quality "1 of which the secondary quality 
is an - effèct 
When in the following century aestheticians began to ask themselves 
what qualities in objects could render these objects beautiful, it was 
almost inevitable that the distinction drawn between primary and secondary 
qualities should attract attention. It was equally inevitable that sooner 
or later somebody would inquire,whether beauty was a primary or a secondary 
quality; in other words, is beauty ánherent in the object perceived, or 
is it merely an affection of the sentient? Hence we find Hutcheson 
declaring that beauty and harmony are sensible ideas excited by primary 
qualities, and that there may therefore be nothing in the objects resembling 
the ideas. Karnes, after affirming that the distinction between primary and 




a curious inquiry, whether beauty be a primary or only a secondary quality 
of objects. "1 On this occasion Eames seems rather unwilling to conzit 
himself to either view, but in his later Sketches of the History of Man 
he lays down quite unequivocally that beauty and ugliness are secondary 
qualities.2 Reid too considers this question, and finds that "though some of 
the qualities that please a good taste resemble the secondary qualities 
of body, and therefore may be called occult qualities, ....this is not always the 
case. "3 
It is clear from the foregoing examples that the doctrine of the primary 
and secondary qualities of matter could have been made the basis of at least 
two a]most diametrically opposite aesthetic systems. Beauty could be 
regarded as either inherent in the object, or objective; or inherent in 
the percipient, or purely subjective. There was in fact a third possibility, 
which was adopted by Hume, who held that beauty consists in the relation 
between the percipient and the object perceived. Neither this last view, or 
the purely subjective theory, however, obtained much support. Thus, although 
Locke had himself displayed little or no interest in aesthetic problems, his 
theories could have been quoted in support of three very different solutions 
to the problem of the nature of beauty. 
Few of the eighteenth century aestheticians showed an intimacy with 
Lockets philosophy equal to that of Francis Hutcheson, who had the good 
fortune, when he carne to cansider aesthetic problems, to find that much 
of the preliminary work had already been done, notably by Shaftesbury and 
Addison. One of Hutcheson's chief merits is that he succeeded in assimilating 
and blending the theories of his predecessors in such a way as to make him 
1 Wks.,vol.iv.p.181 
2 Wks., vol.iii,p.110 
3 Essays, vol.ii,p.498 
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the first important focal point in the history of the development of 
aesthetic theory in this country. 'Alen in his.first major treatise 
Hutcheson came to consider what rendered objects beautiful, he at once 
turned for help to Locke, who had given long and careful consideration to 
the question of matter and its qualities. His study of Locke led him 
to class beauty as a secondary quality, dependent for its existence on 
the primary or permanent qualities of the object. Beauty thus becomes, 
according to the definition of Locke, nothing in the object but a power to 
produce certain sensations in us, and as "there is nothing like our ideas 
existing in the bodies themselves, "1 it would seem to follow that beauty is 
purely subjective. 
Faithful to Lockets philosophy, however, Hutcheson did not rest here. 
In the Essay Locke had stated that secondary or sensible qualities were "but 
the powers of several combinations of the primary qualities when they operate 
without being distinctly discerned. "2 Any system then which made beauty 
a secondary quality, and was to conform with Lockets doctrines, had to 
acknowledge that the sensation of beauty was caused by certain combinations 
of the primary qualities in the object denominated beautiful. Moreover, 
as Locke had shown, no certain connection between the primary qualities and 
the dependent secondary qualities could ever be proved: at best, as a result o 
observation, we could conclude that certain qualities were found frequently 
to co- exist, and were therefore probably but not certainly united by some 
necessary connection. If, therefore, his explanation of beauty as a 
secondary quality w.s to have any practical value, Hutcheson had to find 
1 Essay, II,viii,15 
2 ibid., II,viii,22 
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between the primary qualities of objects some relationship, which could be 
shown to occur in each object that appeared to him beautiful. It was with 
this in mind that Hutcheson suggested that "what we call beautiful in objects 
seems to be in-a compound ratio of uniformity and variety. "1 
It is important to realise that Hutcheson was not putting forward 
a theory that beauty consists in uniformity amidst, variety. His im ediate 
successors generally misunderstood his aesthetic doctrines, and partly 
out of deference to him included uniformity and variety in the ever- growing 
list of such qualities as utility, propörtion, and regularity which were then 
popularly supposed to be causes of beauty: but Hutcheson himself must have 
known that his solution was no more than a hypothesis based on experience. 
His aim had been to find "what quality in objects excites these ideas (of 
beauty and harmony), or is the occasion of them, Tt2 and in order to do this, 
he began by considering the simplest kind of beauty - that of regular figures. 
Starting off with the assumption that a square is more beautiful than an 
equilateral triangle, Hutcheson deduced that when figures are equally 
uniform, greater variety results in greater beauty. He then applied his 
formula of "uniformity amidst *ariety" to such sEseissEefsEl objects, and 
even theorems,as ' were generally considered beautiful, and as in 
each case the formula seemed sufficient, Hutcheson proposed his theory 
that the secondary quality of beauty is dependent upon a ratio of variety 
and uniformity among the primary qualities of the object designated 
beautiful. 
The qut,liti es of uniformity and variety were probably, as Scott has 
pointed out,3 suggested to Hutcheson by Shaftesbury's "order, harmony, 
1 Beauty and Virtue, p.17 
2 ibid., p.16 
3 
W.R.Scott: Francis Hutcheson 
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and proportion," and this may serve as an example of the way in which 
Hutcheson adapted the work of his predecessors.to the philosophy of Locke. 
The result was that Hutcheson constructed a system of beauty which is based 
on and entirely consistent with Lockets doctrine of the primary and secondary 
qualities of matter, and then carne to the conclusion that beauty is "the 
idea raised in us, "l and is therefore subjective. Hutcheson completed his 
system by describing man's power of receiving that idea as an internal sense 
of beauty, and it is interesting to note that this last theory, which later 
in the century was regarded as almost inseparable from the idea that beauty 
is Partly or wholly objective, originally formed part of a system based on 
the belief that beauty was subjective. 
Paradoxically enough, the wbight of Hutcheson's influence fell almost 
entirely on the side of that school of thought whíc.h believed that beauty was 
objective. The reason for this was that most of Hutchesonts successors 
wrongly believed that he had taught that uniformity and variety were qualities 
which themselves gave rise to an im_:edi ate perception of beauty. This was a 
natural enough conse..uence of Hutchesonts doctrine of an internal sense of 
beauty, but as this will be considered ut a later stage, the "internal 
sense" school need not be dealt with at present. Not everyone however mis- 
understood Hutcheson to such an extent, and the most notable exception 
is that of David Hume. 
Though the volume' of Hume +s writings on aesthetics is comparatively 
small, he often realised more clearly than did his contemporaries the 
difficulties inherent in some of the problems facing them. His attitude 
to beauty is a good example of this. Hume dismisses as absurd the 
1 
Beauty and Virtue, p.7 
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suggestion that beauty may consist "wholly in the perception of relations, "1 
and then with particular reference to the circle, he defines.beauty as 
"the effect which t__at figure produces upon the .:ind, whose peculiar fabric 
of structure renders it susceptible of such sentiments. "1 later, in his 
essay Of the Standard of Taste, Hume considers the question with some care. 
He begins by referring to a certain school of thought which, by holding that 
beauty is completely subjective, made it impossible to establish.any standard 
of taste; because if beauty is subjective, it is a mere sentiment, and is 
not subject to any fixed standard. Hume then advances his ovn relativist 
theory. Although it can not be denied that beauty and deformity are "not 
qua liti,, s in objects, but belong entirely to the sentiment, internal or 
external, it must be allowed that there are certain qualities in objects which 
are fitted by n :Tture to Produce those particular feelings. "2 
Hume thus rejects both the objective nd the extreme subjective 
theory, and follows a via media which, however, commended itself to very few 
later aestheticians. It is probably his influence that led :Tames to 
his earlier conclusion that beauty, "which for its existence depends on the 
percipient as much as on the object perceived, cannot 'be .n inherent 
property in either. "3 The opinions of Abraham Tucker may also derive from 
the theories of Hume. Tucker begins by defining beauty as "an aptness 
of things to please immediately upon sight.i4 But not everybody is Pleased 
with the same objects, for beauty depends on the response of the beholder, 
and is therefore relative. Consequently the same thing may appear "charming 
to one, indifferent to another, and disgustful to a.third. "4 Tucker allows 
a sense of beauty, but as he means by it no more than man's capacity to be 
1 Principles of Morals, ed. Selby -Bigge: p.292 
2 Four Dissertations, p.217 
3 Wks., vol.iv,p.188 
4 Light of Nature Pursued, vol.ii,p.147 
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affected by beauty, it does not help him to fix on a standard of beauty; 
and so he concludes that nothing is in itself beautiful. 
A later expression of the view of beauty as purely subjective is to be 
found in an extremely interesting article in the Critical Review for 1807. 
The reviewer starts off by declaring that 'beauty is a relative and secondary 
quality which like that of cold or colour has no existence except in the 
sentiment which we have of it," but adds that "though beauty be an 
impalpable abstraction, the sentiment is a physical reality."' He goes on 
to argue that the sentiment of beauty is the same in everyone, but that, as 
it may be caused by a variety of sensations, it is only to be e ::pected that 
men's opinions respecting beauty will differ widely. 
This shows to what extent Locke's original distinction between the 
primary and secondary qualities of matter had maintained its place throughout 
the century. It may even be regretted that his theories on this point were 
not better understood: if they had been, a great deal of rather unprofitable 
speculation, which was given considerable encouragement by the doctrines of 
Hutcheson, might have been avoided. As it is, however, the distinction can 
be shown to have been the source, directly or indirectly, of quite surprisingly 
different aesthetic theories. The implied failure to interpret Locke 
correctly may be brought forward as evidence of the philosophical incompetence 
of many of those who undertook to work out aesthetic systems. 
2. Berkeley and Visible and Tan ible dualities. 
The common eighteenth century attitude to Berkeley unfortunately 
differed little from that of Dr. Johnson, who considered that by kicking a 
stone out of his way, he had refuted Berkeley's theory of the non -existence 
1 Critical Reviow, N.S.XII,(1807),p.520 
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of material substance. This complete inability to understand Berkeley's 
philosophy is not perhaps surprising in an age which had little respect for 
metaphysical subttty, and few other than trained philosophers gave any serious 
consideration to the problems raised by Berkeley. There were however certain 
theories put forward by Berkeley in his New Theory of Vision which did not like 
his idealism run violently counter to the comfortable assumptions of his age, 
and which were yet sufficiently origi l to arouse immediate interest. Chief 
among these is his insistence on the fact that ideas received simultaneously 
through the different senses are yet quito different and distinct from each 
other. 
Berkeley first points out that we are under no temptation to confuse 
ideas of sight and hearing, and can easily separate the noise made by an 
object from its appearance to the sight. It is however quite otherwise 
with the ideas of sight and touch, which we tend to confuse almost 
continuously. It is impossible for a man to see all six sides of a cube 
at the same time: how then can we know at sight that a cube is before us? 
Berkeley answers that we become acquainted with the peculiar shape of a cube 
through the sense of touch, and on doing so not that a certain visible appear- 
ence always accompanies this shape. )Ahen we say that we see a cube, 
not 
therefore, we are /speaking accurately. We are in fact making, as a result of 
our experience of the'tangiblé body of a cube, a deduction that the visible 
body before us is cubular in shape. 
Berkeley goes on to apply his discovery to two particular cases of 
distance and magnitude. In the caso of distance he finds that "neither 
distance nor things placed at a distance are themselves, or their ideas, 
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truly perceived by sight, "1 but that they are deductions based upon our 
previous knowledge of the appearance of the object when clearly seen, 
and of the modifications observed in that appearance as the object approaches 
or recedes from the eye. Magnitude can be explained on the same principles; 
and we estimate the size of an object, not by its visible but by its tangible 
magnitude. If this were not the case, we might believe it possible for 
ourselves to hold in the palm of our hands houses seen at such a distance as 
to appear very small. There is, concludes Berkeley, "no discoverable 
necessary connection between any given visible magnitude and any one 
particular tangible magnitude; it is entirely the result of custom and 
experience and depends on foreign and accidental circumstances, that we can, 
by the perception of visible extension, inform ourselves what may be the 
extension of any tangible object connected with it. "2 
It is not to be expected that such a distinction should influence the 
course of aesthetic speculation to any extent, but it was undoubtedly made use 
of by certain aestheticians; and traces of Berkeleian influence in this field 
are so very few that it is worth while examining those that exist with same 
care. The first point of interest occurs in the opening paragraph of the 
first papar of Pleasures of the Imagination; Addison opens with the statement 
that the sight is the most perfect ePlielte and delightful of mants senses, 
and continues; "It fills the mind with the largest variety of ideas, converses 
with its objects at the greatest distance....The sense of feeling can indeed 
give us a notion of extension, shape, and all other ideas that enter at the 
eye, except colours....but is confined in its operations to the number, bulk 
and distance of its particular objects. Our sight seems designed to supply 
2 
Theory of Vision, 45 
ibid., 104 
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all these defects, and may be considered as a more delicate and diffusive 
kind of touch. "1 This passage is clearly based on the 'Metaphysics' of 
Aristotle, but as Dr. Rossi ppints out, the use of "ideas" is Lockean,2 and 
so probably is the use of ''notions." But is there not, in the intimate 
connection suggested between sight and touch, also a link with Berkeley, 
whose early. work was,as Dr. Rossi has elsewhere argued, probably known to 
Addison ?3 If so, the relation is a very slight one, as Addison certainly 
does not show any interest in the finer points raised by Berkeley; but it 
is interesting as showing him even thus early this particular aspect of 
Berkeley's theory was to command attention. 
If there is some doubt with regard to Addison, none can be felt 
regarding Hartley, who in one passage explicitly refers to Berkeley when 
making the statement that "we judge of tangible qualities chiefly by sight, 
which therefore may be considered....as a philosophical language for the ideas 
of feeling. "4 But Hartley was also acquainted with Addison, as later 
passages indicate, and it is worth;, of note that in passages which seem to derive 
more directly from sddison there might still have been doubt as to whether 
or not Hartley knew Berkley's theories. Hartley points to the superior 
vividness of the ideas of sight, which tend to obscure even strong tangible 
impressions, and "quite overpower" the fainter ones. "Sight communicates 
to us at once the size, shape, and colour of objects: feeling can not do the 
a. 
last :A all, and the two first only in /tedious way."5 Later he adds that 
1 Spectator, no.411 
2 L'Estetica dell'Empirismo Inglese, voli ,p.255 note 
3 ibid., vol.i,303 note on Spectator no.421, where Dr. Rossi suggests that the 
use of "notins" by Addison is based on the restricted definition of the term 
giver_ by Berkeley. He ends, "E vero che i Principi pubblicate nel 1709 non 
ebbero buona accoglienza in InghL'terra, ma in quell'anno Addison era a 
Dublino come segretario di Lord ';iharton e certo conobbe personalmente 
Berkeley il quale non si allontano dall'Irlanda che nel 1713." 
Observations on Man, vol.i,p.137 
5 ibid., vol.i,p.146 
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the ideas of sight are "far more vivid and definite than any other; agreeably 
to which the word 'idea' denoted these alone in its origin."' 
Hartley, however, does go beyond Addison in practical application of 
Berkeley's doctrines to aesthetic problems, though not unnaturally he tends 
to introduce his own favourite theory of association in partial explanation 
of them.. Thus when .vith regard to painting he suggests that it is fron the 
associations connected with sight that pictures can give "such exact ideas of 
shapes, figures, magnitudes, and distances, "2 or when he says that "our stock 
of visible ideas may be considered as a key to a great part of our knowledge, 
and a principal source of invention in poetry, painting, mathematics, mechanics, 
and almost every other branchiof the arts and sciences,"3 he is clearly 
benefitting by Berkeley's clarification of the relations between these two 
kinds of ideas, the visible and the tangible. 
Gerard was certainly acquainted with the distinction, and it is difficult 
to regard his reference to it without a certain feeling of amusement. After 
mentioning the fact, "well -known to philosophers," that visible ideas are often 
confused with tangible ideas, Gerard argues that "just so a man may have feelings 
in the fine arts which he knows to be wrong, and which his knowing to be wrong 
can not hinder his continuing to have. "4 Beattie's application of the theory 
is reminiscent of Hartley's. He insists on the necessity for distinguishing 
visible from tangible magnitude and distance, and shows how knowledge of the 
difference between them can serve an artist. If a painter can imitate visible 
distance, "the objects he draws in an artificial landscape will seem to be some 
of them near and others remote, though all really at the same distance from the 





4 On Taste (1780),pt.IV,p.218 
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eye. i1 Similarly, by imitating other visible qualities, we can give 
the 
apparent solidity and depth to /representation of a body painted on a flat 
surface. 
Alison;. too, makes use of Berkeley's distinction to support his 
acceptance of what had already become a popular opinion - that more beautiful 
objects are perceived by the sense of sight than by any other sense; but 
develops it in quite an interesting way. The other senses can inform 
us only of single qualities of objects: bbt sight can present to us the object 
in something like its real completeness, and the "visible qualities of objects 
accordingly become to us not only the distinguishing characteristics of 
extern *l bodies, but they also become in a great measure the signs of all 
their other qualities; and by recalling to our minds the qualities signified, 
affect us in some degree with the same emotion which the objects themselves can 
excite. "2 The result of this is that visible qualities come not only to 
signify to us other sensible qualities, but even to produce in us by 
association the some emotions as would be produced by the qualities signified. 
Hence Alison, like Hartley, has been attracted to this distinction originally 
made by Berkeley because of its suitableness as a link in a system based on 
association of ideas. 
Berkeley's ideas are again drawn upon_, this time by Price, in his attempt 
to show that the picturesque, as distinct from the beautiful, is dependent 
largely upon the quality of roughness in objects. Price believes that 
"all broken, rugged, and abrupt forms and surfaces, have also by sympathy, 
somewhat of the same effect on the sight as on the touch. Indeed, as it is 
generally admitted that the sense of seeing acquires all its perceptions of 
1 Dissertations, p.99 note 
2 Essays, vol.i,p.291 
80. 
hard, soft, rough, smooth, etc. from that of feeling, such a sypathy seems 
almost unavoidable."' Price admitted that his sconception of the picturesque 
was valid only if Burke was correcting in holding that smoothness is an 
essential quality of beauty, and it is a minor co- incidence that Knight too 
should have had Burke's theories in mind when he appealed to Berkeley's 
distinction between visible and tangible magnitude. Burke had held that 
greatness of dimension was one cause of the sublime, but,Knight argues, 
visible magnitude varies according to the distance between the object and the 
spectator. Man is thus able to estimate visible magnitude only very 
imperfectly, and as it is with visible maglitude that we are concerned when 
discussing the causes of the sublime we may, concludes Knight, "learn how to 
estimate the theory of Burke. 
It is therefore clear that Berkeley's distinction between the visible and 
tangible qualities of objects was well known in the eighteenth century, and 
that it was quite frequently made use of by aestheticians to help them to 
solve particular problems. It had, for example, an obvious connection with 
such questions as that of perspective, and it would not h. ve been surprising 
to find more use made of it in this connection. This doctrine, however, 
marks the only noteworthy contribution made by Berkeley to the development 
of aesthetic theory in the eighteenth century, and tends rather to draw attention 
to the general lack of interest in his philosophy shown by aestheticians 
than to illustrate the small influence Berkeley did have in this field. 
1 Essays, vol.i,p.118 
2 
Principles of Tasta, p.59 
CHAPTER VI 
LOCKE IND IDEAS 
1. Innate Ideas. 
One sign of the painstaken by Locke in the preparation of his Essay 
is the careful ordering by which, before going on to discuss the origin and 
nature of our ideas, he refutes the doctrine of innate ideas. Campbell - 
Fraser, in his edition of the Essay, has pointed out that the motive of Lockets 
attack on innate ideas was to "explode prejudices, dispel empty phrases, and 
substitute rational insight for blind dependence on authority. "1 This, 
which might well be put forward as the purpose of the whole Epag, was 
thoroughly in keeping with the spirit of the "age of reason "; and Lockets 
criticisms of the doctrine seen to have been soon recognised as in the main 
just. The result was that nine out of every ten eighteenth century speculative 
writers hastened to declare their opposition to innate ideas and principles, 
though not a few then go on to admit them under a less compromising 
denomination. 
Lockets denial of innate ideas hus therefore considerable importance, 
though of a rather negative description, for the eighteenth century writers on 
aesthetic theory, because the weight of his authority thrown so definitely 
into the scale on one side almost in itself sufficed to discredit any systems 
which involved belief in innate ideas. If we grant Locke his premisses, 
and accept his definition of innato, we must also allow that his arguments 
The main strength of the case for are thorough, and even unanswerable. 
1 Lockets Essay (ed. A. C. Fraser vol.i,p.87,note  . ) L 
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innate ideas lay in its appeal to the doctrine of universal assent, 
which held that all men without exception agree. to the truth of certain 
ideas; and this Locke was able to show false with the greatest of ease. 
He then deals with the other arguments that had been advanced in support of 
innate ideas or principles until he has to his p m satisfaction proved the 
doctrine illusory, and can proceed to consider the true origin of ideas. 
The effects of Lockets assault were not long in showing themselves, and 
its power is seen in the way that the contrary opinion of Shaftesbury, mho was 
not without a considerable following, went down before it almost without 
resistance. AS has already been indicated, Hutchesonts work as an 
aesthetician consisted largely in the blending of the aesthetics of 
Shaftesbury and thc: philosophy of Locke into a coherent system. But 
Shaftesbury had more than once stated his belief in innate ideas, and had 
even hinted that the dispute about them was little more than verbal: "if 
you dislike the word innate, let us change it if you will for instinct; 
and call instinct that which nature teaches, exclusive of art, culture or 
discipline. "1 Elsewhere he had spoken rather scornfully of certain men who had 
to admit, despite arguments that religion and beauty were vain, that they were 
yet in a manner innate, or such as men were really born to and could hardly 
by any means avoid. "2 
Hutcheson took from Shaftesbury the conceptions of a moral sense and 
a sense of beauty, and made them fundamental principles in his systems of 
ethics and aesthetics respectively. He was also however convinced by 
Lockets denial of innate ideas, and had to make this quite clear if -his 
theories were not to become generally connected in men's minds with the doctrine 
1 
Characteristics, vol.ii,p.411 
2 ibid., vol.iii,p.36 
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of innate ideas; which, it must be apparent, they resembled with an almost 
embarrassing closeness. Hutcheson had therefore to anticipate criticism 
by claiming at the very outset that his internal senses in no way implied 
innate ideas. This was to a large extent accomplished by insisting on the 
substantial similarity between internal and external senses: "an internal 
sense no more supposes an innate idea or principie of knowledge than the 
external. Both are natural powers of perception. "1 In the accompanying 
inquiry into Virtue or Moral Good, speaking of the moral sense, he warns his 
readers not to "suppose that this moral sense, more than the other senses, 
supposes any innate ideasi2 or knowledge. end elsewhere he refers with 
evident approval to "those who after Locke have shaken off the groundless 
opinions about innate ideas. "3 
The result of the joint efforts of Locke and Hutcheson was that the 
doctrine of innate ideas was scarcely even a controversial issue for many 
years afterwards. host r,riters of treatises on rebated questions assumed that 
there were no such things, and seldom went to the trouble of repeating the 
arguments on either side. The general attitude is well represented by 
a footnote in Kames's Elements of Criticism, when he is explaining the terms 
he has used. "If the original perception of en object be not innate, which 
is obvious; it is not less obvious, that the idea or secondary perception of 
that object cannot be innate. .Abd yet, to prove this self- evident 
proposition, Locke has bestowed a whole book of his Treatise upon Human 
Underst..nding. So necessary is it to give accurate definitions, and so 
preventUive of dispute are definitions when accur ate. "4 Vihatever the 
1 Beauty and Virtue, p.82 
2 ibid., p.135 
3 
ibid., p.81 
4 wks. vol.v,p.461 note 
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intrinsic merit of this passage, it is certainly revealing if taken as an 
effect of Lockers opposition to innate ideas, and alongside it we may consider 
Knight's statement, made as late as 1805, that "the doctrine of innate ideas 
has been so completely confuted and exploded that no person in his senses can 
now entertain it. "1 
Nevertheless many writers who paid lip- service to the point of view 
expressed by Karnes held theories which were distinguished from innate 
principles by little more than their names. It was, for example, more or less 
taken for granted that taste, no matter how explained, was never to be 
regarded as an innate idea. Yet an exception is found even here, and Blair 
e 
brought down on his head the wrath of a contributor to the Critical Review 
by repeating the widely -held opinion that taste was undoubtedly "ultimately 
founded on a certain natural and instinctive sensibility to beauty. "2 The 
reviewer held that this supposed the existence of innate ideas, and wrote 
that "as we are no advocates for the doctrine of innate ideas, we cannot agree 
with our author when he derives taste from feeling, fram a certain natural and 
instinctive sensibility. "3 As Blair would no doubt have been in complete 
agreement with the reviewer's opinion of innate ideas, it is possible to 
deduce how uncritically the doctrines of the non -existence of innate ideas, and 
of taste as an instinctive sensibility or innate sense must have been accepted, 
when they could apparently be held together without a thought as to the 
possibility of their being inconsistent with each other. 
An exception must be made in the case of James Usher, who was one of the 
few to see that these two doctrines could not as they stood be logically 
united in one system, and who therefore sought for a solution which would 
1 Principles of Taste, p.33 
2 Lectures, vol.i,p.19 
Critical Review, LVI(1783),p.46 
85. 
involve the rejection of neither.-: Locke had undoubtedly been right in his 
denial of innate principles, but th ;s had had the unforeseen result of 
strengthening arguments for scepticism and materialism: for many had gone on 
to deduce that there could be no real foundation in nature for taste, morality, 
and conscience, which were therefore wrongly ascribed to the effects of 
custom, or "the apparent interests of men. "1 Usher went on to offer 
his solution; where Locke hnd his successors had erred was in failing to 
admit the existence of innate sentiments of truth, beauty and good. ^These were 
quite distinct from innate principles, and represented mans s natural predi spositior 
to love of virtue and beauty; deviations, being the result of human imperfections, 
could not be taken as proofs that these sentiments were not universal. Thus 
the denial of innate principles did not mean that taste and conscience had no 
real existence in man; for these being sentiments, the arguments against innate 
ideas and principles were in their case irrelevant. And if man be "enlightened 
and directed by innate sentiments, or intellectual tastes, then he has some fixed 
boundaries of judgment (and) he is singled out and distinguished from the 
brute by something more than mere capacity. "2 
It does not, appear however that Usher's solution received a very 
favourable reception. Few of his contemporaries paid attention to him, and 
the Critical Review referring to the 1770 edition of Clio, though it allows 
the work to be very proper and pious, fears that "the author has taken some 
premises for granted that remain to be proved. "3 Still, Usher can claim a 
certain amount of credit for putting his finger on a weak point in many of the 
systems of his day, even if his own endeavours were not always wholly successful. 
1/2 Clio (2013 ed'n),p.'- ix ff. 
Critical Review, .XXIX (177O),p.152 
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2. Sharpe's Theory of Genius. 
Certain eighteenth century conceptions of genius have already received 
some attention, and we now cane to one of the few theories in which genius is 
considered as neither divine inspiration nor unusual strength of imaginati 5n. 
At the very outset of his Dissertation upon Genius (1755), Sharpe acknowledges 
that he had received certain hints on his subject when studying the doctrine 
that sensation is the only original source of all our ideas, including those 
of ref1ection.1 This is patently a reference to Locke, who is also quoted 
as an authority later in the essay. ;It is therefore well to recall that Locke 
held that all our ideas spring from either sensation, or reflection on the 
operations of our own minds; and that these original ideas can be almost 
infinitely multiplied by analysing them, or rejoining them: in new combinations. 
Thus, according to Locke, the mind is capable of comprehending far more than the 
ideas originally furnished to it by sensation and reflection. 
Sharpe's professed intention is to work out a theor., of genius, based on 
the assumption that as at birth the mind of every man is a tabula rasa, all 
mental development must be attributable to the effects of the ideas received 
through the normal channels of sensation. and reflection. Sharpe further 
assumes that the faculties of all men are equal, and that it is therefore 
possible for any'man to become a genius, provided that he is not unduly handicapped, 
by disadvantages of environment and education. Sharpe holds that genius 
consists in the power of thinking which, though potentially the same in all 
men, may come to differ in them very considerably, through causes 'which may be 
physical as well as mental. Thus diversity of genius, and the varying degrees of 
1 Dissertation on Genius, p.2 
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it, are easily accounted for; since men may differ originally in their 
capacity for thought, and the difference may later be increased by favourable and 
unfavourable circumstances. Moreover, the ideas of some men are more "adequate "1 
than others, and this too will contribute to variety of genius. 
The common view is considered by Sharpe as due to a very natural error, 
for genius is indeed "fixed so strongly by the propensities of an early habit, 
and withal so imperceptibly, that it is mistaken for the constitutional 
character of our being. 1g2 Genius in fact begins to form at an age when man 
has certainly no control over it, and so is in its origin largely due to 
accident: but once it is implanted in a man, he has the power to develop. it 
into greatness, or to neglect it so that it may "sink into insignificancy. "3 
This partial control is possible for three reasons. A man may be fitted to 
receive certain ideas and to reject others, and can therefore take care that 
his genius develops., along the lines to which it is suited: this is consistent 
with Locke's remarks that unless sufficient attention is paid to organic 
sensation, no idea may result, and that ideas once received may or may not 
be firmly and clearly established in the mind according to the application of 
the individual concerned. Secondly, genius may be cultivated through man's 
"active power of revolving, examining, and conferring together the ideas thus 
severally and dstinctly received : "4 and finally, the ideas resulting from the 
comparison just mentioned may be so united as to make it possible for men with 
an aptitude to do so to "investigate their consequences and conclusions.'.4 
This again bears an obvinus relation to Lockè's theory of knowledge, which 
1 
cf. Locke's Essay , II,xxxi,I. adequate. ideas "perfectly represent those 
archetypes which the mind supposes them taken from; which it intends them to 
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stand for and to which it refers them." 
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begins with the entrance of ideas and proceeds, through the contemplation and 
comparison of these ideas, to that perception of their connection and agreement, 
or disagreement and repugnance,vhich for Locke constitutes knowledge. 
Sharpe's theories might fairly be described as an application of 
Locke's "new way of ideas" to the particular problem of genius. `!`here is at 
least one specific reference to Locke's essay, and nothing in the Dissertation 
is contrary to any of Locke's main theses: a detailed study of the exact 
relation between the two works would therefore be interesting, in that it would 
bring out clearly the theory of genius that is latent in Locke. It is at the same 
time noteworthy that the conception of genius implicit in Locke and explicit 
in Sharpe was not one vh.ch gained much support in the eighteenth century, and 
Sharpe was alone in working out a t e ey of genius on empirical principles. 
Nearly all other contemporary writers on this subject have preferred to refer 
genius to imagination, and have based their theories on the effcts rather 
thail on the cause; on the productions of men of recognised genius rather than 
on the possibility of the growth of genius in a human being born in favourable 
circumstances. 
A partial exception may be made of Abraham Tucker who, though he 
follows the majority by referring genius to the imagination, says that it 
"proceeds chiefly from the turn imagination has taken in our early youth "1 
rather than from unaided nature; and he adds that our "aptness to run into this 
or that particular course of exercise depends on some accident or lucky hit, or 
the company we converse iith....' Tis art and knowledge which drag forth the 
hidden seeds of native worth. "2 Tucker goes on to discuss, as Sharpe had done, 




the reasons for the emergence of genius at particular times and places, and 
for the fact that "men ingenious in a particular way generally arise together 
in clusters," and draws from this the conclusion that example has "at least 
as great a share as nature in the formation of genius. "1 It appears likely 
that Tucker knew the work of Sharpe, and he therefore provides a. solitary 
additional example of a theory of genius based on the philosophy of Locke. 
But on the whole Sharpers system stands outside the general trend of 
speculation on this particular aspect of aesthetic theory. 
3. Lockets Theory of Consciousness. 
The chief interest of Lockets theory of consciousness lies in his use 
of it to explain personal identity, and that is not relevant to the present 
discussion. In itself, Lockets definition is not ìaery original, and is 
distinctly reminiscent of that of Descartes. "Can the soul think, and not 
the man? or a man think, and not be conscious of it ?....thinking consists in 
being conscious that one thinks....Consciousness is the perception of what 
passes in a manis own mind. "2 This, simple as it may be, is clearly fundamental 
to Lockets whole system, for as was well said by Mayne, who wrote a short 
paper on this subject, "it follows that consciousness is indeed the basis and 
foundation of all knowledge whatsoever; "3without it, the could have no idea of any 
object at all. 
The chief use made of Lockets conception of consciousness by later 
aestheticians was as an argument in favour of the existence of the internal 
senses. Thus George Turnbull writes, in the long and interesting introduction 
to his Treatise on Ancient Painting, that "whether :fe have those (internal) 
1 Light of Nature Pursued, vol.ii,p.146 
2 
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senses that have been mentioned....can only be known by consciousness, and 
therefore in speaking of them an appeal must be made to what we feel and 
perceive. It is the same with regard to all our other faculties and 
perceptions. There can be no other way of convincing one that he hath certain 
powers, ideas and feelings but by endeavouring to make him turn his eyes 
inwards, look attentively into his own mind, and observe what passes in it. "1 
A similar argument is found in Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric. Campbell 
begins by attributing to consciousness our knowledge of the fact that we 
ourselves exist; this knowledge implies certainty of the reality of our 
sensations and passions and of everything whose essence consists in being 
perceived. "2 Campbell then goes on to account in the same way for our 
infallible judgments 7concerning the feelings, whether pleasant or painful, 
which we derive from the....internal senses. "2 The danger of such a theory 
is too obvious to need comment, even if this were the place to make its but 
it should be noted that the difficulty had been foreseen by Hume when he 
. criticized the idea that "all sentiment is right, because it has a reference 
to nothing beyond itself. "3 The truth is that the theory of consciousness 
laid down by Locke was from the outset too temptingly catholic in its possible 
application, and could therefore be used as a justification for many 
extravagances. 
A unique case is the attempt of puff to make the Lockean consciousness 
a mere department of the imagination. In defining imagination at the 
beginning of his Essay on Original Genius, Duff notes that it is "that faculty 
whereby the mind....reflects on its oval operations. "4 This is clearly 
1 
2 
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derived from Lockets theory of consciousness, and can best be explained 
by assuming that Duff considered that the work of imagination in assembling 
the ideas of sensation and memory and then in "compounding or disjoining 
them it leisure.`a -necessarily involved the operation of consciousness. 
He therefore in all probability decided that this function, being essential to 
the processes of genius, was best considered as an integral part of imagination. 
4. Lockets Analysis of Ideas. 
Though Lockets analysis of ideas has not in itself any aesthetic 
significance, it is nevertheless important in that it forms the basis cf the 
analysis of mords and language to which Locke proceeded in the third book of the 
Essay. As this theory of language, with its relation to later eighteenth 
century speculation on the same subject, is to be discussed in the next 
chapter, it will be convenient to review now the main features of Lockets 
classification of ideas. 
The definition of idea given by Locke at the beginning of his ssay 
is "that term which....serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the 
understanding when a man thinks. "2 Lockets primary division of ideas is into 
simple and complex. Simple ideas are such original ideas of sensation or 
reflection as cause one single conception in the mind, and cannot be fubther 
analysed because they are in themselves pure and uncompounded: Locke gives 
as examples knowledge, faith, pleasure, pain and unity. Complex ideas on 
the other hand are such combinations of simple ideas as will when united appear 
to the mind as a single idea, as does for example the idea of a garden, 
though this obviously includes a great variety of simple ideas. 
l On Original Genius, p.6 
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Locke proceeds to subdivide complex ideas into modes, suostances, 
and relations. The last of the se arises fram the ''consideration and 
comparing one idea with another, "1 and hence the ideas of husband, wife 
express relations while those of man and woman do not. Substances are 
"such combinations of simple ideas as are taken to represent distinct 
particular things subsisting by themselves; in which the supposed or confused 
idea of substance....is always the first and chief. "2 If therefore we 
consider together certain simple ideas we shall be able to form conceptions of 
such substances as metal or animal. Triodes have no existence in the real 
world of things, but are "dependences on or affections of substances; such 
as are ideas signified by the words triangle, gratitude, murder, etc.'`3 
Locke recognises two sorts of modes; the simple mode which involves the e xtens4ion 
of one simple idea only, as in the cases of number, duration of time and space, 
or even artificial infinity; and the complex mode, which may combine a variety 
of simple ideas to give compounded ideas such as those of beauty or crime. 
Furthermore, ideas may be considered as particular or general. Eaeh 
separate individual man will give rise to the particular idea of this man; then 
by the process of abstraction, or considering all these ideas freed from the 
circumstances which determine their individuality by character, time, place, etc., 
the mind arrives at the general idea of man, by which it considers only 
what is common to all its particular ideas of men. This may then be considered 
as the genus man; and by including the kualif ication of black skin, we may then 
arrive at the species called negro if we so desire. It is important in 
reading Locke to remember that he considers that all these genera and species 
are but "an artifice of the understanding, "4 made by man for his convenience. 
1 Essay, II,xii,7 







Thus we have in summary the foundations on v,hich Locke erected his theory 
of language. 
ChaPTER VII 
LOCKE AND THE THEORY OF LANGUAGE 
1. The Nature and Use of Language. 
Locke's view of language is very obviously coloured by his epistemological 
aims, and it is well to keep this in mind when considering his statement that 
"the end of language is to mark, or communicate men's thoughts to one another 
with all the dispatch that may be. "1 Locke like Bacon does not linger overlong 
in the theatre; poetry receives no attention at all; and rhetoric is quickly 
dismissed with a sarcastic reference to men's apparent pleasure in being 
a 
deceived. Language is for Locke primarily /eons to knowledge, and it is as 
such that he investigates it in his Essay: consequently, his treatment of 
the subject can have no claim to campleteness, and his omisions gave rise to 
almost as much discussion' as his conclusions. Locke's theory of language 
is interesting, not only intrinsically as presenting a new viewpoint, but also 
historically, for few of the writers on the subject in the next hundred years 
could afford to ignore Locke, and many of them were directly influenced by him. 
In the Essay, Locke refers to language as a "system of articulate sounds,- 
and this #ay serve as a starting -point for the examination of his theory. 
Our ideas are the marks by which we remember the reality of things, and as 
marks of our ideas we can set aside arbitrarily certain articulate sounds. 
When men mutually agree to use the same marks for the same ideas, the marks 
became signs by which we can convey to others our ideas and conceptions, and 
1 Essay, II,xxii,5 
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we have the beginnings of language. Thus an object and the name given to 
it should rouse in men the same idea. But it is clearly impossible for 
every thing and every idea to have a proper named and so by the process of 
abstraction we arrive at first abstract ideas, then general names, and later 
genera and species, the sole purpose of. which is so to classify ideas that men 
will require to learn many fewer names than would otherwise be possible. This 
classification is made on the basis of what Locke calls the nominal essence, 
or that collection of properties which the mind combines into a complex idea 
with a specific name: it is to be distinguished from the real essence, which 
is based on the reality of things and is in many cases unknowable. Nominal 
essences are therefore no more than a creation of the mind, having no relation 
at all to particular existence, and so from them we have no knowledge of real 
existence. 
There can moreover be no guarantee that men will almays have exactly 
the same combination of properties in mind when they use the heme which designates 
the nominal essence, and even such a simple word as chair may cause very different 
ideas in several men. Thus Locke tends to insist on the defects of language. 
"For he that shall well consider the errors and obscurity, the mistakes and 
confusion that are spread in the world by an ill use of words will find some 
reason to doubt whether language, as it has been employed, has cnntribut'ed 
more to the improvement or hindrance of knowledge among mankind. "1 At the same 
time language is, as he admits, the "tie of society," in that it makes it 
possible for man to satisfy his natural desire for closer relations with 
other human beings on the mental, as well as the merely physical or animal 
plane. 
1 Essay, III,xi,4 
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Such a theory could not go long unchallenged, and Berkeley's 
criticisms of it represent a very natural reaction, which must have been 
shared by many others. Berkeley in the introduction to his Principles of 
Human Knowledge makes an attack on Locke's doctrine of abstraction, at the 
end of which he points out that the doctrine is based on the opinion that 
the only end of language is to communicate ideas, with the consequent assumption 
that "every significant name stands for an idea,"1 and that therefore 
names which do not stand for Particular ideas, must stand for general or 
abstract ideas. In reply to this Berkeley argues that many common words 
do not call up distinct ideas, and that in any case it is quite possible to 
understand a speaker without each of his words calling up a specific idea in 
our minds. Moreover, "the communicating of ideas marked by words is not the 
chief and only end of language, as is commonly supposed. There are other 
ends, as the raising of some passion, the exciting to or deterring from an 
action, the putting the mind in some particular disposition."2 This last 
statement is very important as supplying a very necessary corrective to the 
too one -sided theory of Locke; although it is not original, something of the 
sort being found in Hobbes, and indeed in Aristotle. 
Berkeley thus makes room in his system for the arts which employ 
language, for if the "raising certain passions, dispositions or emotions" in 
men's minds be a legitimate end of language, poetry and rhetoric are to be 
not only admitted but even encouraged as ways par excellence of accomplishing 
this purpose. ';'here he and others holding similar views differed essentially 
from Locke was not so much in theory as in attitude; Locke did not deny that 
rhetoric possessed beauties, but these were not in his view alone sufficient 
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to justify the perversion of language to the ends of deception. "All the 
art of rhetoric, besides order and clearness, all the artificial and figurative 
application of words eloquence hath invented, are for nothing else but to 
insinuate wrong ideas, move the passions, and thereby mislead the judgment, 
and so indeed are perfect cheats. "1 There are therefore at the very beginning 
of the eighteenth century two clear statements of opposite points of view: 
that of Locke, which c:.:nnot but recall Plato' s exclusion of the works of some 
of the greatest Greek poets from his republic, and that of Berkeley representing 
a reaction to the narrow view expressed by Locke. 
It is only. to be expected that the latter view should Drevail among 
writers on aesthetic subjects, and it is therefore very rare to find in them 
any express approval of 'Lockets general theory. Such agreement as may occasionally 
appear is not necessarily a sign of Lockean influence; for example, Viarburtonts 
views on eloquence are probably in the main his own, though his conclusion 
that the end of eloquence is "but to stifle reason and inflame the passions" 
would no doubt have won Lockets approval. Stedman's definition of l:;.nguage 
as a "vehicle or machine by which ideas are conveyed from one mind to another "2 
may have been suggested by Locke: as may the assumption of Karnes that 
"communication of thought is the chief end of language." But there is 
scarcely one aesthetician who would h.-ye been likely to cane forward to 
defend the thesis that the/communication of ideas was the "chief and only end 
of language. "3 In so far as they were concerned with language, it was its 
beauties that they wished to analyse, and they were therefore necessarily one 
with Berkeley in holding that "there may be another use of words besides marking 
ideas. "4 
! 
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2. The Classification of ;tords. 
Lockets cl:ssification of words is clearly made in conformity with 
his belief that communication of ideas is the only end of language. His 
main division is into names of simple ideas, modes, and substances, all of W ich 
are given careful and detailed consideratio, and what Locke calls "particles," 
or words used to show the connection which the mind báves to its ideas. 
According to Locke, particles show "what connection, restriction, distinction, 
opposition, emphasis, etc.," a man wants to give to the different Parts of 
his discourse, and are ti_erefore "of constant and indispensable use in 
language- The chapter on p articles is one of the shortest in the whole 
essay. This is not because Locke fails to reconise their importance, 
for he sees that without them his analysis of.language would h:ve been notably 
defective, but because he considers that an exhaustive inquiry into their 
full scope is not essential to his immediate purpose. 
Lockets theory of language has v,Jry obvious limitations, and suffers 
from his insistence that words which do not stand for ideas are but empty 
and insignificant sounds. His classification of wo_ds was however 
influential as regards both method and detail, and was made the basis of 
more than one fresh classification during the succeeding century. Even 
writers like Harris and ivionboddo, who rn.:de interesting contributions of 
their own to the discussion of language, show .knowledge of Locke; while 
others, like Hartley and Burke, seized on those aspects of Locke's theory 
which seemed most gemmane to their own purposes, and largely based their 
accounts on them. 
1 Essay, III,vii,2 
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Harris, when he carnes to treat more generally of language in Book III 
of his Hermes. has clearly got Locke in mind -:hen he declares that words, 
being the symbols of neither "external particulars, nor -et particular ideas," 
can be the symbols of nothing else "except of general ideas." From this Harris 
deduces that language can be the means of expressing general truths of evry 
kind, and that the essential use of words is to stand for general ideas, 
though they can also represent particular ideas "secondarily, acieidentally, and 
mediately. "l Hence language is an adequate medium of both arts and sciences, 
and Harris shows that this is dúe to its use of symbols, which /has made 
possible the comp. rative simplicity of language as we know it. The relation of 
this particular passage to Lockets belief in the prime importance of general 
ideas is clear enough without further con Lent. 
Monboddo's remarkable work on language,though it cannot be denied 
the title of original in a wider sense, drew to a great extent on ti-_e learning 
of the past. Monboddo's references to Locke are not on the whole 
complimentary; nevertheless what might be called the preamble to Monboddo's 
statement of his own theory bears an obvious relation to Locke's work on the 
same subject. His initial definition of language as the expression of the 
conceptions of the mind by articulate sounds is itself reminiscent of Locke; 
and his later division of the art of language into accurate and distinct 
expression of ideas, brevity, the marking of the connections of words one 
with another, and choice of agreeable and varied s.unds2 adds little to Locke's 
views that the "use of language is by short sounds to signify with ease and 
dispatch general conceptions,i5 and that particles or connections are 
N ks.,p.215 
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"indispensable." Monboddo's fourth point was not overlooked by Locke, who did 
not, however, consider it a legitimate use of language. 
Monboddo claims that the first and most fundamental part of an art 
of language is classing things into genera and species, because it helps to prevent 
such multiplication of particular terms as would plunge a language into 
confusion. This done, language is rendered fit for its tasit - of communicating 
to others "the operations of our minds "1 by the invention of means to show the 
connections of words with one another. This is so clearly derived from 
Locke that it seems reasonable to look to the same source for Monboddo's 
classification of all that is expressed by language under the two heads of 
things themselves and the relations or connections of things.2 The latter in 
fact parallels Lockets particles: and the first when subdivided into substances 
and their properties (Lockets substances and simple ideas), and actions and their 
circumstances (modes and more simple ideas) are not so different from Locke's 
classification as to contradict the belief that the one theory suggested the 
other. 
Hartley's primary interest was in the association of ideas, and his 
theory of language is merely a variation on his main theme, in which he holds 
that words are connected with ideas by means of association. He has elsewhere, 
however, a fourfold division of words into those that have ideas only; 
those that have definitions only; those that have both ideas and definitions; 
and those that have neither ideas nor definitions.3 As Hartley is in this 
passage meaning sense ideas, the division has an obvious affinity with 
Locke's chapter Of the Names of Simple Ideas, in which he states that only 
simple ideas can not be defined; in a broader sense, the division suggested 
1 Origin and Progress of Tanguage, vol.ii,p.16 
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by Hartley may be compared with Locke's simple ideas; modes, which have their 
patterns in the human mind, and do not therefore correspond to any real 
existence; and substances, which have counterparts in the rdality of things. 
Hartleyts fourth class, as an example of which he gives the word of, supplies 
what he probably considered an obvious deficiency in the theory of Locke, 
who had omitted to explain how such words could raise determinate ideas in 
the minds of listeners. 
The relation of Burke's analysis of language to the theories of Locke 
was first noticed some years ago, when Mr. Wecter suggestec{in a short articlel 
that Burke's division of words into -ghat he calls aggreate, simple abstract, and 
compound abstract words is based on Locke's distinction between the three types of 
complex idea - modes, substances, and relations. It is I think undeniable that 
that Burke was, in making his classification, influenced by Locke's Essay 
but it seems in every may more probable that it was on Lockets division of 
words rather than ideas that he founded his theory. In the third book of the 
Essay, Locke considers words as names of simple ideas, modes, and substances, 
but at no time refers to relations. This is in itself a trivial point, 
but it ill, when taken in conjunction with certain other facts, be seen to 
indicate a conclusion different from that arrived at by Mr. - ;ecter, who 
argues that aggregate words correspond to substances, simple abstract words 
to modes, and compotind abstract words to relations. 
The relevant passage from Burke is as follows: "Words may be divided 
into three sorts. The first are such as represent many simple ideas united 
by nature to form some one determinate composition, as man, horse, tree, cattle, 
etc. These F call aggregate words. The second are they that stand for one 
1 
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simple idea of such compositions, and no more; as red, blue, round, square, and 
the like. These I call simple abstract words. The third are those which 
are formed by an union, an arbitrary union of both the others, and of the 
various relations between them in greater or lesser degrees of complexity; 
as virtue, honour, persuasion, magistrate, and the like. These I call 
compound abstract words.i' Aggregate words, undoubtedly correspond to Locke's 
substances: but it is difficult to see any justification for the connecting 
of simple and compound abstract words with modes and substances respectively. 
Simple abstracts come far nearer to Locke's simple ideas, and the additi.n of 
abstract signifies that they represent ideas abstracted from particular things: 
this would account for Burke's first two examples, which are both colours, and 
the last two are easily explained as simple modes, which Locke describes as 
"the variation of one only simple idea cambined,i2 and as an instance of which 
he specifically mentions"figuré. Burke's third class can have no possible 
connection with Locke's relations: but they may very well be derived from 
Locke's conception of mixed modes. These are complex ideas which are 
entirely the work of the mind,.which gives quite arbitrarily to several simple 
ideas the "union of one idea.i3 Two of the ways in which such ideas may 
be formed are "by experience and observation of the things themselves, "4 or 
"by invention, or voluntary putting together of several simple ideas in our 
minds. "4 The examples of mixed modes given by Locke are beauty, theft, 
obligation, drunkenness, a lie. This indicates that Burke had principally 
in his mind Locke's cuss of complex modes when he formed his own class of 
compound abstract words, and this is confirmed by his remark that such words, 
l Wks., vol.ii,p.207 






being compositions, "are not real essences, and hardly cause I think any real 
tbdeas. "1 
Burke has therefore in his short discourse on words, clearly drawn on 
the third book of Lockets Essay to a considerable extent, and has made useof 
all Lockets classes of words: the names of simple ideas, and that extension of 
them which Locke calls simple modes, become simple abstract Words; mixed modes 
become compound abstract words; and the names of substances become what Burke 
calls aggregate words.2 But it is notable thut Burke does not go on to 
a 
consider particles, and /reason for this is not hard to find. Burkets interest 
in language was confined to that power in words which renders them capable of 
raising in man beautiful and sublime emotions. Before he could satisfactorily 
account for this power, he had to consider the "coia:ion notion "1 that words 
"affect the mind by raising in it ideas of those things for which custom has 
appointed them to stand.i3 The best way in which he could do this was by 
adopting, with convenient modifications, Lockets classification of words which 
was, as has been seen, based entirely on his system of ideas. Hence Burke,-unlike 
Locke, admits that words are "capable of being classed into more curious 
distinctions, "3 but adds that the classes he has adopted aro sufficient for 
his purpose. 
3. Language as an Aesthetic Medium. 
It has already been made abundantly clear that Locke was not himself 
concerned with any other aspect of language than the one which first brought 
J 
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him to consider it - its close connection with ideas and therefore 7ith 
knowledge. His final opinion was that the only social use of language was the 
communication of ideas, and that mords could do this only when they stood for 
distinct ideas, and excited the same distinct ideas in the mind of the listener. 
Berkeleyts vigorous opposition to Locke on all these points seems to have 
been of little avail if we are to accept Burks statement, already referred to, 
that "the common notion of the pomer of poetry and eloquence, as well as that 
of words in ordinary conversation, is, that they affect the mind by raising 
in it ideas of those things for which custom has appointed them to stand. "1 
It is then probable that up to and even after 1750 Lockets view of language 
had so far held its ground that his main contentions remained almost 
the 
unchallenged, thus making difficult any really satisfactory study of use of 
language as an artistic medium. 
There were however two possible loopholes in Lockets defensive wall, and 
both were exploited to some effect. The first was his failure to distinguish 
between ideas, and images in the po_:;ular sense of pictures in the mind: 
the second was his position with regard to words considered as sounds, which 
allowed of considerable development in several directions. It is notable 
that Locke is far less explicit in his references to images than is EEEEe 
Hobbes, Shaftesbury, or Berkeley, all of whom state very clearly that images 
are representations of external objects, and go on to connect images with 
ideas. The nearest Locke comes to doing this is in his Conduct of the 
Understanding, when he writes that "the ideas and images in ments minds are 
the invisible powers that constantly govern them, "2 and this seems to confirm 
1 ks. vol.ii,p.207 
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Reid's confident assertion that Locke among other philosophers believed that 
men formed images in their minds of the external objects they desired to 
perceive.1 
The importance to aesthetics of such a concession on Lockers part 
is obvious. If words exercise over men's minds almost the same effect as 
the objects themselves, it is a legitimate deduction that they may raise in men's 
minds images of external objects. Thus Addison can claim that "words, when 
well chosen, have no great a force in them, that a description often gives us 
more lively ideas than the sight of things themselves.r2 The reason for this 
ispartly Addison's strangely limited view of imagination as confined to 
objects of sight, which means that then a man looks at a scene, only that 
part of it which is visible Pleases; whereas a poet may in his description 
also reveal parts of the scene which were not perceived by the first and 
perhaps restricted survey. _ddison also draws upon Locke's philosophy; 
the casual observer may perceive only "two or three simple ideas, "2 while 
the poet may be able to present more capplex ideas, or to select such ideas 
as are better fitted to excite the imagination. The same theory is found 
a few years later in Blackmore, who however makes the interesting addition 
that when the poet has a "bright" idea of an object, his mind "stamps the 
impression on the proper words so strongly that the absent object seems as 
if present to the reader. "3 It appears unlikely tht this conclusion would 
have appealed to Locke, who had discussed briefly and with typical 
detachment the connection between words and their sounds: "sounds have no 
natural connection with our ideas, but have all their signification fr anthe 
1 Essays, vol.i,p.153 




arbitrary imposition of men, "1 mad so that no sound is better fitted than any 
other to signify any idea. 
It was therefore possible, without committing oneself to an opinion 
whichmight be considered as hostile to Locke's philosophy in general, and his 
theory of language in particular, to consider words as signs, or sounds, or 
images which could evoke pictures in the mind. Harris in his essay on 
Music, Painting and Poetry (1744) was the first to consider all three aspects 
at once.2 That he did so was due quite simply to his basic thesis that these 
three arts agreed in being imitative, and that tiere was therefore enough 
in common to permit of a comparison of them; and to the obvious enough facts 
that poetry imitates by sound significant. or signs, music by sounds, and 
painting by pictures or images. Harris is thus able to argue early in 
his essay that poetic imitation is superior to that of either painting or 
music, because "its materials are words, and words are symbols, by contract, 
of all ideas. "3 It may even by sounds attempt a direct imitation of nature, 
but is not often successful unless the sounds are also significant. But the 
greatest advantage of poetry is that it can by imitating discourse reveal the 
"characters, manners, and passions of men, "4 and that it is therefore not only 
an "adequate medium of imitation, but in sentiment the only medium. "4 
Harris's treatise did much to prepare the may for the discussion of the 
imitative nature of poetry that was to occupy so prominent a place in aesthetic 
speculation in the second half of the eighteenth century. It was however less 
influential than the Inquiry of Burke, which appeared just over a decade later, 
1 
Essay, III,ix,4 
2 It is but justice to acknowledge th"t Sir :illiam Temple had in his Essay on 
Poetry claimed that "in poetry are assembled all the powers of eloquence, 
music, and picture." The difference is that Harris's approach is that of 
an investigator and not that of a panegyrist: the resemblances between these 
arts had often been observed before, but not with reference to words as the 
3 
"symbols, by contract, of all ideas. " 
)as., p.32 ibid., p.38 
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and which brought to bear on the subject the methods of Locke himself, though 
it was far from ac, epting all his conclusions. 'Indeed, the first point the t 
Burke makes in his sections on language is that poetry does not obtain its 
effects by raising the ideas of things, as might be supposed from the 
philosophy of Locke. Burke supports his argument by analysing the effects of 
Compound abstract words; these are compounds made by the mind and are not real 
essences, so can not be held to raise determinate ideas in the mind. They 
might do so if we hhd time to analyse each into its component simple ideas; 
but even if we could do this the effect of the compound would then be lost, 
Hence, concludes Burke, such words are mere sounds; but sounds which have 
by long habit been connected ,:pith certain circumstances, and which will 
therefore when heard have on the mind the very effect produced by the original 
circumstances. 
Having thus refuted Lockets argument that unless a word raises in the 
hearer a clear and distihct idea, it is a meaningless sound, Burke goes on 
to re- examine the whole question. There are three possible ways in which 
words may affect us; the first is by their sound, the second by the image 
of the thing signified by the s._und, and the third is by the affection of 
the soul produced by one or by both of the foregoing. "1 He then proceeds in 
the manner of Locke to apply these conclusions to the different classes of 
words; compound abstract words can affect by sound and sentiment only, but 
simple abstract and aggregate may affect by all three ways,though in 
practice the latter rarely do so. when aggregate words do in fact raise an 
image in the mind, it is nearly always due to conscious effort on the part of . 
the imagination; and in general they operate just as do compound abstracts; 





Burke then deals in some detail with the power of words over the 
passions, but has remarkably little to say on the third way in which! words 
may affect men; he does however indicate that descriptive poetry operates 
largely by sounds," which by custom have the effects of realities. Nothing 
is an imitation further than as it resembles some other thing, and words 
undoubtedly have no sort of resemblance to the ideas for which they stand. "1 
It is interesting to compare this with a passage in one of Dr. Johnson's 
Ramblers written several years earlier, in which Johnson h_<d argued that 
"the general resemblance of the sound to the sense is to be found in every 
language which admits of poetry, in every author whose force of fancy enables 
him to impress images strongly on his own mind, and whose choice and variety 
of language readily supply him with just representations. To such a writer, it 
is natural to change his Measure with the subject, even without any effort 
of the understanding, or intervention of the judgment. "2 This particular 
aspect of the general problem is also treated by Daniel Webb, who tried to 
place it on a more scientific basis by arguing that words were but 
modifications of sound and motion, the former by means of vowels, and the 
latter by consonants: and that therefore words were capable of imitating 
directly any ideas that are naturally related to either sound or motion.3 
Burke's own conclusions were far different. Poetry, "taken in its most 
general sense, "1 was not really an imitative art at all, though. it could 
imitate dramatically, by showing.men express their characters and passions 
in words which seem to be their own. Description was not the proper province 
of either poetry or eloquence, and could be done far better by painting: the 
business of poetry and rhetoric was "to affect rather by sympathy than 
2 
Rambler, no. 94 
Wks.,vol.ii,p.216 
3 Poetry and Music, pp.63ff. 
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imitation; to display rather the effect of things on the mind of the speaker, 
or of others, than to present a clear idea of the things themselves. "1 This 
so far as it related to the irritative nature of poetry was generally accepted 
by Burke's successors, and it must be granted that Burke performed an 
important service to aesthetics by disposing finally of the belief that 
words necessarily called up images in the mind if they had any meaning 
at all. The effect of his speculations on poetic imitation was quickly 
a parent, and it was soon recognised as almost a commonplace that the only 
truly imitative types of poetry were dramatic or epic, which could present 
immediately to a listener the passions or sentiments of men, This view was 
endorsed in their different ways by Jones, Gerard, and Blair. 
The allied question of how far language is imitative2 was not however 
answered so easily, and as has been indicated speculation on this particular 
aspect of the problem continued to occupy men's attention. Against Webb's 
advocacy of the close connection between sound and sense can be set Campbell's 
view that "the resemblance or analogy which the sound can in any case be _made 
to bear to the sense is, at best, when we consider it abstractly, but very 
remote. Often a beauty of this kind is more the creature of the reader's 
fancy than the effect of the writer's ingenuity. "3 Yet Campbell is 
ready to except from this general statement the effect which may be produced 
by such a resemblance in certain types of poetry, and which is stronger 
"that any other whereof language alone is susceptible." Even this concession 
1 tißcs., vol.ii,p.215 
2 The view of Thames Robertson, Minister of Dalmeny, is quite unique, so should 
be referred to here. Robertson held that speech was a fine ̀ art of the same 
general nature as music. "The theory of speech as a fine art, treats of 
words as sounds....and gives the principles of prose and verse. It is the 
most general in its nature; and hence....the most extensive in its influence 
of all the fine arts." Unfortunately Robertson did not complete his scheme 
of An Inquiry into the Fine Arts, for only one volume was published, so his 
3 
theory of speech was never fully expounded. 
Philosophy of Rhetoric, vol.ii,p.257 
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is refused by Blair and Harpur; the former distinguishes sharply between 
imitation and description, and goes on to insist that words unlike pictures 
or statues, "have no natural resemblance to what they signify. "l ;lsewhere 
however Blair pays a good deal of attention to the possible music of words, and 
he has some interesting things to say on the subject, though many of them were 
probably suggested by his predecessors. At ane point he even admits that 
there may originally have been a connection between, words and their objects, 
but adds that any such connection has by now been obliterated by the 
development of language from its primitive state. Harpur on the other 
hand, writing in 181q dismisses the subject as if there never had been any 
problem to consider; is words have not any natural analogy to the things which 
they signify, language can be adequate to such mimetic representation, onl, 
as it is significant by compact. "2 
One of the best and clearest passa as dealing with the relation of sound 
to sense is found in Thomas Twining's Dissertation on Poetry Considered as an 
Imitative .xt, which is prefixed to his translation of Aristotle's Poetics. 
Twining was a scholar rather than a speculative thinker, and it is as such that 
he treats his subject. "Inevery imitation, strictly and properly so- called, 
two conditions seem essential: the resemblance must be immediate....and it must 
also be obvious. "3 Twining's expression of his opinion is so admirably 
concise that it is better to allow him to continue to speak for himself. 
"The materials of poetic imitation are words. These may be considered 
in two views; as sounds merely, and as sounds significant, or arbitrary and 
conventional signs of ideas. It is evidently in the first view only that words 
1 Lectures, vol.i,p.107 
2 Essay,p.20 
3 Aristotle's Poetics, p.4 
can bear any real resemblance to the things expressed; and accordingly that 
kind of imitation which consists in the resemblance of words considered as 
mete sound, to the sound and motions of the objects imitated, has usually 
been assigned as the instance in which the term imitative is in its strict 
and proper sense, applicable to poetry. But....even in such words, and such 
arrangements of words as areactually in some degree analogous in sound or 
motion to the thing signified or described, the resemblance is so faint and 
distant, and of so general and vague a nature, that it would never of itself lead ud 
to recognise the object imitated. We discover not the likeness till 
know the meaning. The natural relation of the word to the thing signified 
is punted out only by its arbitrary or conventional relation. "1 
It follows from this that if we call poetry imitative, we can not be using 
imitation in the same strictly limited sense in which we apply it to works of 
painting or sculpture. Poetic imitation involves the use, not of simple 
sounds, but of sounds significant: and language is a proper medium for such 
imitation primarily as it is significant, and only secondarily as it bears 
a distinct resemblance, discoverable only through the meaning, to natural 
sounds. 
Apart from this very complete discussion of words as sounds, Twining has 
little that is original to contribute; poetry can describe well only inasmuch 
as it can raise an "ideal image or picture, more or less resembling the 
reality of things, "2 and is properly imitative only when dramatic or personative, 
as in epic or history. In Twining, therefore, as in Locke almost exactly 
1 Aristotle's Poetics, p.6 
2 ibid., p.9 
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a hundred years earlier, there are three possible ways in which words may be 
considered; as signs, as sounds; and as images. The debt to Locke of all 
writers in these intervening years and indeed later on this subject is indeed 
great, not only because of the questions asked and the answers given by Locke, 
but also because of the very method : f his inquiry, which encouraged a new 
approach to a subject that had already been very fully treated by the :Titers 
of anti.;ui ty. 
PART III 
TWO MAIN AESTHETIC CURRENTS 
CHAPTER VIII 
LOCKE AMID THE INTERNAL SENSES. 
1. The Development of the 'Internal Sense' Theory. 
The credit for giving the theory of the internal senses the form in which it 
enjoyed such popularity for more than half of the eighteenth century, before 
it vanished almost as suddenly as it appeared, must go principally to Francis 
Hutcheson. At the same time, paradoxically enough, the theory as given shape 
by Ehtcheson h:.d little in it that was original, for all the necessary 
ingredients were to be found in the works of Locke and Shaftesbury. 
Hutcheson's importance is due to the fact that he perceived the possibilities 
latent in Shaftesbury's sense of beauty and his moral sense and that 
he provided them with a convincing philosophical justification from the 
works of Locke. 
Even the name "internal sense" came from Locke, who used the phrase when 
trying t,_ explain what he meant by ideas of reflection as opposed to ideas 
of sensation. Sensation and reflection were for Locke the only sources 
of all man's ideas; the mind at birth is a tabula rasa, and its first 
materials are received through the organs of sense, and are therefore called 
ideas of sensation. Once provided with these ideas of sensation, the 
mind begins to operate on them by perceiving them,thinking about them, mowing 
them, and all the other activities attributed to the mind. But man has the 
power of observing the: e activities of his own mind, end his consciousness 
of them supplies him with a new set of ideas which Locke has called ideas of 
reflection "This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and 
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though it be not sense, ,s having nothing to do with external objects, yet 
it is very like it, and might grope rly enough be called an internal sense. 
But as I call the other sensation, so I call tids reflection, the ideas it 
affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own 
operations within itself. "1 Later in the Essay Locke again employs the 
phrase when he says that "external and internal sensation are the only 
passages that I can find of knowledge to the understanding. 112 It is 
important to note that for Locke reflection meant man's power of 
contemplating the operations of his own m-nd, and this he interprets in a 
very broad sense "as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about 
its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them, such as is 
the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought. "1 Ir. other words 
Lock, allows that the perceptions of tais internal sense may include the 
pleasure or pain rising from the "thoughts of our minds, or anything 
operating on our bodies. "3 
There is no evidence to show that Shaftesbury even contemplated the 
building up of a theory of internal senses akin to that of Hutcheson, though 
his dodtrine of the sense of the good and the beautiful appears in his 
early work on Virtue and Merit, and is maintained in his later and more 
mature works. He does indeed once use the words "internal sensation 
»-f- 
but with a writer so rhetorical as Shaftesbury too much importance cannot 
be attributed to a single instance, esp.cially when nothing in the context 
indicates that Shaftesbury himself regarded the usage as significant. 
The 
1 Essay, 
2 ibid., Il,xi, l7 
3 ibid., 
4 Characteristics, vol.ii,p.284 
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chief interest lies, therefore, in Shaftesbury's accounts of the moral sense 
and of the sense of beauty, and in the examination of how far these 
contributed to the conception of the internaL:senses arrived at by 
Hutcheson. 
The earliest and one of the clearest statements of Shaftesbury's 
position appears near the beginning of his Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit. 
As the title of his inquiry indicates, Shaftesbury's approach to the problem is 
that of the moral philosopher, and his primary concern is with virtue, 
or moral beauty, though in his later work his point of view gradually 
long 
changed till his last work, the/unpublished Second Characters, reveals 
him as an aesthetician pure and simple. But even in trlis earliest 
work his incidental references to the beauty of the material world are 
in themselves striking enough with a view to the future development of 
aesthetic theory. One pL,ssage concerned is of such importance that it 
must be nuoted in full. 
"The case is the sine in the mental or moral subjects as in the 
ordinary bodies or common subjects of sense. The shapes, motions, colours, 
and proportions of these latter being presented to our eye, there 
necessarily results a Beauty or Deformity, according to the different 
measure, arrangement, and disposition of their several parts. So in 
behaviour and action`, when presented to our understanding, there must 
be found, of necessity, an apparent difference, according to the regularity 
or irregularity of the subjects. 
"The mind which is spectator or auditor of other minds cannot be 
without its eye and ear; so as to discern proportion, distinguish sound, and 
scan each sentiment or thought which conies before it. It can let nothing 
117. 
escape its censure. It feels the soft and harsh, the agreeable and 
disagreeable, in the affections; and finds a foul and a pair, a harmonious 
and a dissonant, as really and truly here, as in any musical numbers, or 
in the outward forms or representations of sensible things. Nor can it 
with9hold its admiration and ecstasy, its aversion an,. scorn, any more 
in what relates to one than to the other of these subjects. So that 
to deny the common and natural sense of a sublime and beautiful in things 
will appear an affectation merely, to anyone who considers duly of this 
affair.'1 
Shaftesbury proceeds to construct on this foundation his theory of a 
moral sense which, he holds, must consist in the love of what is truly and 
absolutely good, and the dislike of what is truly and absolutely bad. the 
soul "must needs find a beauty and a deformity as well in actions, minds, and 
tempers, as in figures, sounds or colours. "2 The ultimate identity of the 
good and the beautiful follows very naturally from what has been said; both 
are forms of beauty, and both have a necessary and real existence. If 
this be so, man must clearly be equipped with some means of discovering them. 
The obvious analogy, nd that chosen by Shaftesbury, is with the bodily 
senses which permit man to perceive the external world all around him. The 
mind then must have something in the natu c of senses to enable it to perceive 
the spiritual world; for Shaftesbury conceives of things as fallinL into 
the two great divisions of mind and body, or of action and figure: what is 
good in the first we perceive by the moral sense, and what is beautif4 in the 
second we perceive by the sense of beauty. 
It must be emphasised that Shaftesbury is most careful never to confuse 
1 
Characteristics, vol.ii,pp.28 -29 
ibid., vol.ii,p.43 
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the good and beautiful with mere pleasure: the good and the beautiful are 
to be sought for their own sake, and are quite independent of pleasure "which 
may be very great and yet very contemptible. "1 That is not to say that 
Shaftesbury denied the validity of pleasure: he admitted the existence of 
pleasures of both body and mind, and flowed them to be when properly 
used a power for good. But he was determined not to fall into the Hedonism 
of those with whom, like Hobbes and Locke, it was "orthodox divinity, as well 
as sound philosophy, to rate life by the number and exquisiteness of the 
pleasing sensations. "2 Another point on which he disagreed with Locke 
was the existence of innate ideas, so vigorously attacked by Locke in the 
first book of his Essay. When in the Moralists, Theocles is asked if he 
maintains that "the notions and principles of fair, just, and honest with the 
test of these ideas, are innate, "3 he answers that they are undoubtedly 
implanted b,; nature, and are therefore innate. The only concession he 
makes is to agree to abandon the word innate for instinct, "and call instinct 
that which nature teaches, exclusive of Art, Culture, or Discipline. "3 
As has already been shown, Hutcheson supported Locke's condemnation of 
all innate ideas or principles, and t::is had no small influence in determining 
his conception of the internal senses. He could not like Shaftesbury argue 
that the principles of the good and the beautiful were innate in all mass 
men, enkabling them to perceive immediately goodness and beauty. Moreover 
he agreed with Locke's definition of good as that which "has an aptitude to 
produce pleasure in us, "4 and so unlike Shaftesbury had to show the relation 
between pleasure, and the good and the beautiful. The solution chosen by 




4 ibid.., vol.ii,p.411 
Essay, II,xxi,42 
119. 
Locke and Shaftesbury, and it was perhaps with this in his mind that 
Hutcheson read what Locke had to say on the subject, before interpreting 
the doctrine of ideas of sensation and reflection in a way entirely new. 
Locke, he asserted, had not expressed himself with sufficient clarity, with 
the result that his ideas of reflection were wrongly interpreted to mean 
"reflex acts upon external sensations." Locke had really meant reflection 
to be understood as a proper internal sense, "an inward power of perception." 
His account of the external senses was clearly inadequate, as it did 
not explain how men perceive such common sensations as those of hunger and 
thirst, but he had been right in saying that almost all our ideas, whether 
of sensation or feflection, were accompanied by some degree of pleasure 
or pain. 
Hutcheson's system must therefore be founded on the doctrine that all our 
ideas come to us through some kind of sense, and he names these senses 
as external, internal, public, moral and honour. Such a division clearly 
involves a new conception of what a sense is, and Hutcheson therefore 
defines it as any "determination of our minds to receive ideas independently 
of our will, and to have perceptions of pleasure and pain.; Elsewhere 
he indicates that he has given the name of senses to our "determinations 
to be pleased with Lny forms or ideas which occur to our observation," 
and adds that he distinguishes them "from the powers which commonly gn by 
that name, by calling our power of perceiving the beauty of regulLrity, 
order, harmony, an internal sense." 2 Internal and other senses no more 
suppose innate ideas than do external senses; all kinds of senses are 
natural powers of perception, and the internal sense is but "a passive 
2 Beauty and Virtue, p.xiii 
tivtars On the Passions, p.4 
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power of receiving ideas of beauty from all objects in which there is 
unifar:ni ty amid variety. " 1 
The genesis of the doctrine of the internal senses should now be quite 
clear. Locke had so definitely refuted the doctrine of innate ideas that 
it became difficult to explain why man should take a wholly disinterested 
pleasure in contemplating ideas like beauty, justice, virtue, and honour, 
which are often roused in him without any volition on his part. These ideas 
had been regardes by Locke as wholly relLtive, end without fixed standards: 
Shaftesbury!s opinion was just the con-Lary, and it was adopted by 
Hutcheson. According to this view, certain actions, forms etc. were 
truly good, just or beautüul, and were t : :erefore ale to raise in a 
spectator the appropriate ideas of good or beauty. The difficulty as 
to how we perceived these ideas was solved by Hutcheson's interpretation of 
Locke' s internal sense c.s an inti yard power of perception, enabling us 
to perceive the idea of beauty or virtue r6used in us; the idea of beauty 
was accompanied with a feeling of pleasure which was inseparable from it, but 
not identical with it. Here Hutcheson called upon his knowledge of 
Shaftesbury, who provided him with explanations of the sense of beauty and 
the moral sense, and much of the material for his ublic sense: the sense 
of honour seems to hLve been Hutcheson's ,,wn idea, and the external series 
as expounded by Locke and others could, with certain modifications serve his 
purpose perfectly. 
The internal sense theory as expounded by Hutcheson became popular 
almost immediately, and remained so for the greater part of the eighteenth 
c- ntury, in the course of which it formed th basis for many accounts of 
1 Beauty and Virtue, p.82 
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beauty. Generally speaking, the assumptions which accompanied 
acceptance of the theory differed very little, once it was taken for 
granted that the perception of certain relations between the different 
parts of an object gave rise to the perception of a beauty, which was 
itself a quality of the object. This, as has already been explained, 
was not the doctrine of $utcheson, but it was the view held by most of 
those who adopted his theories. Exceptions should be made of Lancaster 
and Hume. Lancaster, writing in 1748, says that "nature has implanted 
in us an internal sense, which gives us a just perception of the relation 
between our faculties of apprehending, and the objects presented to them. "1 
This was also the view of Hume, who argues further that beauty can not be 
the result of the mere perception of relations in the object. 
Gerard introduced a certain variety by identifying the internal senses 
with what he calls the powers of imagination, 2 and by reducing them to 
the senses of novelty, sublimity, beauty, imitation, harmony, ridicule 
and virtue. A possible single source for all these is Akenside's 
Pleasures of Imagination, which had appeared fifteen years earlier, 
t 
but more likely that Gerard drew on most of his predecessors on 
this subject. At all events, it is clear that we have here, united, 
Addison's and Hutcheson's sources of aesthetic pleasure, and th;t Gerard is 
only putting forward old theories under a new guise. He is followed 
by Beattie, who writes that "there is in our constitution such a thing 
as a musical ear, a sense of beauty, a taste for sublimity and imitation, 
a love of novelty, and a tendency to smiles and laughter. "3 Though 
all these are partly dependent on the external senses, 
they are also 
clearly distinct from mere sense perceptions, and 
are therefore 
1 
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distinguished by the title of secondary, or reflex, or internal senses. 
Beattie acds that the "pleasures derived from them are....the pleasures 
of the imagination. "1 
The sudden withdrawal of favour from the theory of the internal senses 
was probably due partly to the influence of Reid, who though he never 
objected to the phrase itself did much to discourage its indiscriminate 
application. Reid approves Locke's action in calling consciousness an internal 
sense as being very proper, but objects to later confusion in the use of 
the word sense which would s_:em to make the moral sense and the sense of 
sight similar powers. Moreover, he disliked the conception of any sense 
at all, internal or external, as being a passive or uncritical faculty; and 
insisted that an act of sense should always be accompanied by an act of 
judgement. Reid's dislike of the internal sense theory as expounded by his 
predecessors may well have influenced Alison when he came to propose in his 
Essays the alternative associationist theory which was soon to displace the 
"internal sense of beauty" as the deus ex machina of aesthetic theory. 
2. The Sense of Beauty. 
The sense of beauty being one of the internal senses, its early history 
is the same as theirs, so need not be repeated. It *as one of the two senses 
which Sh ftesbury specified by name in addition to the external senses, 
but Hutcheson was the first to develop fully the conception of an internal 
sense of beauty. This he did in his Inquiry into Beauty and Virtue, first 
published in 1725. In the Introduction Hutcheson laid down three facts 
which he looked on as incontrovertible and which could therefore be regarded 
Dissertations, p.172 
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as suitable starting points for his inquiry. First of all, he assumed 
that there must be some sense of beauty natural to man; secondly, he held 
that men's "relishes of forms "1 were no less common to them than their 
external senses; and finally, in consequence of certain preliminary 
arguments, he concluded that pleasure and pain naturally accompany men's 
perceptions. 
Hutcheson goes on to discuss whether the sense of beauty, and the 
closely related sense of harmony, are internal or external senses. At first 
he says, rather surprisingly, that it is "of no consequence "2 which we 
consider them, though this is scarcely borne out by h :.s later pronouncements 
on the same subject. But in the end he decides that it is better to call 
them internal senses, for otherwise they may be c refused with the ordinary 
external senses of seeing or hearing from which they are certainly distinct. 
This distinction is, in the case of the sense of harmony, acknowledged in 
everyday speech by the different meanings attached to "a good hearing" and 
"a good ear ". Hutcheson goes on to refer to a class of beauty which is 
certainly not perceivable by the external senses; that is, the beauty of 
"theorems, universal truths, general causes, etc., "3 and this helps him 
to decide to make the sense of beauty an internal sense. 
He proceeds to analyse the pleasure that accompanies ideas of beauty, 
for the perceptions of the sense of beauty are necessarily accompanied 
by a pleasure which is immediate, and t: erefore antecedent to knowledge. 
It follows logically from this that certain objects exist which are the 
immediate occasions of this pleasure: and the function of the sense of 
beauty is to perceive them, with accompanying pleasure, whenever they are 
1 
2 





presented. .is this pleasure is immedi.te, we may have the sensation of 
beauty without knowing its cause; and the real difficulty facing as 
inquirer into the original of our idea of beauty is finding ;ghat in an 
object can cause this sensation in an observer. It is at this point 
that Hutcheson divides beauty into that which is relative, or the result 
of imitation, and that which is absolute, and dependent on some permanent 
principle: and, as has already been seen, Hutcheson fixed upon the principles 
of uniformity amid variety as the cause of absolute beauty. 
One of the first of Hutchescn's successors to adopt this theory was 
George Turnbull who nL de rather :11. unusual use of it by attributing to the 
sense of beauty our ability to study Natural Philosophy, and thus 
understand nAure more fully. This, at first sight rather surprising, is 
soon seen to be reasonable enough, for Turnbull like Hutcheson considers 
that the sense of beauty rises from uniformity amid variety or, as he aleo 
calls it, regularity and orde_.. Consequently all the pleasure found by the 
natural philosopher in the "contemplation of nature's unity, beauty, and 
harmony is owing to this sense; that is, they belong to it as properly as 
those of hearing to the ear. "1 Turnbull also holds that "all the arts 
presuppose a natural sense of harmony, beauty, proportion, greatness, and 
truth: and that as necessarily....as tastes and smells presuppose faculties 
fitted to receive these sensations. "2 
Recognition of a special sense which had the power to perceive beauty was 
fairly general, and it was not questioned until late in the century when, with 
the other internal senses, it fell under suspicion. McInoth considered that 
the sense of beauty was universal, though it did not always exist in 
1 
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the same degree; and that there were certain forms which were natum1ly 
fitted to excite the pleasurable sensation of beauty. Hume too in his 
Principles of Morals agreed that certain kinds of oeauty, especially 
those of nature, won i iredi,te approval; and added that if they did not 
give immediate pleasure, no demonstrations or arguments could make them 
agreeable. This is clearly a reference to Hutcheson's absolute beauty, 
for Hume goes on to argue that beauties in works of art can be appreciated 
in course of time when they were not at first approved. And an anonymous 
pamphleteer, writing a few years later, says th.A men perceive beauty by a 
"sense which they can not suddenly resist: it is antecedent to reflection, 
an impression quick as goodness makes. Indeed such impressions are rare, 
for great beauty is rare. "1 
Lord Monboddo, whose opinions on most subjects had at least the merit 
of being definite, spoke vehemently in favour of the sense of beauty, but 
unlike most of his contemporaries went direct to Shaftesbury himself for a 
definition of it. Monboddo believes that noting "more eminently 
distinguishes the man from the brute than the sense of the fair and 
the beautiful,r2 and expresses his amaxement that anyone should even 
doubt that this sense was implanted in man by nature, and was not the 
result of education or habit. He concludes that Shaftesbury's proposition 
that the good and the beautiful are one is, in his opinion, "the basis both 
of morality and theology. "3 In one of the last volumes of his Ancient 
Metaphysics, published in 1`7197, at a time when the theory of a sense of 
so generally 
beauty was no longer /accepted, Monboddo continues to defend it, and indeed 
includes in it most of the other intern11 senses quoted by Hutcheson. The 
Of Beauty, p.9 
2 
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sense of beauty is "the foundation of virtue and of every good action," 
and it is also the source of honour, or love of praise," that governing 
principle among men. *1 Finally it is the "source of every virtue, public or 
private, neither of which can be without the sense of beauty. "2 
Tucker, while accepting the fact that there is such a thing as a 
sense of beauty, opposes the usual view that it is born with us, holding 
rather th «t it "grows by time and may be moulded into almost any shape by 
custom, conversation, or accident.r3 James Usher expresses a similar 
opinion. "At an immature age, the sense of Beauty is we::.k and confused, 
and rekuires an excess of colouring to catch its attention."4 But, he adds, 
as we grow older and more mature, "if the human genius 'be assisted by a 
happy education, the sense of universal beauty awakes."4 Both opinions 
represent a changing attitude, w.ich was unwilling to allow that beauty was 
a matter of mere sensation, and this school finds its first authoritative 
spokesman in Reid who, though he continues to use the title 'sense of beauty,' 
interprets it very differently from Hutcheson. 
According to Reid, our judgment of beauty is, "by the constitution of our 
nature, accompanied with an agreeable feeling or emoktion, for which we have 
no other name but the sense of beauty. This sense of beauty, like the 
perceptions of our other sense$, implies not only a feeling, but an opinion 
of some duality in the object which occasions that feeling. "5 Reid proceeds 
to divide the sense of beauty into an instinctive and a rational sense of 
beauty: the former refers to beauties which are felt ini .ediately and 
inexplicably, and therefore does not differ from the usual conception of 
1 
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the sense. The rational sense, on the other hand, is always affected by 
a recognisable quality in the object, and its cause may be specified. 
This division bears but a superficial resemblance to Hutcheson's absolute 
and relative beauty, which may well have inspired it, as natural objects 
may appeal to either sense of beauty depending on their present circumstances. 
The tendency in the last years of the century was to retain the name et 
sense of beauty,but at the some tiiae to abandon all pretence of treating it 
as a sense. One of the most direct statements of such a view is that which 
appears in an article in the Critical Review for 1807, vhich rejects the sense 
of beauty on the grounds that neither of the two c gnditicns which such a sense 
presupposes does in fact exist; there is not a separate and recognisable 
class of objects of beauty, as there are objects of si_ht or objects of 
smell. This is evident from every man's experience. Moreover a sense of 
beauty implies an absolute standard of beauty, which wuld leave no room for 
disputes as to whether or not a certain object was beautiful; clearly, no 
such standard exists, and the idea of a sense of beauty is therefore 
chimerical. Similar arguments are used by Jeffrey,- who also sr aws that 
the lack of agreement as to what is beautiful in itself contradicts the 
theory of a special, sense: and also argues that it would be quite impossible 
to find in all the many actions, forms, and ideas that are described as 
beautiful any quality which is com:: on to them all, and ::fight therefore act 
on a sense of beauty, even if such existed. Mangin contents himself with 
remarking that it is a pity that Hutcheson limited himself by "ascribing 
the pleasure which we receive from beauty to a peculiar sense distinct from 
the other faculties of the human mind, and did not consider how far this 
1 Article on Beauty in Encyclopaedia Britannica (1824) 
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pleasure results from the known principles of our nature, and how far it is 
similar to sensations which we experience upon other occasions."' This 
aestheticians 
incidentally illustrates how for some/ ;.lison was repLcing Hutcheson as 
the final court of appeal. 
There are two other matters connected with the sense of beauty which 
some 
deserve /notice - the sense of harmony, and the problem of deformity. 
The first of these has already been mentioned in connection with Hutcheson, 
vvho noted it as one of the internal senses on the grounds that just as there is 
a necessary perception of beauty in the presence of certain objects, so there 
is a perception of harmony pn hearing certain sounds. In Hutcheson's own 
words, harmon: "denotes our pleasant ideas arising fran composition of 
sounds, "2 which i s in itself an original source of beauty, not usually 
"conceived as an imitation of anything else. "3 Nevertheless it too is 
based on a ratio of uniformity and variety, both of which may be attained 
in music by concord and by varied notes or discord respectively. 
The same idea is expressed perhaps more picturesquely, if less forcefully, 
by Isaac Browne in his poetic epistle on Design and Beauty: 
"In sound ttis harmony that charms the ear, 
Yet discords, intermingled here and there 
Still make the sweet similitudes appear. "LI 
Charles ':vison, one of the first to write an aesthetic treatise devoted 
specifically to music, h.Ls much the same to say on the subject: "As the 
proper mixture of light and shade....has a noble effect in painting, and 
is indeed essential to the composition of a good picture; so the judicious 
mixture of concords and discords is equally essential to a musical composition. "5 
2 
usures fit itgarjl GxnposiUons, p . 263 




On Design and Beauty ( 11739 ),p . 7 
On Musical Expression, p.20 
129. 
This is certainly true, but the constant emphasis laid on it by all 
writers, musicians and others, is certainly the outcome of the original 
desire to translate uniformity and variety into musical terms. 
Gerard by stating that the sense of harmony enables us to perceive a 
"kind of beauty in sound," allows an extension of its scope to "all the 
arts which employ language," as well as music, of which it "lays the sole 
f oundati on; "1 it i s, of course, dependent on uniformity and variety, and, 
Gerard adds, proportion in timo. Gerard also notes a similarity between 
the principles of melody !,;nd the arrangement of parts in a beautiful 
figure, and decides that of the tvo harmony gives the greater pleasure 
because it is able to preserve a greater measure of uniformity, while 
still providing abundant variety. The same conception of the sense is 
found in Blair, who talks of style in terms of music when he says th:._t it 
is better to introduce even a discord "than to cloy the ear with the 
repetition of similar sounds: for nothing is so tiresome as perpetual 
uniformity. "2 This sense like the others disappears in the face of the 
alternative explanations suggested by Alison. 
hutche s on t s doctrine of deformity may have been connected with Lockets 
view that "the absence of good is not always a pain, as the presence of 
pain is . "3 It was based on the belief that "deformity is only the 
absence of beauty"4 and that as far as the sense of beauty was concerned 
"no canposition of objects which give no unpleasant simple ideas, seems 
positively unpleasant or painful of itself, had we never observed anything 
1 
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better of the kind. Our sense of beauty seems designed to give us positive 
pleasure, but not positive pain or disgust, any further than what arises from 
disappointment. "1 Thus to Hutcheson there is nothing which is really ugly or 
disagreeable: the nearest we can come to it is when we compare an object void 
of all beauty with somethtng very beautiful. This is what he calls deformity 
and his conception does not differ much from Stuubes's definition of it2 as 
disproportion, disorder, and irregularity. On this point Gerard follows 
Hutcheson closely, attributing deformity to the lack of uniformity, variety 
and proportion, Which is merely another way of saying absence of beauty; 
and it is difficult to see what else Reynolds can have meant when he said 
that it was not nature, but an "accidental deviation from her usual practice."3 
Barrett is in the same tradition When he says that deformity is the negation 
of beauty, just as falsehood is of truth. 
Hutcheson's whole conception of deformity was rejected by Burke, who 
advanced a far more positive theory in its place. Deformity is the opposite 
not of beauty but of what Burke calls the "complete, common form. "4 Burke 
grnts that it results from a failure to observe the common proportions, 
but points out that even where these are present, there may be no beauty. 
Ugliness, on the other hand, which Burke maintains to be the true opposite 
of beauty, may well co -exist with these correct proportions; and he also 
argues that it is consistent ;ith the sublime for reasons which do not n w 
concern us. Price has clearly got Burke's arguments in mind when he 
distinguishes between ugliness and deformity: the latter he describes as "some 
striking and unnatur:.l deviation from What is usual in the shape of the face 
1 
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or body, "1 whereas ugliness arises from "that want of form, that unshapen 
lumpish appearance, which perhaps no word exactly expresses.r2 Sometimes, 
the two may combine, and then we have what Price calls "the hideous.i2 
Neither of these writers considers the problem with relation to any sense 
of beauty. The last to do so ws Lord Monboddo, who attributes to the sense 
of beauty our pov,er to perceive what is ridiculous, and goes on to 
identify the ridiculous with the deformed. This is hov ver probably the result 
of his tendency, already indicated, to unite all the internal senses in the 
sense of beauty. ri sense of the ridiculous had already been suggested 
byenside, who considered its existence "beyond all contradiction.," and 
adi fitted by Gerard, who seemed as eager to multiply the number of internal 
senses as Monboddo apparently was to restrict it. Even so, Monboddo's 
views are interesting, because he not only affirms that the ridiculous 
(or deformed) is the opposite of beauty, but deduces.frcm it that laughter 
is peculiar to man uecause no other 4aimal has a sense of beauty. Hence, 
Monboddo concludes, "the higher our sense of beauty is, the more lively and 
correct will our perception of the ridiculous be" - an interpretation of the 
sense of beauty that might have astonished its founders: 
3. The Object of the Sense of Beauty. 
When the second edition of -lison's Essays on Taste appeared in 1811, 
it was acclaimed by Jeffrey, writing in the Edinburgh Review, as the 'best 
and most pleasing work "that had yet been written on the subject. Before 
going On to consider :,lison's theories, Jeffrey had some interesting remarks 
to male about the sense of beauty, which is, he declared, "obviously implied 
1 
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at all events, and we rather think occ..sionally expressed, in all the theories 
that resolve beauty into combin tions of curve lines - into relaxation of 
the fibres - into smoothness - proportion fragility, or any other physical 
qualities: the authors of such s pecul_:,ti ons ....assuming it as a final 
principle and fixed law of our constitution, of which no account could be 
rendered, that those elements produced a distinct operation upon some inward 
sense of faculty, the result of which was the emotion or perception of 
beauty." Jeffrey's criticism may be justly applied to nearly all the 
aesthetic theories advanced between 1725 and 1790. The supposition of a 
sense of beauty implied a special class of beautiful objects just as the 
sense of sight implied visible objects. Consequently those who did not 
believe beauty to be an intrinsic quality had to find what quality or 
qualities in an object could be called beautiful; and a large proportion 
of eighteenth century aesthetic research :, s directed to the a ttempt to 
discover such qualities. 
So far as the sense of beauty is concerned, their, the import ..dace of 
Hutcheson's theory th_.t beauty depends on "uniformity amid variety" is 
obvious. It was the first attempt to find a single principle which would 
satisfactorily account for every known example of beauty, and Hutcheson's 
successors did not, as he had done, try to work out the full philosophical 
implications of the theory.1 Hutcheson's theory was based on the supposition 
that there exists in man a sense of beauty which determines him to receive 
the idea of beauty from cert .in objects, and tht ce ;tain qualities in 
objects must give rise to this idea. Hutcheson deduces empirically that the 
qualities concerned are uniformity and variety in a "compound ratio," but 
1 
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he does not say that these are'beautiful qualities, or even that they 
constitute beauty. Later aestheticians, on the other hand, overlooked the fact 
that the object of the sense of beauty was beauty itself, and introduced such 
qualities as proportion which, as was correctly pointed out by Burke, are 
immediate objects of the understanding, and are therefore nothing to do with 
beauty. 
The common belief that by attributing beauty to uniformity amid variety 
Hutcheson was declaring himself in favour of a theory of objective beauty 
accounts for the irrelevant nature of much of the criticism directed at him. 
Hutcheson's claim that his formula was applicable in all cases of absolute 
beauty was not accepted, and we find KameS rejecting it on the grounds that 
every 
it was not true with regard to/beautiful object, and that it might exist in 
objects that were actually ugly' - an argument which is brought forward 
again in the Critical Review in 1807. Blair too objects, because "even in 
external figured objects it does not hold that their beauty is in proportion 
to their mixture of variety with uniformity, "2 and he triumphantly quotes 
beauty of colour in support of his contention. Alison certainly implies 
that uniformity and variety were often considered as qualities in themselves 
beautiful, when he says that "the composition of uniformity and variety in 
forms is agreeable, or is fitted by nature to excite an agreeable sensation in 
the sense of sight....; these qualities are also capable of conveying to us 
very pleasing and very interesting expressions and...in this manner they are 
felt as beautiful. "3 But, Alison adds, no such union of material qualities 
perceived by sight is of itself beautiful. His attempt later in the same volume 
to show how far uniformity and variety are the causes of beauty in the arts is 
:h 
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but another example of how far he and his contemporaries were from appreciating 
the principles of the aesthetic system worked out by Hutcheson. 
Hutchesonts "uniformity and variety" were almost certainly.the development 
of a hint given by Shaftesbury, and the many systems which adopted such 
principles of beauty as order, regularity, proportion, and the like, 
probably originate from the same source. The number of Aaese principles tended 
to increase as the century went on, and we find Hogarth including in a list of the 
principles of beauty fitness, variety, uniformity, simplicity, intricacy, 
and quantity, all of which are supposed to "co- operate in the production of 
beauty, mutually. correcting and restraining each other occasionally. 1 Karnes 
notes that regularity, proportion, order and colour contribute to both 
beauty and grandeur, and singles out proportion of parts as "not only in 
itself a beauty, but ....inseparably connected with a beauty of a higher 
kind, that of concord or ha 2 At first sight, _ibraham Tucker appears 
to have thought out a new set of sources for beauty, for he lists "composition, 
succession, translation, and expression "3 as its principles; but on 
examination these prove to be but new names for the usual symmetry, proportion, 
order and variety. De Polier considers that regularity, contrast, proportion, 
congruity, uniformity, variety, and simplicity give agreeable exercise to the 
mind, and are therefore to be commended as "adding beauty to the objects that 
surround us, and....procuring us enjoyments far superior to those of the senses. 
These attempts to discover what qualities of objects might justly be 
named principles of beauty were always based on the study of objects which 
were gener-lly recognised as beautiful, and it should be helpful to consider 
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some of the more common classes of these beautiful objects. Such objects 
may conveniently be considered under the general heads of nature, the ::ind, 
the human body and face, and external objects in general. Beauty of nature 
receives less attention from aestheticians than might have been expected, 
though an exception must certainly be made in the case of Shaftesbury, who does 
not however fell within the scope of the present inquiry. In the cases of 
Cooper and even Price, the principles suggested by Hutcheson for absolute 
beauty are sufficient explanation: Cooper considers that "a view at once 
gives pleasure if it provides unity in variety, with the individual parts 
related to each other, "l and Price writes that "Nature forms a beautiful 
scene by combining objects in :Such a manner as that no sudden or abrupt 
transition in form or colour should strike the eye. "2 He adds that though 
on occasion particular effects may be somewhat displeasing, "each scene as 
a whole impresses an idea of the most pleasing variety, softness, and union.r2 
Gilpin however perhaps canes nearer than either to the original conception of 
a sense of beauty, when he says that we are most delighted when a grand 
though perhaps incorrectly composed scene strikes us beyond the power of 
thought, and makes an impression before :my judgment is formed: such a scene 
"we rather feel than survey. "3 
Beauty of mind is another type which was given some attention, and once 
again we find that it is traated more fully in Shaftesbury than in most of his 
successors. It is however related to the internal senses by Nathaniel 
Lancaster, who suggests that if men believe that they receive pleasure from à 
sense of symmetry, order and proportion in nature, they must adm..t that there 
is also such a thing as beauty of mind, compared with which the beauty of nature 
l Letters concerning Taste, p.3 
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is "but of a subordinate and lower degree. "1 Blair too holds that there 
are certain qualities of the mind which when exprêssed by grimaces or actions 
will always "rouse in us a feeling similar to that c;f beauty. "2 Harpur, 
expressing a rather different point of view, argues th t of the "combination 
of uniformity with variety which exists in all things beautiful, nothing 
but mind is capable.a And therefore as all beauty is recognised by mind 
alone, so by mind alone can it be produced. i3 
It is very nearly true to say that we will learn more about beauty of 
mind by studying theoriès of the beauty of the human form, for many 
aestheticians believed that bodily beauty could exist only as a reflection 
of beautiful qualities of mind. Thus Hutcheson himself believes that 
human beauty is due to certain natural signs of Virtue or dispositions 
towards virtue in the countenance, which give it a charm superior to that 
of any other kind of beauty. Consequently men's tastes for beauty will 
vary "according as it denotes the several qualities agreeable to themselves. "4 
Beattie expresses a similar opinion, and after contradicting the traditional 
saying that beauty is only skin-deep, asserts that "derives its origin and 
most essential characters from the soul. "5 Reid supports this view, holding 
that "the beauty of the human body is derived from the signs it exhibits 
of some perfection of the mind or person. "6 Alison too attributes "the 
whole beauty or sublimity which is to be found in the external frame of man "7 
to the expression of pleasing qualities of mind, and his follower Jeffrey 
considers that that we admire in a beautiful woman is "not a combination 
1 Fugitive Pieces, p.350 
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of forms and colours....but a collection of the signs and tokens of certain 
mental feelings and affections which are universally recognised as the 
proper objects of love and sympathy. "1 
There were also however many others who preferred to explain human beauty 
on such principles as symmetry, fitness, and others which had been made the 
basis of whole systems of beauty. Among these was Hartley, who gave symmetry 
as one possible source of permanent beauty, and suggested that it c insisted 
in "such proportions of the face and of the head, trunk, and limbs to each 
other as are intermediate in respect of all other proportions. "2 The 
anonymous writer of the pamphlet Of Beauty, on the other hand, considered 
that "the perfection of the human body lies in its fitness for the uses of 
life, "3 and Campbell holds the somewhat similar view that "the perfection 
of the human body consiscs....in its fitness fr serving the purposes of 
the soul,"4 but adds that it is also capable of "one peculiar excellence 
as a visible object,'4 namely, beauty. 
The most detailed account of the beauty of the human body is that given 
by Joseph Spence in Crito. Spence reduces all human beauty to the four 
heads of colour, form, expression and grace; and much of his subsequent 
analysis was quoted with approval by Reid in support of the opinion cited 
above. Spence believes that the "general cause of beauty in the form or 
shape in both sexes is propôrtion; or an union and harmony in all the parts 
of the body. "5 He has some interesting remarks to make on the subject of 
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beauty than judgment, "l everyone may appear beautiful to somebody, and there ma 
be as many beauties in the world as there are people to appreciate them. 
The beauty of the human face had quite a literature of its own in the 
eighteenth century, but the theories advanced add little to what was 
written on the subject of beauty of form. Burke, Usher, Blair, Reid, 
Alison and Mangin all considered that, in the words of the It st- named, 
the human countenance derives by far the greater part of its beauty from 
expression of....the feelings and the character. "2 An interesting 
contrary view is that of Alexander Cozens, the painter, who after pointing 
out that there could be no disputes on the subject of absolute beauty, 
expressed his conviction that an example of it could be produced even. 
in the human face, if a set of features could be "combined by a regular and 
determinate process in art, producing simple beauty, uncharactered and 
unimpassioned. "3 Cozens compares this "simple beauty of the face" to 
pure water, without any colour, taste or other distinguishing characteristic: 
it would be "one and the same at all times and in all places, and is void 
of any predominant mental character,r4 and might correctly be termed an 
example of absolute beauty, as it would not be strictly speaking aa 
imitation, no prototype being either in existence or likely to exist in 
the future. 
The last class of things considered as possessing beauty is perhaps 
best, if loosely, described as external objects, and the line of investigation 
is suggested by Shaftesbury at the very beginning of the century when he says, 
with reference to the common subjects of sense, that "the shapes, motions, 
1 Crito, p.53 
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colours, and proportions of these latter being presented to our eye; there 
necessarily results a beauty or deformity according to the different measure, 
arrangement and disposition of their several parts."' This is clearly 
what Hutcheson had in mind when working out his theories of the sense of 
beauty and of absolute beauty, and with the general principle laid down 
by Shaftesbury most later aestheticians would almost certainly have been 
in complete agreement. The difficulty was to find a formula for the 
disposition of parts which would be universally acceptable as a principle 
of beauty, and this is what the eighteenth century could not do. Consequently 
many systems were proposed, but few achieved any distinction; and it -::ill 
be sufficient to examine briefly those of Hogarth and Burke, who were 
clearly the chief targets of Jeffreyts criticism in the Edinburgh Review. 
Hogarth's professed aim in waiting his :m.lysis of Beauty was to fix 
the "fluctuating ideas of taste," and as a prelim:.nary to doing so he took 
one by one what were generally held to be the principles of beauty, and 
showed how each was in itself inadequate without the assistance of others. 
He insists particularly on the necessity for variety, and praises Shakespeare 
for having "summed up all the charms of beauty in two words, infinite variety:2 
Hogarth being a painter, the problem of beauty was to him a practical one, 
and his chief contribution to the discussion was likewise practical. 
Experience had suggested to him that in general the "waving line" is more 
productive of beauty than any other -line, but it had to be admitted that 
it could also appear in something comparatively ugly. Hogarth's answer 
was what he called the "line of beauty," by which he meant the waving line 
1 Characteristics, vol.ii,p.28 
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par excellence: for though all such lines are "ornamental when properly applied, 
yet strictly speaking there is but one precise line, properly to be called 
the line of beauty."' This line, if used judiciously, and combined with 
sufficient variety and fitness, should result in beautiful objects, in 
nature or art. Thusogarth's view.of beauty is entirely objective, -;nd 
Hutcheson's distinction between absolute and relative beauty is deprived 
of any significance, for if the principle of beauty can be worked out with 
a pair of compasses, art can produce abolute beauty as well as can nature. 
It is true that Hogarth wrote as a practising artist rather than as a 
speculative thinker, but he had imbibed enough of the philoso by of his day 
to know that he had to find "solid principles"2as a foundation for taste, 
and his work shows how purely empirical and therefore often too superficial 
the approach to aesthetic questions was in the England of his day. 
Burke was no more a philosopher than Hogarth, but he had at least studied 
philosophy and was well acquainted with Locke's Essay, the influence of 
which is apparent in many of the details of his theory. Burke begins by 
rejecting on various grounds explanations cf beauty as the result of 
proportion, fitness, perfection or even the expression of virtuous qualities 
of mind, then proposes a theory of his own, based on the assumption that 
"beauty is, for the greater part, some quality in bodies acting mechanically 
upon the human mind b the intervention of the senses. "3 Thus, as Jeffrey 
points out, Burke is committed to the implications of the internal sense 
theory, although he nowhere accepts that theory explicitly. It is, 
after that admission, only a question of what qualities do thus act on the 
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mind; and Burke's investigations lead him to consider beauty as a quality 
which exists in certain objects, and is conveyed to the mind by various 
sensible qualities on which it depends. The qualities of beauty 
suggested by Burke are smallness, smoothness, gradual variation, delicacy 
or frgility, and moderate colouring; and on each Burke has some acute 
comments to make. His theory is completed by the proposal that the material 
cause of man's pleasure in beauty is a certain "agreeable re la:ration" of the 
fibres of the body. This attempt to provide a physiological explanation 
was not taken very seriously by Burke's contemporaries, and was not 
further developed by them. 
4. The Sublime: the Picturesque: Colour. 
As has been pointed out by iiionk and others, the eighteenth century 
interest in the sublime -,as very largely due to the rediscovery of Longinus, 
who was one of the sources of Adison's Pleasures of the Imagination. 
Addiscn was the first of many to draw a clear distinction between the sublime 
andthe beautiful: the latter he described as diffusing " a secret satisfaction 
and complacency through the im-tgination. "1 The sublime he first mentions 
as a most essential part of the art of poetry, as "something that elevates 
and astonishes the fancy, and gives a greatness of mind to the reader, 
which few of the critics beside Longinus have considered. "2 Thereafter 
Con dens 
Addison Points out three dualities in objects which kecapable of giving 
aesthetic pleasure, and of these greatness clearly corresponds to the 
sublima. Addison's implied distinction between the great and the sublime 
is one of the most original departures in his papers. The sublime is 
1 Spectator, no.412 
2 ibid., 409 
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throughout reserved for the effect of art, as it was by Longinus, whose 
interest in the sublime w s confined to the mmm.er of expression and the 
effect produced by it. But ,.ddison, by considering the "greatness" of 
objects, is laying the foundation of all future eighteenth century 
speculation on the sublime, for interest was generally in the sublime object 
rather than in the sublime style. 
It was only to be expected that the inquiry into the sublime would be 
affected by the current view of aesthetics, and that it would, so long as 
the internal sense theory enjoyed unrivalled supremacy, proceed upon 
many of the assumptions inherent in that theory. The first and most 
obvious of these was the one just considered; that there must be certain 
qualities in objects which when contemplated give rise to certain feelings. 
The influence of this idea is apparent in Baillie's ¿ssay on the Sublime, 
the first considerable work to appear on the subject in the course 
of the century. Saillie states at the outset that the effect of the 
sublime, whether in writing or in nature, is immediate, and he accounts 
for it by the fact that "every person, on seeing a grand object, is affected 
with something which as it were extends his very being and expands it to 
a kind of immensity. "1 A few lines further on he adds that an object 
is truly sublime only when it "in some degree disposes the mind to this 
enlargement of itself, and gives her a lofty conception of her om powers. 
This exalted sensation then will always determine us to a right judgment, for 
wherever we feel the elevated disposition, there we are sure the sublime 
must be. "1 Bailiie sees the problem facing him as one requiring 
1 On the Sublime, p.4 
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investigation of sublime objects in order to find what quality in them 
is capable of rousing this sensation, and he is therefore to be classed 
with members of the tinternal senses school. He finds a solution by 
identifying the sublime with greatness: "the sublime in writing is no more 
than a description of the sublime in nature;- and he then explains that the 
natural sublime consists in the vastness of objects allied with a certain 
degree of uniformity and novelty. Baillie's whole account of the subject 
is of ouite exceptional interest, and merits a more detailed investigation 
than can be given to it here. 
Burke's treatment of the sublime is what might be expected after the 
examination of his theory of the beautiful, to which he sets the sublime in 
direct opposition. As the beautiful has its original in a mode of pleasure, 
so for Burke "a mode of terror or pain is always the cause of the sublime. "2 
Burke then proceeds to enumerate the qulities in objects which give rise to 
this feeling, and that these are such qualities as vastness, uniformity and 
magnificence, is here of less importance than the acceptance of the principle 
that there is in objects a power to produce a certain sensation or emotion, 
and that this power resides in certain recognisable qualities of the object. 
This attitude, which for many years was adopted almost without question by 
critics and aestheticians, is very clearly expressed by Karnes who sgys 
that "grandeur and sublimity have a double signification: they commonly 
signify the ..;uality or circumstance in objects by which the emotions of 
grandeur and sublimity are produced: sometimes the emotions themselves. "3 
Burket s Sharp distinction between the sublime and beautiful on the 
grounds that one was founded on pain and the other on pleasure found little 
1 






or no favour, and the Critical Review made a point of reasserting ;.hat 
had previously in all probability been taken for granted - that the 
sublime is "never void of positive pleasure. "1 Previously it was 
probably assumed that sublime objects affected the sense of beauty, though 
this is nowhere specifically stated. Hutcheson paid no special attention 
to the sublime, and there is no mention of a special sense of the sublime 
until after Burke's Inquiry had appeared. It is clear enough, however, 
in the case of Baillie that the mechanism of the internal senses was 
presupposed, If the sublime was recognised by the internal senses, it 
followed from Hutchesonts accounts of these senses that the sublime must 
give pleasure; and therefore Burke's emphasis on pain was inconsistent with 
all earlier views on the subject. Burke's successors were therefore 
generally careful to disassociate themselves from his attempt to relate 
the sublime to pain. Thus Beattie and Blair both insist on the pleasure 
given by the sublime, though the former maintains that it differs from the 
gratification afforded by the beautiful. Stedman goes further, and 
maintains that there is no essential difference between the sublime and the 
beautiful, both being the cause of what we now know as "aesthetic pleasure." 
This view is supported by Gilpin and Dugald Stewart, who both condemn the 
attempt to separate the beautiful from the sublime, and by Barret who 
considers that the beautiful comprehends the sublime. Jeffrey once agin 
pronounces a judicial decision on the dispute; "sublimity and beauty, in any 
just or large sense, with a view to the philosophy of either, are manifestly 
one and the same. "2 But Jeffrey said this on the authority of ,lison, and 
1 Critical Review, III(1757),p.336 
2 Encyclopaedia Britannica (1824),p.180 
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it is well to remember that it was the common appeal of the two classes . 
to the internal senses that kept them close together for the pajority of 
early writers. 
' The word picturesque originally meant "suitable as a subject for a 
painter," but towards the end of the eighteenth century there emerged a new 
school of aestheticians who held that the word should be reserved for a 
special class of objects intermediate between the sublime and the beautiful. 
The reasons for the sudden appearance of this new category are not far to 
seek; from the time when Hutcheson's internal sense -;as accepted as the 
basis of aesthetic speculation, the tendency had been to confine 
investigation to the quality in objects which excited the sensation. The 
first classification made by Addison, which divided the causes of the 
Pleasures of imagination into the great, the beautiful, and the uncommon, 
had been made on the basis of the different emotions aroused in the 
spectator; astonishment, pleasure, and curiosity. The emphasis placed by 
the internal sense school on the qualities of the object almost inevitably 
led men to make a new division on the basis of the qualities of objects 
rather than on the reactions of the observer. When. this tendency 
coincided with the new admiration for romantic scenery of the rough and 
mountainous type, it was at once felt that another category was needed, 
and the word picturesque was set aside to denote the new class. 
Chief credit for the popularity of the picturesque must go to William 
Gilpin, although he had no intention of trying to establish the 
picturesque as .n entirely new category. Gilpints fundamental argument 
was that "a distinction certainly exists between such objects as are 
beautiful and such as are picturesque - between those vaiich please the eye 
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in their natural state: and those which please from some quality, capable 
of being illustrated by painting. "1 The quality selcted by Gilpin as being 
most characteristic of the picturesque was roughness; and he gives as an 
example old e rt- horses, "whose harder lines and rougher coats exhibit more 
the graces of the pencil. "2 This is clearly in deference to Burke's 
definition of beauty, which included smoothness as one of its qualities: 
but it must be remembered that later in the same essay Gilpin has 
remarked that when we talk "of a sublime object, we always understand 
that it is also beautiful. *3 For Gilpin therefore the sublime and the 
picturesque were variations on the beautiful rather than categories 
essentially different from it. 
Gilpin's distinction was accepted by Pric, who considered that "the 
picturesque not only differs from the beautiful in those .,utilities which 
Burke has so justly ascribed to it, but arises from qualities the most 
diametrically opposite. "4 These qualities Price elsewhere describes: 
"-where an object or a set of objects is without smoothness or grandeur, 
but from their intricacy, their sudden and i rregul: <r deviations, their 
variety of dorms, tints, and lights and shadows, are interesting to a 
cultivated eye, they are simply picturesque. "5 Urikce's relation to 
Gilpin and to Burke, to the latter of whom he openly acknowledges his 
debt, is obvious, as is his acquiescence in the assumption that certain 
properties of objects are fitted by nature to call up a specific aesthetic 
pleasure in those who perceive them. His advocacy does however show that 
1 Three issays, p.3 
2 ibid., p.14 
3 ibid., p.43 
4 Lssay, vol.i,p.49 
5 ibid., vol.i,p.90 
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the picturesque tiras recognised by many as a distinct class, and it is 
interesting to notice that in 1811 a writer in the Critical `-eview 
criticised Mangin quite sharply for failing to pay any attention to the 
picturesque, which the reviewer regarded as a"minor sublime which 
"should have had an essay devoted to it on account of its great importance 
and extent."' 
The :,ua stion of colour probably caused eighteenth century a.;stheticians 
more trouble than any other single problem, and this is foreshadowed 
by _:ddison's remark, made very early in the century, that "the ideas of 
colours are so pleasing and beautiful in the imagination that it is possible 
the soul will not be deprived of them_ '2 in the next world. ::ichardson's 
statement that some colours are less agreeable than others, made a few years 
later, is an early example of the temptation to regard colours objectively. 
This tendency could not but be strengthened by the internal sense school's 
efforts to show that certain properties were immediately productive of the 
sensation of beauty, and Burke by referring to the beauty of "both shape 
and colouring "3 would seem to allow colour as one of these qualities. 
Beattie notes that it is possible to account for all our ideas of beauty 
by associations of ideas except in the case of "colours giving pleasure and 
being called beautiful because they are bright.... or delicate. *4 It was 
probably Burke's example that encouraged Price to affirm that "the beautiful 
in colour is of a positive and independent nature..., beautiful colour is 
a common and just expression. "5 This was carried even further by Knight, 
who maintained that colours could, when separated in the mind from the 
1 Critical Review, X7,II(1811),p.178 
2 Spectator, no.413 
3 
:ks., vol,ii,p.165 
4 Dissertations, p.148 
5 Essay, vol.i,p.169 
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qualities accompanying them, possess real beauty of their awn. This 
theory was not however well received, and was criticised by Jeffrey in his 
article on Beauty. It does however show to -;:ghat extent prevailing 
tendencies had made it possible for aestheticians to conclude that beauty 
was objective. 
5. Taste and the Internal Senses. 
It is perhaps more surprising that the eighteenth century aestheticians 
Separate 
kept taste and the sense of beauty for the most part from each other than 
that they occasionally identified the one with the other, in whole or in 
part. Shaftesbury regarded them as esGentially different faculties; 
as we have seen, he considered internal senses as innate, or instinctive. 
Taste on the other hand he identifies with judgment, and says that ''just 
taste can neither be begotten, made, conceived or produced, without the 
antecedent labour and pains of criticism. "1 Nor does Hutcheson make any 
-b-tempt to define taste as an internal sense: for him it is "a greater capacity 
of receivinE such pleasant ideas "2 of beauty and harmony. 
The theory of an internal sense of beauty had however such an obvious 
relevance to the question of taste that it was inevitable that sooner or 
later they should be associated with one another. n early example is an 
article in the Echo or Edinburgh -eekly Journal which emphasises the 
intuitive nature of taste, and holds that it is "purely the gift of 
nature, and is not to be acquired by art or industry. Taste....exhibits 
to us at once, quick as a flash of lightning, not only the exterior, but also 
the very essence of things without calling the reasoning faculties to our 
1 Characteristics, vol.iii,p.164 
2 
Beauty and Virtue, p.9 
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assistance. "1 The same inclination to identify taste with the iritsrnal 
sense is seen in Akenside, who defines taste as .strong and active internal 
powers, or as 
"a discerning sense 
Of decent and sublime, with quick disgust 
From things deformed i2 
and in Melmoth, who saw in it "nothing more than this universal sense of 
beauty, rendered more exquisite by genius and more correct by cultivation.r3 
There can be no doubt that the acknowledgment of the existence of both 
the internal sense and a faculty of taste was embarrassing to such 
aestheticians as Gerard, whose system was formulated by drawing very largely 
and not always eclectically on the theories of his predecessors, and by 
then so disposing them as to present a more or less coherent argument. 
This is particularly evident in the Essay on Taste where Gerard is 
clearly unhappy about the ..osition he should accord to the internal 
senses. On the very first page he admits that taste is not wholly natural 
and later he gives as its components the internal senses, delicacy of passion 
and judgment. The inclusion of this last is, as Miss Grene has recently 
pointed out,4 difficult to reconcile with his statment that "taste is 
properly a kind of sensation "5 which "supplies us with simple perceptions 
entirely different from all that we receive by external sense or by 
reflection "5 -an inter.:sting deviation from the original view of an 
internal sense. It is doubtful whether Miss Grene's charitable 
attempt to make these statements consistent with each oth<.r and with 
1 Echo, XXII(1729),p.78 
2 
Pleasures of Imagination, II1,11.517 -9 
3 Fitzosborne's Letters, p.182 
4 Modern Philology, XLI (1943 ),p.45 
5 On Taste, p.160 
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accepted contemporary opinion is really necessary, for Gerard has 
explained the difficulty to his own satisfaction in a lengthy footnote. 
In this, he reaches the conclusion that though the powers of taste are 
to be regarded as senses, they are not therefore to be regarded as ultimate 
principles, because ail the phenomena of the internal senses can be 
"accounted for, by simpler qualities of the mind."' We may however 
continue to regard each individual principle of taste as a "particular 
sense, because its perceptions, however produced, are Peculiar to it, 
and specifically different from all others."' The absurdity of such 
deductions should have warned others of the danger of trying to explain 
the judicial faculty of taste on the basis of the internal senses. 
Gerard himself seems to have realised the untenability of his position, 
and in the fourth book which he :.dded to the 1780 edition of his essay on Taste 
he attempts to repair some of the damage without however making any 
fundamental change in his system. Taste may now be considered either 
"as a species of sensation or as a species of discernment. In the former 
light....it is simply the faculty by which we receive pleasure from the 
beauties _end pain from the faults of things....In the other light, it is 
a faculty by which we distinguish the true causes of our pleasure or our 
dislike: by a reflex act it discerns the several qualities which are fit 
to excite pleasure or disgust.2 That Gerard regarded such an explanation 
as necessary seems to render superfluous Liss Grene's attempt to explain 
Gerard's inconsistencies; but it mush be remembered that this was for 
Gerard an afterthought, and that it left intact the principal inconsistency - 
that of a sensation which provides us with simple perceptions, and which yet 
1 On Taste, , p.161,note 
ibid.,IV,p.214 
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includes the power of judgment.' 
There were no further attempts made to carry on the inquiry on the lines 
suggested by Gerard, and writers like Beattie, who had more Philosophical 
acumen than Gerard, were careful not to involve themselves in the same 
dilemma, Beattie has very obviously the internal senses of Gerard in his 
mind when he notes as one of the qualities of taste, the capacity of being 
easily, strongly, and agreeably affected with sublimity, beauty, harmony 
exact imitation, etc., "2 but such a statement enables him to develop a more 
defensible theory than that of Gerard. Others made taste one of the internal 
senses, and were thus able to develop a consistent theory along different 
lines. Anong these last was Duff, who called taste "that internal sense which 
by its own exquisitely nice sensibility, without the assistance of the 
reasoning faculty, distinguishes and determines the various qualities of 
objects submitted to its cognisance; pronouncing by its own arbitrary 
verdict that they are grand or mean, beautiful or ugly, decent or 
ridiculous. "3 Monboddo likewise argues that if a man "has not in his 
mind a preconceived idea of beauty, or in common language, if he has not 
taste, he will have no perception of beauty in any single thing, or in any 
combination of things. "4 
The fact that taste often involved the comparison of one object with 
another remained a stumbling -block to the progress of the attempts to 
identify taste with the internal sense; and generally a solution was 
sought which could include judgment as one of the c anponent parts of taste. 
This usually meant that the internal sense h:.d to be jettisoned, or so 
' ..s Miss Grene does not refer to the 1780 edition of Gerardts Essay, it is to 
be presumed that she did not consider Book IV in her article. 
2 Dissertations, p.166 
6 Original Genius, p.11 
4 _ancient Metaphysics, vol.ii,p.181 
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watered down as to be almost unrecognisable, but an exception must be 
made of John Ogilvie, who deserves special mention for an ingenious 
attempt to retain both faculties. Í_ccording to Ogilvie, by taste or 
"this internal sense (as philosophers have denominated it) objects are 
perceived immediately to bear a certain relation to each other, which even 
the superior faculties of the mind, when considered apart, would not 
have been qualified to trace. "1 This is another outstanding example of 
the determination of eighteenth century aestheticians to accept without 
question the materials used by their predecessors, and to re- arrange them 
almost at will, withóut regard to reality of any sort. Towards the end 
of the century there is an almost anagrammatic quality about some of 
the systems worked out that makes it, at this distance of time, difficult 
to see how a theory such as that of the internal sense, which had so many 
manifest inconsistencies, held its `round for so many years in the field 
of aesthetic inquiry. 
One of the most definite identifications of taste and the internal 
sense is tht in Thomson's Principles of Beauty,2 published in 1800. 
Thomson held that there were five internal powers of mind; perception, 
memory, imagination, taste, and judgment. Taste is the only one of these 
to have sensation and feeling, so may justly be referred to as the sixth 
sense: it is, in fact, "a perfect and distinct internal sense." Thomson holds, 
a most exalted view of the powers of this sense: "it is the seat of all the 
passions: and nothing could affect the human mind either with desire or 
aversion....or any other passion or emotion if this power did not exist, 
1 On Composition, vol.i,p.302 
2 I have not been Able to see a copy of this work: quotations from it are 
taken either from the Monthly Review for 1801 (New Series, vol.XV, 
pp.387ff.) or Knight's Philosophy of the Beautiful. 
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there being no other faculty of the mind which can so feel or be affected 
by them." This system may be striking.: but its real value is well assessed 
by an article in the Monthly Review, in which it is remarked that Thomson's 
taste is "another new and im::ginary sense; the situation of which in the 
human frame we know not. "1 
The account just given of the various developments of the doctrine of 
the internal senses, though far from .exhaustive, should show clearly the 
great importance of this theory for the student of eighteenth century 
aesthetic theory. in ilingland and Scotland. ;, more complete study would need 
to examine more fully the influence of Shaftesbury, which is only glanced 
at here, for though the philosophical details of the theory were provided 
by Locke, it is equally certain that the inspiration came from Shaftesbury, 
and that without him the internal sense might never have attained the 
prominence it did in the eighteenth century. It would also be 
necessary to examine more closely than can be done here th:; relation 
between the internal senses and association of ideas, for it was 
only by combining these two theories that anything approaching a final 
answer t_ the aesthetic problems which troubled the eighteenth century 
could be given. 
1 Monthly Review: New Series X IV(1801),p.390 
CHAPTER IX 
HOBBES, LOCKE, AND ASS OCIATI ONIS11 
1. The Doctrine of ssociation of Ideas. 
In its review of Beat-, :iets Dissertations, the Monthly Review makes the 
following comment: "The doctrine of association of ideas has furnished 
matter for many ingenious speculations, and served as the basis of many 
modern theories. It is but justice to the memory of a great philosopher 
of the last age, to observe that this doctrine, which is commonly considered 
as having been proposed by Mr. Locke, is to be found illustrated with 
great ingenuity in the philosophical writings of Hobbes. "1 That such a 
remark was necessary is a symptom of the comparative neglect into which 
Hobbes had fallen. Yet it may be doubted whether the doctrine of 
association as proposed by Locke would ever have wielded the same 
influence in the eighteenth century had it not been supplemented and even 
to some extent corrected by a Point of view which had its source in Hobbes. 
Then considering the doctrines of either Hobbes or Locke, it is always 
necessary to keep in mind the fact that both men had what is vulgarly known as 
"an axe to grind." Hobbes was expounding a mechanistic philthsophy, and 
had to show that everything in the universe was subject to invariable laws: 
Locke was putting forward a theory of knowled.;e which involved the view 
that man had normally some conscious control over the ideas passing through 
1 Monthly Review, LXIX(l783),p.32 
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his -mind. The respective aims of the two philosophers are clearly 
reflected in the attitudes they adopted. -: °hen considering the succession 
of thoughts in the mind; and it is because neither Hobbes nor Locke considered 
association from an entirely disinterested point of view that their theories 
can be considered as in some degree complementary. Hnmets treatment 
of association was more disinterested and consec]uently more complete 
than that of any of his predecessors, and it exercised correspondingly 
greater influence on the subse, uent development of the associationist 
theories. It is, therefore, to Hobbes, Locke, and hume, and in a lesser 
degree to Hutcheson, that the steady growth of associationism is due; 
and in its later stages little or nothing is added to the foundations 
provided by them. 
The phrase association of ideas, as is well knovm, does not occur in 
the works of Hobbes, who uses fairly indiscriminately such terms as mental 
discourse, or train of thoughts,to describe what was to him an 
observable mental phenomenon. Hobbests purpose was to explain, on the 
basis of his mechanistic philosophy, hoer such an apparently way -ward 
faculty as the imagination could still be regarded as subject to 
regular laws: memory required no such explanation because according to 
the system of Hobbes its function was to preserve perceptions in the 
exact order in which they came originally. The imagination had however 
greater liberty: for although it could pass only from one idea to another 
that had previously succeeded it in sense, when very many phantasms 
have been generated within us by sense, then almost any thought may 
arise from any other thought: insomuch that it my seem to be a thing 
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indifferent and casual which thought shall follow which. "1 Hobbes 
distinguishes between regulated and unregulated trains of thoughts: the 
former is guided by "some desire and design," as when the mind is 
trying to trace an idea, whereas the latter is "not as we want or need 
it, but as we have new sensations" which recall former ideas. This in 
Hobbes's view accounts for the never -ceasing train of thoughts or phantasms 
which passes through the mind of man: and suggests very obviously at 
least three lines of investigation: dis traction of the mind when guided 
by a desire; the power to summon up the ideas gained by experience when 
the mind is pursuing a certain design: and what we now call day -dreaming, 
when the mind wanders in a seemingly casual manner from idea to idea. 
That this connection was regarded by Hobbes as a mechanical rather than a 
voluntary mental operation does not lessen its value as a contribution 
to psychology: Hobbes not only drew attention to the previously 
uninvestigated coherences in our trains of ideas, but even suggested possible 
reasons for them which could be used quite independently of his own 
fundamental theories. 
It is generally accepted novadays that Hobbes bad no direct influence 
on Locke. The possibility that he may have had indirect influence remains but 
need not detain. us at present: it can however be argued that ;ocke's chapter 
the 
on association of ideas, which first appeared in/1698 edition, was written 
as a criticism of the popular belief tht, as Dryden said, there was a 
thread in every discourse, consisting of a train of connected thoughts. 
In the first edition of his Essay Locke had stated that "another cause of 
ignorance, of no less moment, is a ,:rant of discoverable connection between 
1 Llements of i'hiloso h p ,: Wks.,vol.i:IV,xxv,8(p.397) 
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those ideas we have." The later passage is clearly complementary to this, 
and Locke is careful to use "association" as meaning the casual and 
unaccountable connection of what he refers to as a "whole gang` of ideas. 
In view of this, it is interesting to note that Berkeley never uses 
"association' byt talks always of the "connection' of ideas, and that his 
opinions on the question are contrary to those of Locke. Hutche eon on 
the other hand invariably talkes of " association" but shares many of Locke's 
views on the subject. Hume settles the matter by heading his chapter 
Of the Connection or association of Ideas. 
Locke's chapter on association was therefore, as we have seen, an 
afterthought; and it was written from a purely critical point of view. 
Locke held that knowledge consisted in the a:rception of the agreem.nt or 
disagreement of our ideas, and to him the fact that chance or custom could 
bring together in the mind two ideas having no natural connection ,ath 
each other was a serious obstacle to man when in search of truth. The 
purpose of the additional chapter was not therefore to analyse or 
explain trains of ideas, but to warn men against what seemed to Locke a 
real hindrance to knowledge. "This wrong connection in our minds of 
ideas in themselves loose and independent of one another, has such an 
influence, and is of so great force to set us awry in our actions, as well 
moral as natural, passions, reasonings, and notions themselves, that perhaps 
there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after. "1 
Two features in Locke's account were outstanding and had considerable 
influence on his successors. The first was the recognition of a natural 
i is say, II,xy.xi.ii,5 
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bu suggesting certain kinds of connection, looks forward to the work 
of Hume, who was to gather up the loose ends left by his predecessors 
and present a more complete theory of association than any of them. 
It has been suggested by Dr. Rossi that it is only the poker of 
Humets name that h lent interest to his writings on aesthetics. This 
is true only if we leave out of consideration his indirect contribution 
through his work on association which,by giving coherence to previous 
half -theories, produced a new and comprehensive theory which was 
eventually to turn aesthetic speculatic. into a completely new channel. 
His importance from this point of view is unquestionable, and doubts 
as to the intrinsic value of his associationist ideas are here irrelevant. 
Hume at the outset abolished the implied distinction between connection of 
ideas, which was allowed by Locke to be natural and reasonable, and 
association of ideas, which was contrary to reason, by attributing the 
"association or connection of ideas" equally to the imagination. This 
meant, in Lockean phrase, that all complex ideas were formed by the 
associating power of imagination joining simple ideas into various 
combinations, and made the need for clearly stated rules of association 
imperative. Hume suggests as the qualitie s giving rise to these 
associations resemblance, cause and effect, and contiguity in time or 
place, and then goes on to propose a theory of association of impressions, 
which last may be said to correspond very roughly to Locket s simple 
ideas. Impressions may be either sensible, or the result câ sensation, 
or reflective, when they are the recurrence in the mind of ideas of 
pleasure or pain which had originally accompanied certain sensations, 
and which when again evocated make a new impression on tin mind. These 
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secondary impressions are, according to Hume, the passions, or emotions 
resembling them. All resembling impressions are connected with each 
other, and as they form like the thoughts a never -ceasing succession, are 
continually running one into the other. Hume c amp le to s his theory 
by stating that these two kinds of association, of ideas and impressions, 
are very closely related, and tke one may .ssist the other, especially 
where they both: concur in the same object."' 
If this is c arnpared with the theories of Hobbes and Locke, it will be 
seen to be a compound of both. Hobbes had tried to deduce certain laws 
which would account for the operation of men's trains of thoughts: Locke had 
shown how certain prejudices or emotions could handicap reason, and had 
given examples of cases where it could be overruled by an associated 
feeling of pleasure or pain. Hume inherited both these theories, and so 
treated them that he himself considered that "if anything can entitle the 
author to so glorious a name as that of inventor, 'tis the use he makes 
of the principie of association of ideas, .which enters into most of his 
philosophy. "2 The application of this principle to passions as well as to 
ideas enabled him to develop a theory by which "our more durable sentiments 
and the complexities of most of our emotions were generated from a 
comparatively small number of ultim-te human. feelings. "3 
Hume has himself given us examples of the possible uses of his doctrine in 
the field of aesthetics. In the chapter on association in his Inquiry he 
employs it to explain the necessity for maintaining the unity of action in 
1 Treatise, II,i,4 
2 
From An Abstract of the Treatise,1740. It is here assumed that the 
arguments advanced by Mr. Keynes and Mr. Sraffa in favour of Hume's own 
authorship of this pamphlet are correct. 
6 Laird: Hume's Philosophy of Human. Nature, p.189 
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any composition. The whole -.,ttention of the reader can be held only 
so long as the events portrayed allow his thoughts and emotions to succeed 
one another according to the natural laws of association. Sudden 
digressions are therefore to be avoided, as they break the necessary 
continuity of this succession, and so distract the reader, causing him to 
lose interest. "The strong connection of the events as it were facilitates 
the passage of the thought or imagination from one to another, facilitates 
also the transfusion of the passions, and Preserves the affection in 
the same direction."' 
Nine years later, in his essay on tragedy, Hume again made use of his 
own theory of association to e xplain aesthetic reactions. He drew to some 
extent on the t:_eory of du Bos that there is a certain pleasure in the 
excitation of any Passion whatsoever, as being preferable to a wholly 
passionless condition: but his main argument was that the emotions most 
directly aroused by tr ,gody, such as the sentiments of beauty awakened 
by the art and genius of the writer, were themselves pleasing. The effect 
is, in Hume ' s own words, that "the impulse or vehemence, arising fran sorrow, 
compassion, indignation, receives a new direction from the sentiments of 
beauty. The lager being the predaninant emotions, seize the whole mind. r2 
hume has thus made, from the aesthetic viewpoint, one extremely important 
addition to the existing theory of association: he has provided a means of 
relating pleasure and pain, and the various passions connected with them, 
to ideas with which they could have no discoverable natural connection. 
The significance of this in a century which attached excessive import:.nce to 
various modes of pleasure is easily seen. 
1 Enquiry, iii 
2 
Four Dissertations, p.191 
161. 
2. Early !applications of the Doctrine. 
The first to use the doctrine of association for aesthetic ends was 
Adison, and he does so in a way that suggests that he was acquainted with 
the opinions of Locke, and perhaps also of Hobbes; for he does not use the 
phrase association of ideas, and does on the other hand attribute the power 
of associating ideas to the imagination. He remarks that "any simple 
circumstance of what we hve formerly seen often raises up a whole scene of 
imagery, and awakens numberless ideas that before slept in the imagination. "1 
This may set in motion a whole train of related ideas, and if cultivated may 
become a fruitful source of images for a poet. Addison, following up a 
hint from Locke, explains this phenomenon by some "Cartesian" physiology, 
by no means essential to the theory he is proposing. 
Hutcheson's views on associati _n are in many ways an advance on anything 
written on the subject by Hobbes or Locke, and it seems likely that 
he profit-10d by the work of both of them. His theory is not on the other 
hand anything like so complete as that of Hume, and the contrary opinion 
of McCosh seems to be due to his insuperable antipathy to the later 
philosopher. Hutcheson regarded the power of association as a "disposition 
in our nature to associate any ideas together for the future which once 
presented themselves jointly. "2 Unlike Addison and Berkeley, Hutcheson 
uses the term association, and he does not attempt to distinguish as Locke 
had done between it and connection of ideas. He does however seem to write at 
times in the spirit of Locke, as when he says that association of ideas may make 
an object in itself unpleasing desirable, and thus "greatly corrupt the 
1 Spectator, no.417 
2 On the Passions, p.10 
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affections and cause great evils."' His chief contribution to associationist 
aesthetic was his explanation of t ho diversity of tastes despite the 
existence of an internal sense of beauty, which seemed to carry with it the 
assumption of a uniform standard. ccording to Hutcheson, association 
of ideas is the cause of much of the "apparent diversity of fancies in the 
sense of beauty, "2 as it may be responsible for the introduction of 
extraneous ideas which rouse in the spectator a sense of pain where he 
should first be conscious of beauty. Hutcheson insists however that this 
is not an argument against the sense of beauty, because when men do have 
such an "aversion to the objects of beauty and a liking to others void of 
it, "2 it is "under different conceptions than those of beauty and deformity. "2 
It is interesting to note that Hutcheson holds that "grandeur and novelty are 
two ideas different from beauty which often recommend objects to us."3 
The other side of Hutcheson's contribution to associationism remains to 
be considered. Despite the disadvantages just quoted, Hutcheson thought 
association a very necessary faculty," as all our language and much of our 
memory depends on it. ,,ere there no such associations made, we must lose 
the use of words, and a ¿rent part of our power of recollecting past events: 
besides many other valuable powers and arts which depend upon them. "4 
This most important statement contains the seed of a theory that was one day to 
displace hutcheson's own principle of an internal sense, and is the first 
sign of the Later tendency to attribute almost every activity of the Mind 
to some form of association. It is surprising that Hutcheson did not 
1 
On the Passions, p.11 
2 Beauty and Virtue, p.83 
3 ibid., p.86 
4 On the Passions, p.11 
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himself see the immense possibility of future development allowed for 
by his attributing language to association. If he had done so, the 
internal sense school might have been strangled at birth, and the slow 
growth of the associationist school over the next half century might have 
been anticipated. Hutcheson even notes that tLere is a certain charm in 
music "which is distinct from harmony, and is occasioned by its raising 
agreeable passions. r Hutche son's associationist doctrine is full of 
unfulfilled promise, for the obvious reason that he himself considered it 
of relatively minor importance, and therefore never took the trouble to 
work it up into a complete and self -consistent system. 
Akenside's theories as to association have been well summarised by a 
recent article in iiodern Language Notes, which leaves little to be said on 
the matter. ykenside first refers to association in his thort introduction, 
when he describes it as "the source of many pleasures and pains in life "2 
and adds that for this very reason it "bears a great share in the influence of 
poetry and the other arts." ,kenside's doctrine of association is 
expounded in the cassage beginning 
"For when the different images of things, 
By chance combined, have struck the attentive soul... "3 
His ideas are not distinguished by any great originality, and all bear 
recognisable marks of their respective sources in Locke, .iddison and 
Hutcheson: the most interesting feature is his development of Hutcheson's 
statement that memory depends to a great extent on association when it 
comes to supply the materials for artistic creation. The combination of 
memory and association is capable of supplying the mind with a wide variety 
1 Beauty and Virtue, p.84 
2 Pleasures of Imagination (Preface) 
3 ibid., 111, 11.312-3 
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of ideas which it can then select from, and dispose at will. 
Baillie too, in his Essay on the Sublime, has something to say on the 
subject of association which he regards as one of the two sources of man's 
pleasure in the objects surrounding him. One source is what Locke and 
Hutcheson had explained as a natural capacity in certain objects to please 
as soon as perceived, from "a certain harmony and disposition of their 
parts:rl the other is a long association with pleasing objects, so that 
"though in themselves there be nothing at first delightful, they at last 
became so. "1 Hence, concludes Baillie, "we see the powerful force of 
connection."' There is nothing very striking in this, but elsewhere 
Baillie reveals clearly his acquaintance with the psychology of Hume, 
which he draws on to explain that sublime which arises "merely from 
association. "2 According to Baillie's theory, association with certain 
types of ideas can make objects capable of sublimity, as well as of the 
emotions they themselves naturally arouse: this sublimity is however as a 
sensation of the soul perfectly genuine for in cases of objects sublime by 
association, the sublime is the predominant passion, and is therefore 
strengthened instead of weakened by accompanying associated emotions. 
This can of course work both ways, as Baillie admits: and if another 
passion such :s terror becomes predominant, the sublime may be altogether 
destroyed. The most interesting thing about Baillie's theory is that 
it early shows that the trend of an associaticnist aesthetic must be 
towards subjectivism: the sublime by association is as much a case of 
true sublimity as th,: sublime of nature because it produces in the 
1 On the Sublime, p.34 
2 ibid., p.15 
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spectator the same elevation of soul, and the measure of a sublime object 
is therefore not so much what qualities it possesses as what emotions it 
arouses. 
Hartley was the first philosopher to attempt to base a Whole system 
on the doctrine of association, but in doing so he added very little that 
magi new to What had already been proposed by his predecessors. He 
accepted the theory that association was the means of uniting simple ides 
into complex ones, and varied it slightly by taking from Berkeley 
the suggestion that the visible idea is the sign of the other sensible ideas, 
and therefore the mark of their connection. Hartley illustrates the 
influence of association on language, already noted by Hutcheson, by 
certain examples of the power words may obtain through association. As the 
only possible connection between words and ideas is by association, and as 
the associations of raen vary as much as do their circumstances, words will 
convey slightly different ideas to different men. ,ords by association 
with agreeable ideas come in time themselves to excite pleasure or pain, 
and this they my in turn transfer to things indifferent by conjunction 
with their names: hence the effectiveness of many figures of speech. The 
pleasure given by painting is largely due to association, because of the 
power of visible ideas to suggest associated ideas of magnitude, distance 
and the like- and of the various pleasing associations colours have for 
most men. Likewise, music affects us because of the connections established 
by association between tunes on the one hand, and passions and emotions 
on the other. The pleasure taken in discord is attributed by Hartley 
to the .fact that discords are first heard in conjunction with agreeable 
cnncords, and that the pleasure is then transferred to these discords, 
1 See chapter V,section2 
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which may then by association become themselves pleasing. 
The position in 1750 (the year after the publication of lartleyts 
Observations on idan) should now be clear. association, which had found 
a place only in the fourth edition of Lockets Essay, had so far increased 
in importance as to become the foundation of a system of mental philosophy. 
That is perhaps the significance of Hartleyts work in the history of the 
development of associationism: he gave it an added importance by according 
it a central place in his philosophy, and so without displaying the 
originality of Hume on the same subject, he became known as the typical 
representative of the associationist school of philosophy. His concern with 
aesthetic questions was not sufficient to make his opinions on such 
matters of great moment; but his remarks on the subject are of interest, and 
are symptomatic of a tendency which was rapidly becoming general to make 
association of ideas the basis of the explanation of any difficulties in 
working out a philosophy of the arts. 
3. aesthetic Problems and Association. 
The doctrines of association of ideas were applied to most of the 
problems confronting aestheticians in the years 17i50 -1790. It proved an 
invaluable asset to the internal sense school, for it could always 
be brought forward as an explanation of .hat seemed exceptions to their 
rules. This subordination to the internal sense accounts for the absence 
of proper examination of the relationship between aesthetics and 
association, and it is only in isolated cases that the hatter problem 
received satisfactory treatment. Typical of the way in which the doctrine 
was often used is a passage from Dr. Johnson's Rambler,- in which he 
1 Rambler, no.168 
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explains that "words become low by the occasions to which they are applied 
or the gener_.1 character of those who use them; and the disgust which they 
produce arises from the revival of those images with which they are commonly 
united." This statement, however correct it may be, is a good example of 
the piecemeal way in which associationism was employed to explain 
isolated facts. 
Association of ideas was used to account for beauty, in whole or in 
part, long b::fore :Alison formulated his system. One of the most interesting 
early examples is that of Sir Joshua Reynolds, in his Idler paper on 
the true idea of beauty. Reynolds comes to the cnnclusion that "the 
works of Nature, if we corn are one species with another, are all equally 
beautiful, and that preference is given from custom or some association 
of ideas: and that in creatures of the same species, beauty is the medium 
or centre of all its various forms."' This anticipates much of the later 
speculation on the subject, and was referred to by Beattie in his 
Dissertation of Imagination. Another early application of the doctrine 
is found in James Usher, who based his analysis on the already existing 
division between intrinsic and relative beauty. Intrinsic beauty remains 
for him ultimate, and its standard is absolute and unchanging: the attacks 
on it made by such men as iviandeville are due to their failure to 
distinguish clearly between it and acci ental beauty or "the adjuncts, or 
habitual associates of beauty, that please us only accidentally. "2 These 
last are, says Usher, so numerous that there is an "inexhaustible variety in 
arbitrary beauty or fashion. "3 This is typical of the attitude of the 
internal sense school, who were thus able to retain absolute beauty, and 
1 
Idler, no.82 
2 Clio(IS03 ed'n),p.23 
6 ibid., p.25 
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still able to allow for cL,nsiderable varieties in tastes for other' kinds of 
2xam)l2 
beauty,20 ,yo1' hat w ich seemed to exist in such things as dress. 
A similar point of view is expressed by Joseph Priestley, who was an 
enthusiastic disciple of Hartley' s. Priestley takes the qualities 
then popularly supposed to be the cause of beauty, such as uniformity, 
variety and fitness, and suggests that they please only because, having been 
perceived in most agreeable objects, they become associated with the idea 
of pleasure, and so please whenever they are discovered. Priestley ends, 
rather weakly, by saying that even if the principle of association cannot 
account for all the pleasures of taste, it has certainly "a very considerable 
influence in this affair, and will help us to account for much, if not all 
of the variety that is observable in the tastes of different persons."' 
The same fundamental idea is expressed in a strange pamphlet on the 
Principles of Taste (1785): "From the association of ideas any object may 
be pleasing, though absolutely devoid of beauty, and displeasing with it. 
The form is then out of the question: it is some real good or evil with 
which the object, but not its form is associated. "2 What all such accounts 
have in common is a determination to maintain the objective nature of 
beauty, and at the same time to find an explanation of the observable 
fact that in certain cases it seems rather to be subjective. Probably none 
of the aestheticians concerned would hove agreed to such a statement of their 
difficulties: if they had seen the problem in this light, there might have 
been less unprofitable repetition of the same positions in the latter half 
of the century. 
Exactly the same solution was from time to time used to explain certain 
1 
Lectures on Oratory and Criticism, p.163 
2 Principles of Taste, p.30 
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cases of sublimity. Gerard points out, as Baillie had done before him, 
that an, object not in itself sublime may nevertheless become so if 
associated with a sublime object. On these grounds he accounts for sublimity 
of style as arising from the nature of the ideas connected with the words 
used; and then sums up by saying that "the sublime of those arts in which 
the instrument of imitation is language, must evidently arise entirely 
from association; because it is the only principle from whi:chmords derive 
their force and meaning. "1 Beattie likewise comments that à "common 
sentiment may be made sublime when it is illustrated by an allusion to a 
grand object, "2 and Barrett in his Pretensions to a Final :analysis concludes 
that if an object has not in itself the dignity necessary to make it sublime 
it may become so by means of circumstances which must, however, "be marked 
with that very'quality without which the object itself cannot be possessed 
of it. "3 
The pleasure given by colour was a source of much difficulty, and here 
too association of ideas, proved helpful. Hartley himself had suggested 
that although colour might be a source of immediate pleasure to children, 
"in adults the pleasure of mere colours is very languid in comparison of their 
present aggregates of pleasure, formed by association. "4 Donaldson goes 
into this question in some detail; he starts by suggesting that we are apt 
to associate the id ea of warmth with a certain shade of yellow, and from 
this draws the general conclusions that "by habit certain qualities 
inferred come to act much in the same way as immediate objects of sensation, "5 
and,after considering other examples, that "gentle tones of colour associate 
1 On Taste, p.24 
2 Dissertations, p.632 
3 Final Analysis, p.41 
4 
Observations on Man, vol.i,p.208 
5 Elements of Beauty, p.12 
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with and dispose to, the gentle and delicate of internal feeling; harsh and 
sharp ones, with rude and disagreeable emotions."' Blair has little to say 
on the question, but agrees that association has probably "influence, in some 
cases, on the pleasure wr.ich we receive from colours. "2 Beattie, too, 
has something to say on this subject, and he comes to the logical 
conclusion that "the beauty of colours depends so much on the ideas with 
which they may happen to have been associated by custom, that the same 
colour shall be beautiful in one object, and in another ugly.... "B 
This does however represent only one aspect of the attention paid to 
associ ationi sm in the second half of the c ntury, and there we. e also 
several attempts to use the theories of association as parts of a tentative? 
aesthetic. One of the first to do this wus Lord Karnes, and though his views 
are not all original, being mostly derived from hume, they are of 
importance because of the popularity of his Elements of Criticism, and also 
because of the prominent place accorded to association in a work avowedly 
literary in character. The very first chapter in th.e book is called 
Perceptions and Ideas in a Train, and in it Karnes repeats what Hume has 
already said on the subject; that trains of ideas are governed by certain 
laws based on the relations of things, and that these laws are not 
completely inviolable. Ulan has no power to vary his trains of thought 
other than by paying more attention to some ideas than to others, and by 
making a selection where there are possible alternatives; but even here 
the ideas may follow the law of order by proceeding either from the general 
towards the particular or vice versa. 
1 Elements of Beauty, p.14 




Karnes then makes his own contribution by deducing that since men are 
subject to the natural laws of connection and order which govern their 
thoughts,order and connection wherever they occur must be a source of 
pleasure, and their absence must occasion displeasure. But "every 
work of art thA is conformable to the natural e nurse of our ides is so 
far agreeairle; and every work of art that'.reverses that course, is so far 
disagreeable, "1 and so it follows that order and connection re one source 
of our pleasure in works of art. They are moreover, :hen submitted to by 
the artistrvaluable restraints on a "bold and fertile imagination, "1 
and are the source of that order and unity essential to good composition. 
They do not exclude Hutcheson's principles of uniformity and variety: on 
the contrary they comprehend them, and Lames gives examples of both 
principles operating in our trains of thoughts, and then combines his 
conciusi.ns in the general observation, that "in every work of art it 
must be agreeable to find that degree of variety which corresponds to the 
natural course of our perceptions; and tht an excess in variety or 
uniformity must be disagreeable by varying that natural course. "2 These 
speculations would seem to provide a basis for a complete aesthetic theory 
which Karnes did not however try to develop, as his interest was not 
privarily in the theory of the beautiful. His aim wa; to provide himself 
with a philosophical foundation on which he could then build up his theory 
of criticism, and he was not concerned with abstract speculation further 
than he considered it essential to his purpose. 
The position of Gerard in his Essay on Genius is not unlike that of 
1 Wks., vol.iv,p.24 
2 ibid., vol.iv,p.289 
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Karnes. The nature of his subject involved him in a certain amount of 
philosophical speculation, and like Karnes he took humets theory of 
association as a starting- point, then proceeded to construct a system in 
accordance with it . Gerard's main thesis is well summarised in his awn 
words: "Genius sometimes has great force and compass: but a vigorous 
construction of the associating principles is sufficient to accunt fo^it, 
however great it be... "1 The associating principles here referred to are 
a slight variation of t.ose laid down by Hume: Gerard divides them into 
simple principles of resemblance, contrariety, and vicinity, and compound 
principles, composed of the "union of simple principles with one another 
or with other circumst,nces, "2 and consisting in co- existence, the 
relation of cause and effect, and order in place or time. According 
to Gerard, one or other of the associating principles is, by constitution 
or by custom, predominant in almost every man, and gives a certain direction 
to his talents or, if he possesses any, his genius; the subordinate 
principles follow the lead given by the eredominating principle _.nd help it 
in various ways, as by supplying' it with suitable ideas. The stronger the 
combination among these principles, the greater will be the force and 
range of a man's genius. 
Gerard again summarises his theories very concisely. "In every kind of 
genius, its predominant principie of association keeps the end in view, 
renders the mind intent on it, gives it a disposition to run into :what 
can promote it, and reject what is unserviceable: the subordinate 
principles have their vigour imparted to them by the predominant principle, 
and they act in a direction suitable to it. "3 Gerard's essay was on the 
1 On Genius, p.185 
2 ibid., p.118 
3 ibid., p.352 
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whole well received by the reviewers, and despite its obvious indebtedness 
to the philosophy of hume the work undoubtedly shows originality in the 
application of the theory of association . The interest aroused by this 
aspect of his theory is reflected in the suggestion made in the i:`.onthly 
Review that it may be possible for a man, "by the judicious direction of 
the associating principles, to produce material variations and improvements 
in his genius."' 
Both Kames and Gerard displayed interest in the question of association 
of emotions and passions, and once again the influence of Hume is 
discernible, The treatment of Gerard, being more comprehensive than that 
of Karnes, will alone be considered at present. Gerard held that when 
any specific passion is roused, it brings along with it into themind 
all the widely different ideas thAt have been a ssociated with it in the 
past. This theory has obvious relevance to his an lysis of genius; and 
Gerard makes use of it to explain diversity of genius, and also that 
concentration of passion so often found in workd of art, because "a passion 
tends to hinder the mind from running into the conception of such ideas as 
have no connection with th_.t passion. "2 It is, therefore, from Gerard's 
point of view, "of great importance to understand the influence of 
passion on association. "3 
Reid has a chapter on association in his Intellectual Pacers of Lean, 
and refers with approval to the accounts of it given by Kanes and Gerard; 
he has little to add to existing theories, but utters a very necessary 
warning against the danger of attributing too much importance to attractions 
of ideas in explaining trains of thoughts. If these are, he concludes, 
1 Monthly Review, LII(1775),p.8 
2 Un Genius, p.174 
3 ibid., p.145 
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"the sole causes of the regular arrangement of thought in the f,ncy, there 
is no use for judgment or taste in any composition. "1 Reid was however 
of far less significance in the development of associationism as a factor in 
aesthetics than his contemporary Beattie, whose Dissertations appeared 
in 1783; tht is, two years earlier than Reid's work just cited. 
Beattie's theories as to association of ideas received their fullest 
expression in his essay Of Imagination. Like his predecessors Karnes and 
Gerard, he accepts the basic positions of Hume, laying down as 
associating principles resemblance, contrast, custom, contiguity and 
the relation of cause and effect. He does however lay special emphasis 
on the influence of custom, and one example given by him is of unusual 
interest. "The daily contemplation of the grand phenomena of nature, in 
a mountainous country, elevates and continually exercises the imagination 
of the solitary inhabitant; "2 one effect of such a way of life, Beattie 
adds, is to ."render the mind in a peculiar degree susceptible of wild 
thoughts and warm emotions.i2 He also attributes to custom as an 
associating principle the power of a painter to convey b;v certain uses of 
light and shade the ideas of distance, magnitude or solidity on a flat 
surface. 
Beattie then proceeds, by way of the familiar dictum that association 
may render unpleasing things in themselves agreeable and vice versa, to 
consider the relation between beauty and association. He begins with the 
general statement that "from affections founded in habit, many or perhaps 
most of these pleasing emotions are derived, w:ichaccompany the perception 
of what in things visible is called beauty: those colours, figures, gestures 




and motions being for the most part accounted beautiful which convey 
to the mind pleasurable ideas; and those ugly or not beautiful, which 
impart suggestions of an opposite or different nature. "1 He then takes 
several of the then recognised sources of the pleasure proceeding from 
beauty, and argues that they can be explained by their association with 
other qualities such as perfection or utility, which are universally pleasing. 
Thus the popular theory that beauty of form depends on proportion and 
variety is resolved by Beattie into association of ideas: variety is not, 
he holds, in itself ple sing, unless it is ilw!tediately connected with 
some other agreeable ideas; and proportion is made beautiful by a combination 
of the "pleasing ideas of skill, contritaance, and convenience. "2 
It looks for a moment as if Beattie is about to formulate a wholly 
associationist aesthetic, but at this point he comes up against the 
problem of the standard of beauty, and this can only be solved by his 
acceptance of the internal senses. Beattie, therefore, despite his 
belief tht "in all cases it seems possible to account for (our ideas 
of beauty)....upon the principles of association, except pa /taps in 
the single one of colours," 5 finds it necessary to retain the snse of 
beauty. This allows him to admit without perturbation that men do now 
differ, and always will differ in their ideas of beauty "so long as they 
differ in their customs,p_-ejudices, passions and capacities. *4 Beattie 
is however clearly the last link in the chain connecting Hume to Alison: 
it only remained for his successors to abandon the internal sense of beauty 
1 Dis sertations, p.110 
2 ibid., p.115 
3 ibid., p.142 
4 iDid., p.141 
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altogether, and the way would then be clear for the nmedgskas of an 
aesthetic doctrine based solely on the association of ideas. 
4. The _ssociationist _=esthetic of Alison. 
Alisonts issays on Taste (1790) abandoned the theory of the sense of 
beauty, and substituted for it as the foundation of aesthetic speculation 
the principle of association of ideas. The system he formulated is built 
up almost painstakingly, and there is about it a unity and completeness that 
is rather notably lacking in most ':.:f the works on this subject in the 
period under consideration. The reason for this is not far to seek: 
Alsion by taking association as the basis of his rstem and at the same 
time rejecting the internal sense, h :.d to reject many of the comfortable 
assumptions of his predecessors, and consider each point on its merits. 
He was moreover a true aesthetician, and did not concern himself with 
ethics or any other branch of philosophy; this left him free to 
concentrate on the one set of problems, and consequently his work has a 
purpose about it that is Lacking in, for example, KAmes when he is dealing 
with aesthetic Problems. 
Alison in his introduction announces that the objects of his incuiry 
both 
are two: they are, to investigate /'the nature of those qualities that produce 
the emotions of taste "1 and the nature of that faculty by which these emotions 
are received. "1 Then after rejecting as unjustified the common assumptions 
of an internal sense and of the simplicity of the emotions of taste, he 
bagins to develop his own theory. ';;hen we say that an object which is 
presented to our senses is beautiful or sublime, we are wrong in believing 
1 Essays, vol.i,p.xiv 
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that there is in th -t object any inherent beauty or sublimity. - We are 
in reality describing our own reactions to that object, and we should 
therefore apply the description of Tbeautifult to our own emotions: it is to 
them, then,that we must loot, if we wish to analyse beauty. :ilison finds 
that the immediate efect of a 'beautiful' object when perceived by sense 
is to start an analogous train of thoughts in the imagination, and it is 
only when an object sets in motion such trains of im:,.gery that we call 
it beautiful. The consequent emotion is proportional to the strength 
of the associating principle of resemblance, which __lison believes to be 
predominant in trains of thought produced by objects of taste. Such 
a theory supposes previous acquaintance with the objects, which will 
otherwise have no power to start immediately a train of imagery; and 
conversely the greater the number of associations we have with the object 
concerned, the greater will be its apparent beauty. The first essential in 
Alison's system is therefore a sudden exercise of the imagination consequent 
on the perception of a so- called "object of taste." 
So long as the trains of thoughts originate in an idea associated with 
the object, they may depart very far from it, and still make the object 
appear beautifùl. Such trains must however be distinguished from 
ordinary trains of thoughts, and -dison notes two characteristics which 
are oeculiar to them. They must possess "some bharacter of emotion "1 so 
that the component ideas vrili be "ideas of emotion ";1 and the thoughts 
must have "some general principle of connection which pervades the whole 
and gives them some certain and definite character, "2 whether it be 
one of gaiety, pathos or anything else. Alison then goes on to state 
1 Essays, vol.i,p.75 
2 ibid., vol.i,p.77 
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his main contention: experience shows that objects of taste are all 
"productive of same simule emotion, '1 and Alison therefore concludes that 
"wherever the emotions of k sublimity or beauty are felt,....some affection 
is uniformly excited by the presence of the object, before the more 
complex emotion of be _.uty is felt;....if no such affection is excited, no 
emotion of beauty or sublimity is produced. "1 
Finally, Alison distinguishes between the emotions of taste, and the 
ordinary emotions of simple pleasure. The emotions of taste are felt only 
when a "regular and consistent train of ideas ot+ emotions"2 follows on the 
perception otan object of t_,,ste. In the case of a simple emotion of 
pleasure, on the other hand, "no additional train of thought is necessary, "3 
and the emotion does not necessarily cause any exercise of the imagination. 
Alison appropriates the word delight to the peculiar pleasure given 
by objects of taste, and points to several additional contributory 
factors which help to keep it distinct from ordinary pleasure: these are 
the pleasures taken in the exercise of the affections, and in the 
activity of imagination, especially when uncircumscribed by the realities 
of everyday life, Both contribute to delight, and therefore the 
pleasure "which accompanies the emotions of taste....(is) a complex 
pleasure. "4 
The remainder of __lisont s work is devoted almost wholly to 
showing that his theory is able to provide a solution to nearly all 
the specific difficulties that had confronted aestheticians during the 
1 
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eighteenth century. The question of a fixed standard of beauty is now 
easily disposed of, because Alison does not admit any such thing as 
absolute beauty: for him, beauty and sublimity are purely subjective 
emotions, and the only standard is the feeling of the individual. Different 
opinions as to the beauty of objects are due to the difference in the 
ideas associated with them, and "although we may not discover what the 
particular association is, tie do not fail to suppose that some such 
association exists which is the foundation of the sentiment of beauty, and 
to consider this difference of opinion as sufficiently accounted for on 
such a supposition. "1 Such associations arise in various ways, and may 
be attributed to age, occupation, or prevalent habits amongh other things; 
and they account not only for the variety of opinions in the world, but 
also for the fact that the same object appears more or less beautiful 
at different periods of a man's life, or even at different times in the 
same day. 
AS Jeffrey was later to point out, Alison's theory abolishes the 
distinction m -de between beautiful, sublime, picturesque, and any other 
possible classes of the objects of taste. If such objects are recognised 
only by their effects, and if these effects are in every case a train of 
thoughts of a Particular kind, there is clearly no real distinction 
between them. Alison does however allow that they differ inasmuch 
as they may vary to some extent the character of the train of imagery, 
and may also, as in the case of the picturesque,wriden its scope by making 
us consider other qualities in the objects concerned. This will increase 
the emotion of beauty by suggesting fresh im.:.ges : o the mind, :end thus 
1 Essays, vol.i,p.85 
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giving more exercise to the imagination. 
The means by which the fine arts accomplish their purpose of producing 
the emotions of taste are also investigated by Alison, and he concludes that 
only such subjects are fit for artistic treatment as are capable of 
producing some kind of simple emotion. Other subjects may however also 
be rendered beautiful if they are associated with qualities which are 
productive of these emotions, and the power of each art is to be measured 
by the scope it allows for such additions as will lend beauty to its subjects. 
The task of the artist is to invent circumstances which will lead the 
mind in the desired direction, and at the same time to provide his 
composition with unity by subordinating the various parts to one general 
principle; thus making it possible for his audience to feel the 
emotions of taste in the greatest degree possible. "It is this purity 
and simplicity of composition accordingly, which has uniformly 
distinguished the great masters of the art (i.e. painting) from the 
mere copiers of nature. "1 Alison reviews the advantages of certain 
arts, and concludes that poetry has a greater povtier to produce beauty 
art/ 
and sublimity than any other/, because it is less limited in its choice 
of subjects, is able to give animation to all it describes, and above all 
because of the "unbounded power which the instrument of language affords to 
the poet "2 by enabling him to speak directly to the imagination. 
The second and the _longer of Alison's two essays is entitled Of the 
Beauty and Sublimity of the Material Jerld. At the outset ;ìlison rejects 
the possibility that matter can by itself or by means of its qualities 
1 Lssays, vol.i,p.126 
2 Ibid., v.ol.i,p.132 
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produce any kind of emotion. But, he adds, the dualities of matter may 
produce emotions or affections "from their association with other qualities; 
and as being either the signs or expressions of such qualities as are 
fitted by the constitution of our nature to produce emotion;rl for "the 
constant connection we discover between the sign and the thing signified, 
.between the material quality and the quality productive of emotion, renders at 
last the one expressive to us of the other, and very often disposes us 
to attribute to the sign that effect which is produced only by the quality 
signified. "2 The rest of the essay is little more than a series of 
illustrations of the applicability of this doctrine to almost every type 
of beauty considered by Allison's predecessors. These fall into two 
main classes; beauty of material objects and beauty of mind, both of which 
are made knovn to us by material signs, which are in turn signs of the 
qualities productive of the emotion of beauty. __lison deals in turn with 
the beauty found in music, colour, form, and (in the second edition) the 
human face, and shows that each can be accounted for on the saine principle 
of association with a quality capable of exciting emotion: when such 
associations are dissolved, material qualities can no longer be called 
beautiful. 
In his closing chapter Alison claims that his doctrines are 
substantially the same as t; ose of the Platonists, and of Shaftesbury, 
Hutcheson, Akenside, Spence, and Reid, all of whom believed that beauty 
consisted in the expression of mental qualities. There _isa, he holds, 
both a direct and an indirect way in which material qualities may be the 
signs of mental qualities. They may be so directly as "the immediate 
1 Essays, vol.i,p.178 
2 ibid., vol.i,p.179 
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signs of the powers or capacities of the mind, "1 or by signifying to 
us the more amiable affections of mind with which it is natural for 
man to sympathise. Indirectly, the material qualities may signify 
the mental as a result of experience of their constant co- existence; 
because of certain resemblances or analogies between them; from 
association "when by means of education, of fortune, or of accident, 
material objects are connected with pleasing or interesting quáiities 
of mind;i2 and finally from the individual and personal associations 
each man makes in the course of his life. Therefore, concludes 
Alison, "the beauty and sublimity which is felt in the various 
appearances of matter, are finally to be ascribed to their expression 
of mind; or to their being, either directly or indirectly, the signs 
of those qualities of mind which are fitted by the constitution of our 
nature, to affect us with pleasing mr interesting emotion. "3 
McCosh tells us that A1sonts ess:;.ys seem to have "passed very 
much out of sight till the booksellers in 1810 told him that there 
was a wish expressed for a. second edition, which was reviewed 
by Francis Jeffrey in 1811, and afterwards had an extensive circulation 
in various countries. "4 This is borne out by the comparative 
neglect of his work in the twenty years which intervened between the 
first and second editions: during this period there are very few 
references made to his essays,in the aesthetic writings of others. 
An exception must be made in the case of Mangin who, although he does 
not mention Alison by name, draws upon his theories as well as those of 
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mast of his predecessors in his Lssays on Literary Pleasure. Very early in 
this work he advances the view that much of the pleasure received from 
objects of taste is due to the train of ideas with which they are 
associated in our minds, "1 and further on he defines association of 
ideas as the "part of our constitution which is always raising up a train 
of thoughts in c onsequenbe of every object which engages the attention. "2 
Mangin considers that the character of the emotion felt on the perception 
of an object is governed by the kind of train of thought that it starts, and 
from this deduces the artistic necessity of presenting only such 
circumstances as will arouse the find of thoughts and emotions ill ended 
by the artist. This all indicates knowledge of .,:lisonts theory, but it 
must be added that Mangin did not accept .zlison's principal arguments, and 
used the theory of association only when and as it answered his own purposes. 
The second editicn of .lisonts essays was at once hailed by Jeffrey, 
writing in the Edinburgh Review,as "on the whole the best _.nd most pleasing 
work that has yet been produced on the subject of taste and be__.uty. "3 
There are good grounds for suspecting that it was Alisonts work that first 
led Jeffrey to take an interest in aesthetic theory, and to develop a 
system of his own which e Wikaly appeared in the Encyclopaedia Britannica 
supplement for 1824. In the earlier essay, Jeffrey allows that ti,e_e 
may have been a certain amount of truth in earlier systems: "it seems 
to be perfectly true for instance, that certain combinati cats of colours and 
sounds are originally agreeable to the eye and the ear, and constitute a 
sort of beauty.... of which no other account can be given than that, by the 
1 Plesurésfrom l.itprarY +PpSjtíon, p 9 
2 ibid., p.20 
3 Edinburgh Review, XVIII,no.35(1811),p.1 
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constitution of our nature, such objects are agreeable to us. "1 This 
admission at once lays Jeffrey open to the very accusation which a few 
'ages earlier he had levelled at others; that of implying the existence of 
an internal sense, for how else are such "combinations of colours and sounds"' 
to be recognised as beautiful? 
In his article on Beauty however, Jeffrey abandoned the attempt to 
combine the objective theory of the internal sense with the subjective 
theory of Alison, and his attack on Knight's belief in the intrinsic 
beauty of colours shows that Jeffrey no longer held that belief himself. 
As the later :article is therefore a more exact expression of Jeffrey's on 
views, it will be better to confine our attention to it at present. 
Jeffrey's theories are set out and expressed with admirable conciseness 
and clarity. After rejecting the possible existence of an inherent 
beauty, he claims that the "vast variety of objects to which ,e give the 
common name of beautiful become entitled to that appellation merely 
because they all possess the power of recalling or reflecting those 
sensations of which they have been the accompaniments, or with which 
they have been associated in our imagination by any other more casual 
bond of connection. "2 Jeffrey's debt to _ilison,from whom he differs 
on certain points,is throughout obvious; but the two systems are not 
sufficiently alike to make a detailed account of Jeffrey's theory 
superfluous and the poihts of difference deserve special attention. 
Jeffrey holds that the chief fault in ::lison's theory is that it 
does not allow for the instantaneous nature of our perception of the 
beautiful, and ti.is he attributes to lison's "assertion that our sense 
1 Edinburgh heview,XVIII,no.35(1811),p.6 
2 
Encyclopaedia Britannica (1824),p.174(col.ii) 
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of beauty consists not merely in the suggestion of ideas of emotion, but 
in the contemplation of a connected series of such ideas. "1 This Jeffrey 
considers quite inconsistent with the fact t.at a beautiful object gives 
an immediate pleasure, and he concludes that it is impossible that the 
cause of a perception of beauty can be "a long series of various and 
shifting emotions. "1 It can only be assumed that Jeffrey had failed 
to a.p reciate one of the most central features of ,_lison's theory, which 
insisted that beauty -could not be perceived until the imagination had been 
aroused, and that .perception of beauty consisted in just this imaginative 
activity. Jeffrey allows that "the perception of beauty implies a 
certain exercise of the imagination," which involves a complete shifting 
of the emphasis. If then the first elements of the feeling of beauty 
were for __lison perception and imagination, it might be said that for 
Jeffrey they become sensation and emotion. 
hence Jeffrey's fundamental principles are that beauty is but "the 
reflection of our own inrrrard &motions, and is made up entirely of certain 
little Portions of love, pity and affection "2 recalled on the perception 
of certain objects: and that "the love of sensation seems to be the 
ruling appetite of human nature, "2 so that many sensations in themselves 
a 
painful may be the subject of /Certain kind of pleasure. Having 
established these theories, and deduced from them that the only interest we 
can have in anything, including beauty, must be connected with the 
"fortunes of sentient beings, "3 Jeffrey can proceed to examine the 
relation between the object called "beautiful" and the emotion felt by the 






beholder. here his system differs little from Alison's, and he finds 
that "almost every tie by which two objects can be bound together in the 
imagination, in such a manner as that the presentment of the one shall 
recall the memory of the other, "1 and in fact "almost every possible 
relation which can subsist between such objects may serve to connect the 
things we call sublime or beautiful, with feelings that are interesting 
or delightful. "2 Thus beauty and sublimity c:.n both be explained as 
the "reflection of emotions excited by the feelings or condition of 
sentient beings: and are .produced altogether by certain little portions.... 
of love, joy, pity, veneration, or terror, that adhere to those objects that 
are present on occasion of such emotions. "3 
Jeffrey ends by sub vesting the consequences that will follow upon the 
adoption of his theory. He claims, as he had done earlier on behalf of 
Alison's theory, that it "establishes the substantial identity between 
the sublime, the beautiful and the picturesque "4 by showing that material 
objects differ not in the qualities, but in the emotions which they may 
cause by association of ideas in each individual according to his 
experience. Attempts to classify these emotions as sublime, beautiful 
or picturesque he considers as ill- advised, since they tend to mislead men 
into attributing these classes to actual qualities in the object. The 
second advantage of Jeffrey's theory is that if accepted it makes 
unnecessary any fresh attempts to set up a fixed standard of taste, for it 
will follow that in so far as a roan in discussing questions of taste speaks 
of his own emotions, all tastes must have equal validity. It does not mean 
1 ,Incyclopuedia Britannica (1824),p.181(ii) 
2 ibid., p.182(i) 




however, as Jeffrey hastens to add, that all tastes are qqually good; since 
all amen have not the same degree of sensibility. There is therefore still 
room for the cultivation of taste "through the indirect channel of 
cultivating the affections and powers of observation. "1 
Although it did not appear until 1824, the spirit in which Jeffrey 
writes is clearly the spirit of Beattie and Alison rather than that of 
Kant or Coleridge, and there is on thi§ score an obvious justification for 
including him in a work on the eighteenth century aestheticians. His 
article on Beauty has moreover an air offinality about it that makes it 
peculiarly suitable for consideration as the last word in a long 
controversy. Nobody now things that Jeffrey had provided the key to 
the solution of all aesthetic problems: but there is no reason to doubt 
that Jeffrey himself believed that his theory should "put an end to all these 
perplexing and vexatious questions. "2 It required no such indefensible 
assumptions as that of an internal sense of beauty; it accounted for the 
wide variety aE tastes among men, at different ages and in different countries; 
and above all it seemed eminently reasonable and self-consistent from 
beginning to end. It had therefore accomplished all that any eighteenth 
century aesthetician could have hoped for, and Jeffrey may fairly be 
excused for thinking that he had ended a long and, it is to be feared, 
sometimes tedious dispute. 
1 Encyclopaedia Britannica ( 1824 ),p.196,(íí) 
2 ibid., p.196(i) 
PART IV 
C O N C L U S I O N 
CHAPTER X 
THE INFLUENCE OF HuBBE , LOCKE, AND BERKELEY 
ON THE ENGLISH AND SCuTTESH AESTHETICIANS 
OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
What has already been said in the preceeding chapters leaves little 
more to be done now than to gather up certain loose threads, and to try 
to take a whole view of what h,s so far necessarily been treated piecemeal. 
It is never easy to estimate the influence exercised by individuals on 
succeeding generations, and the task of doing so is rendered more difficult 
by the myopia that close study of certain aspects of any problem is apt to 
beget. It is nevertheless clear that eighteenth century aesthetic theorists 
were considerably indebted to the great philosophers whose chief works 
appeared between 1650 and 1750, and it is my immediate aim to try to set 
down the extent of this influence. 
Berkeley, the last and the most delightful of the philosophers with 
whom I am specially concerned, is also the least influential of the three. 
It has already been indicated that Berkeley's philosophy was little 
understood by the ordinary educated man of the day, and his influence 
on what may be called the popular philosophy of the day was correspondingly 
small. ,s Professor Moore has pointed out, Berkeley was and is a 
"philosopher's philosopher," and few of those who dabbled in aesthetic 
theory could advance a claim to competence in philosophe. It may be said, 
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then, without fear of contradiction, that Berkeley's influence do the 
eighteenth century aestheticians was negligible. Certain of his theories 
did find favour, but it was often through the intermediacy of another 
philosopher that they became more widely known. Thus Hartley must have 
helped to popularise certain conclusions which could be drawn from 
Berkeley's New Theory of Vision, and the interest taken in Berkeley by 
Reid may be reflected in the slight increase in the knowledge of 
Berkeley's work which is apparent in some of the Scottish aestheticians 
at the end of the century. 
The influence of Locke was as great as that of Berkeley was small, 
Locke as a philosopher expressed the spirit of the post -revolution 
period just as clearly as did Addison as an essayist, and a certain 
similarity of temperament in the two men may account in some degree 
for Addison's ready acceptance of much of Locke's philosophe. Locke 
at5 
has been claimed sm both /an empiricist and as a rationalist; and in either 
case he was giving expression to a point of view that was sure of a 
an 
sympathetic hearing in the eighteenth century. He was /empiricist 
in so far as he believed in collecting carefully the facts of experience, 
and then drawing only such conclusions as seemed to him certain in view 
of the evidence before him. He was a rationalist in that he upheld 
the supremacy of the understanding among the human faculties, and taught 
that it was only through the exercise of reason that man could attain 
to certain truths. There are to be found, therefore, in his philosophy, 
two fundamental positions which came to be accepted by the vast nßjority 
of his successors, and which made his ;,orks,even as regards method,of 
great importance in the eighteenth century. 
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Locke did far more, however, than suggest to later aestheticians a 
way of approaching the problems which faced them. He provided a system 
of thought which, though it at no time dealt with aesthetic questions, 
at least provided a philosophic basis for numerous answers to such 
questions, though by doing so it often raised fresh problems. that 
is beauty? If it is an idea in the mind, Locke's new way of ideas" could 
be used to explain just how it came to be there. If beauty is a quality 
residing in the beautiful object, the distinction between primary and 
secondary qualities provided the basis for a profound discussion of the 
point. In the same way, Locke's division of ideas into those arising 
from sensation and those arising from reflection gave a starting point 
to investigations on many subjects, and notably to Hutcheson's attempt to 
analyse the internal senses. 
Locke's influence on the development of aesthetic theory was in fact 
very great. As has been pointed out earlier, most of the eighteenth 
century aestheticians were not philosophers at all, yet most of them 
realised that the problems they were dealing with went deeper than mere 
questions of artistic expediency. They looped around therefore to find 
philosophic support for their theories, and as often as not it was to 
Locke that they went for succour. Few of them were acquainted thoroughly 
with his philosophy, but most of them knew something about it, and took 
from Locke just as much as they needed and no more. Locke was also 
fortunate in that his philosophy was to some extent popt.larised by Addison 
in the opectator, for this made it reach a wider audience than it might 
otherwise have done. 
The influence of Hobbes on eighteenth century aesthetic theory is more 
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difficult to assess than that of either Locke or Berkeley. Hobbes was 
not in general well spoken of by hissuccessors, and he is generally 
dismissed as "Mr. Hobbes the atheist," while Kames refers to his "dark 
and confused notions." It is well to remember however that one can shout 
disapproval of a philosopher in public, and still read his works in 
private. How far'this can be said of the eighteenth century attitude 
to Hobbes, it is very hard to say. A large folio volume containing 
nearly all his most important works was published in London in 1750, 
and it is difficult to believe that this would have been done if there 
had not still been a good deal of interest in his philosophy. 
So far as aesthetic theory was concerned, Hobbes had one great 
advantage over Locke. he had himself shown some interest in the arts 
and in criticism, and had expressed views on these subjects which had 
attracted some attention in the post -Restoration period when he was still 
the dominating figure in English philosophy. -blest of the writers who 
wrote in the second half of the seventeenth century and in the early 
years of the eighteenth century felt his influence, which can be seen 
in the works of Dryden, Temple, Dennis, the uambridge philosophers, 
Addison and Shaftesbury, even if it manifests itself only in violent 
oposition to Hobbests theories. It was in this p riod that certain 
of Lobbests ideas became established in the minds of critics, and chief 
among these were his various theories as to the functions of the imagination, 
whether or not engaged in the work of artistic creation. As these ideas 
were adopted piecemeal, they did not involve the necessary acceptance 
of Hobbest s determinism, _.nd could therefore be passed on till a later 
generation could draw upon them in formulating a theory of creative genius. 
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It must also be remembered that many of Hobbes's theories as to the 
imagination were in keeping with traditional ideas on the subject. This 
helps to account for the readiness with which certain of his doctrines 
were accepted by men who were on the whole opposed to his philosophy, 
and for the fact already noted in the fir st chapter that even at the end 
of the eighteenth century, the functions of imagination were not regarded 
as differing in essentials from those proposed by Hobbes. 
Other points in Hobbes's philosophy aroused sufficient controversy 
among his immediate successors to make almost certain their survival 
as living issues. Notable examples are his theory of laughter adopted 
by Addison and opposed by lutcheson, and his op_iosition of wit and 
judgment, which preceded and no doubt in some way suggested Lockets later 
remarks on the same subject. He was also, as came to be recognised 
later in the eighteenth century, a pioneer as regards investigation 
of the associations of ideas in the mind, and can therefore claim some 
credit for the great amount of attention given to this phenomenon during 
the eighteenth century. 
A comparison of the influence of Hobbes with that of Locke suggests 
a ready answer that Hobbes's influence was more in the field of 
psychology, and Lockets more in the field of philosophy. Such a wide 
generalisation would not be by any means the whole truth, and ; et 
there is just an element of truth in it. Hobbes's philosophy did 
concentrate to some extent on the processes of the mind: whereas Locke 
paid more attention to objects. and their qualities than did Hobbes. 
This is illustrated by the fact that in the first part of this thesis 
of 
the nng/hobbes occurs more frequently than that of Locke: in the second 
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part it is mentioned very rarely. 'The difference probably illustrates 
just how much truth there is in such a generalisation. 
Hobbes and Locke are, then, the two philosophers who exercised most 
influence on the course of eighteenth century aesthetics, and their ideas 
continued popular throughout the century. These ideas were sometimes, 
especially in the case of Locke, known directly from their philosophical 
works; but they were also known indirectly through the work of such men 
as Addison and Hutcheson, at the beginning of the century, and Karnes 
and Gerard later on. This influence was very considerable, and of such 
a nature that it is safe to say that without the work of Hobbes and Locke 
the course of aesthetic theory in both England and Scotland would have 
been very different. The extent to which aestheticians were dominated by 
the basically empiricist assumptions of Hobbes and Locke may be estimated 
by.a comparison between the development of aesthetic theory in 
eighteenth century England and the development of the aesthetic views 
of Kant between 1764 and 1790. In his earlier Observations on Beauty and 
Sublimity,Kant, like his English contemporaries, based his aesthetic 
on the theory of an internal sense. In the next quarter of a century 
however, Kant came to abandon this view, with its implication of an 
objective beauty, and in his Critique of Aesthetic Judgment (1790), he has 
come to accept the view that beauty is subjective. By an curious 
coincidence, in the same year appeared Alison's Essays on Taste, which was 
the first work in English to propose a theory of subjective beauty. The 
difference between the works of Kant and Alison is however very significant. 
Kant had by this time had shaken off the bonds of dogmatism, and had 
adopted a new critical approach that makes him the forerunner of a 
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completely new school of aesthetic thought. Alison, on the oth .Jr hand, 
continued to accept the empiricist assumptions that had been established 
first by Bacon, and later by Hobbes and Locke, and therefore his 
theories are one of the last expressions of the empiricist aesthetic. 
It is not Alison, but Coleridge, who knew the work of Kant, who should 
be regarded as the herald of a new era in English aesthetics. 
196. 
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of the Seventeeth Century, vol.iii:` 
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edins., 17185, 1787, 1790, 1793, 1796, 1798, 1801,189; etc.. 
Bolingbroke, Lord Viscount: see St. John. 
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edtn., 1764. 
Browne, Isaac H.: Essay on Design and Beauty. Edinburgh, 1739, Also in 
Poems on Various Subjects,2 Latin and English. London, 1768:K 
Burke, Edmund: The ; corks of the Right Honourable Edmund Burke. 6 vols. 
(The Worlds Classics) Oxford University Pres ;, 1925.* 
A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the Sublime 
and Beautiful. 1756. 2nd edtn., 1757 (contains an Introductory Discourse 
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This later version, which contains only minor altLrations, is wrongly 
liS+e[3 in +he f!nmhrirlmra RihlinrnroTh+. o0 0 onnor,Ai-e 
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1761, 1776 (8th), 1787, 1792, 1796. 
Burnet, James; Lord Monboddo: Of the Origin and Progress of Language. 6 vols.. 
Edinburgh. Vols. published 1773:'1774:K1776:(1787:` 1789; 1792:' 2nd ed'n. 
of vol. I, 1774: vol. III, 1786. 
Antient Metaphysics; or, the Science of Universals. 6 vols. 
Edinburgh.( Vols. published 1779, 1782, 1784, 1795, 1797, 1799. 
Burney, Charles: A General History of Music; to which is prefaced a Disserti.on 
on the Music of the Ancients.(4 vols) Vol.', London, 1776 
Burrowes, Robert: Essay....on Style in Writing. T.R.I.A.3 vol..v. 1794:I( 
Burton, Robert: The Anatomy of Melancholy, 1621. Another edtn. Ed. A. R. 
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Byrom, John: Miscellaneous Poems. 2 vols. Manchester, 1773. (Includes 
Enthusiasm: A Poetical Essay). 
Campbell, George: The Philosophy of Rhetoric. 2 vols. London, 1776.* Other 
ed'ns., 1801, 1808, etc. 
Collins, Anthony: A Discourse concerning Ridicule End Irony in Writing. 
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Cooper, Anthony Ashy; Third earl of Shaftesbury: Characteristicks of Men, 
Manners, Opinions, Times. 2 vols.. London, 1711. (including: Inquiry 
concerning Virtue: On Enthusiasm: Sensis Communs: The Moralists: 
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with an introduction and notes, by J. M. Robertson: 2 vols.. London, 19OO:1< 
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T.R.I.A., Transactions of the Royal Irish Academy. 
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Not Second Characteristicks, as wrongly given in the Cambridge Bibliography 
and elsewhere. 
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1780. Read in 1782. 
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Encyclopaedia Britnnica, or a Dictionary of Arts, Sciences, etc.. On a Plan 
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entirely New....The second edition, greatly improved and enlarged. 
10 vols.. Edinburgh, 1778 -83* Vols.I -III 1778: vol.IV, 1779: vols. 
V -VI, 1780: vol.VII, 1781: vol.IX, 1782: vol.X,1786. (Date of vol.VIII 
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Enquiry concerning the Principles of Taste, and of the Origin of our Ideas 
of Beauty. London, 1789* 
Ferguson, Adam: in Essay on the History of Uivil Society. Edinburgh, 1767` 
Other ed'ns., 1768(twice), 1773, 1782, 1789, 1793, 1814. 
Fiddes, Richard: Treatise of Morality. London, 1724:* 
Four Odes 2 On Beauty. 3. On Taste....By Mr. H.. London, 1750 
Gerard, Alexander: An Essay on Taste. Iith Three Dissert&ons on the same 
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of the Standard of Taste; with observations concerning the imitative nature 
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An Essay on Genius. London, 1774.* 
Gibbon, Edv;ard: Miscellaneous ':irks of E. G. with memoirs of his life and 
writings, composed by himself. 2 vols.. London, 1796:` 
Gilpin, ;illiam: An Essay on Prints, containing Remarks on the Principles of 
Picturesque Beauty. London, 1768* 
Travel 
Three Essays: On Picturesque Beauty: On Picturesque/ and On Sketching 
Landscape....London, 1791.* 
Hall, Samuel: An attempt to show that a Taste for the Beauties of Nature and 
the Fine arts has no influence favoura131e to morals. i''.i. L. P. S.M.,1 
vo 1. I, 1785. 
Harpur, Joseph: Essay on the Principles of Philosophical Criticism applied 
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concerning music, painting, and poetry. The third concerning happiness. 
London, 17144. Other ed'ns., 1765 (revised), 1773, 1783, 1792. 
Hermes, or a Philosophical Inquiry concerning Universal Grammar. 
London, 1751. Other ed'ns., 1765, 1771, 1794. 
Phi loical Engiirie s, 3 parts. London, 1781. 2nd ed'n., 1802. 
The Works of J. H. With an account of his life, ... by the Earl of 
Malmesbury. Oxford, 1841.1 
Hartley, David: Observations on Min, his frame, his duty, and his expectations. 
2 vols.. London, 1749* 2nd ed'n. 1791. 
Hawkesworth, John: Paper in the Adventurer: (no.82, 
Hawkins, Sir John: A General History of the Science and Practice of Music. 
5 vols.. ïtol.I, containing a Preliminary Discourse: London, 1776* 
Hay, William: Essay on Deformity. London, 175: 
Hobbes, Thomas: The English Works of T.H....Collected and edited by Sir 
W. Molesworth. 10 vols. and index. Londmñ, 1839 -45 
T. H. Malmesburiensio opera philosophica quae Latina scripsit 
omnia, in unum corpus nunc primum collecta studio....Gulielmi 
Molesworth. 5 vols. London, 1839-45:Y- 
De Corpore Politico; or the Elements of Law, Moral and Politick. 
London, 1650. Another ed'n., ed. F. Tfinnies, Cambridge, 1928: 
Human Nature, or the Fundamental Elements of Policy....London, 1650. 
Philosophical Rudiments concerning Government and Society....London, 
1651. 
Leviathan, or the Matter, Form, and Power of a Commonwealth, 
ecclesiastical and civil. London, 1651. Another ed'n., ed. M. Oakeshott. 
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Oxford, 191+6: 
Hogarth, William: The Analysis of Beauty. Written with a view to fixing the 
fluctuating ideas of Taste. London, 1753.' 
Home, Henry; Lord Kames: Elements of Criticism. 3 vols. Edinburgh, 1762. 
Other ed'ns., 1763, 1765, 1769, 1774, 1785; 1788, 1807, 1817: 
Sketches of the History of Man. 2 vols. Edinburgh, 1774. Other 
ed'ns., 1774 -5, 1779, 1788, 1796, 1802, 1807, 1813; etc. 
Articlesson Architecture; Art; Beauty; ConEruity; Criticism; 
Language; Novelty; Uniformity: in Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2nd ed'n. 
Hume, David: A Treatise of Human Nature: being an attempt to introduce the 
experimental Method of Reasoning into Moral Subjects. 3 vols.. London, 
1739 -4©i: Vols. I, II, 1739: vol. III, 1740. Another edition; ed. 
with an analytical index, by L. A. Selby- Bigge. Oxford, 1388: 
An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature, 1740. Another ed'n.; 
a Pamphlet hitherto unknown by DLvid Hume: reprinted with an 
Introduction by J. M. Keynes and P. Sraffa. Cambridge University Press, 
1938. 
Essays, Moral and Political. 2 vols. Edinburgh, 1741 -42. Vol I, 
1741; other ed'ns., 1742, 1748; Vol.II, 1742; 2nd ed'n., 1748: 
Philosophical Essays concerning Human Understanding. London, 1748. 
Other ed'ns., 1751 (with additions and oorrections), 1756, 4758 
(under new title of Enquiry concerning Human Understanding), 1760, 
1764, 1767, 1768, 1770, 1772, 1777, etc.. Another ed'n.6; Humeb 
Enquiries concerning the Human Understanding and concerning the 
5 
Some but not all of these are verbatim reproductions of passages in 
Elements of Criticism. 
6 It should be noted that this edition fails to record differences from the 
original text of 1748. It should not be used, therefore, without 
reference to the earlier editions. 
20`1. 
Principles of Morals. Reprinted from the posthumous edition of 1777, 
and edited with introduction, comparative table of contents, and 
analytical index, by Le A. Selby- Bigge: Oxford, 1894. 
An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. London, 1751. 
Four Dissertations.I The Natural History of Religion. II Of the 
Passions. III Of Tragedy. IV Of the Standard of Taste. London, 1757á 
Hurdis, James: Lectures, sheaving the several sources of that pleasure 
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press, Bishopstone, Surrey; 1797. 
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An Inquiry concerning the Original of our Ideas of Beauty 
and Virtue, in Two Treatises. London, 1725. Includes an Inquiry 
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ed'ns. 1726, 1738, 1753, 1772. 
An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections 
With Illustrations on the Moral Sense. London, 1728 Other ed'ns., 1730, 
1742, 1751, 1756, 1769, 1772. 
J,ckson, William: Thirty Letters on Various Subjects. London, 1783. Other 
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The Four Ages, together with Essays on Various Subjects. London, 
1798: 
Jacob, Sir Hildebrand: Of the Sister Arts; an Essay. London, 17340 
Jeffrey, Francis: Article in Edinburgh Review, vol. XVIII, no. 35: May, 1811 
On Alison's Essays on Taste. 
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4th ed'n 
Johnson, Samuel: Articles in the Rambler, 1750 -52: and the Idler, 1758- 
1760. 
Lives of the Most Eminent English Poets. London, 1779 -81. 
Another ed'n., Chandos Classics 
Jones, Sir William: Poems, consisting chiefly of translations from the 
asiatick languages, to which are added two essays...II On the Arts, 
commonly called the Imitative. 1772 
Kanes, Lord: See Home. 
Kant, Emmanuel: Critique of Aesthetic Judgment. Translated with seven 
introductory essays, notes.... by J. C. Meredith. Oxford, 1911. 
Kirkshaw, Thomas: On the Comparative Merit of the Ancients and -Moderns, 
with respect to the Imitative Arts. ML.P.S.M.1 vol.I, 1785: Read in 
1783. 
Knight, Richard Payne: An Analytical Inquiry into the Principles of Taste. 
London, 1805e Other ed'ns., 1805, 1808(4th). 
Knox, Vicesimus: Moral and Literary. London, 1778. Other ed'ns. 1779' 
(2 vols.; ,reatly enlarged), 1782, 1785 (6th), 1787, 1791 (12th). 
Liberal Education. London, 1781: 2nd ed'n$., 1781. 
Winter Evenings, or Lucubrations on Life and Letters. London, 
* 1795(corrected). 1788. Other- ed'ns., 1790 (enlarged),  ) 
Personal Nobility, or Letters to a Young Nobleman on the 
conduct of his studies. London, 1793. 
Lamotte, Charles: An Essay upon Poetry and Painting, with relation to 
the Sacred and Profane History, with an appendix concerning Obscenity 
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in WritinL, and Painting'_iondon, 1730 
Lancaster, Nathaniel: The Plan of an Essay upon. Delicacy, 1748. Also in 
Fupitive Pieces on Various Subjects, by several authors. London, 1761. 
Letters to a Young Nobleman. London, 1762.1((On study, history, taste, etc.) 
Locke, John: ELL;istola de Tolerantia. Gouda, Holland; 1689. English 
translation; London, 16)0. 
Two Treatises of Civil Government. London, 1690. Other 
ed'ns., 1694, 1698, 1713, etc. 
An Essay concerning Human Understanding, London, 1690. 
Other ed'ns., 1694, 1695, 1700 (with additions), 1706, 1732(9th), 
etc.. Another ed'n., collated and annotated, with prolegomena, 
biographical, critical, and historical, by A. C. Fraser. 2 vols. 
Oxford, 1894: 
Some Thoughts on the Conduct of the Understanding in the 
search of truth. London, 1806. 
(Mangi.n, Edward :) Essay on the Sources of Pleasures received from Literary 
Compositions. 1809:`2nd ed'n., 1813. 
(Maxwell, John:) An Essay upon Tune.....Edinbargh, 1731: 
Zachary :) Two Dissertations concerning Sense and the Imagination 
....1728. 
AeJmoth, William: The Let ers of Sir Thomas Fitzosborne on Several 
Subjects. 2 vols.. London, 1742 -49; Other ed'ns., 1769(7th), 
1784(9th), 1795. 
Miller, George: An Essay on the Origin and Nature of our Idea of the 
Sublins,. T.Fc.I.A.3, vol.V, 1794.'E` 
Monboddo, Lord: See Burnet. 
Moor, James: Essays read to a Literary Society....within the College, 
at Glasgow.... Glasgow, 1759. K 
Net tleton, Thomas: A Treatise on Virtue and Happiness. London, 1729.* 
Other ed'ns., 1751 (3rd, corrected), 1776. 
Of Beauty: to the Earl of -. London, 1757.K 
Ogilvie, John: Philosophical and Critical Observations on the Nature, 
Characters, and Various Species of Composition. 2 vols.. London, 1774. 
Percival, Thomas: Moral and Literary Dissertations: Warrington, 1784. 
2nd ed'n., 1789.' 
Plumer, F.: A Letter from a Gentleman to his nephew at Oxford. 1772 
Pope, Alexander: Essay on Criticism, 1711. 
Preston, William: Essay on Wit and Humour. T.R.I.A.3 vol. II, 1788;4 
Price, Richard: A Review of the Principal Questions in Morals. London, 1757* 
Other ed'ns., 1769 (corrected), 1787 (correct =d), Another ed'n., 
ed. D. Daiches Raphael; Oxford, 1948.4 
Price, Sir Uvedale: An Essay on the Picturesque as compared with the 
Sublime and Beautiful....2 vols.. London, Hereford, 1794-98. 
Other ed'ns., 1796 -8 (a new ed'n., with considerable additions), 
1810 (3 vols.) 
Priestley, Joseph: Lectures on the Theory of Language and Universal 
Grammar. i arrington, 1762.* 
A Course of Lectures on Oratory and Criticism. London, 1777.'` 
Pye, Henry James: Beauty; a poetical essay in three parts. London, 1766; 
Ramsay, Allan; the younger: An Essay on Ridicule. London, 1753.'4( Also 
in The Investigator, 1762. 
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Reid, Thomas: Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. Edinburgh, 1785. 
Essays on the Active Powers of Man. Edinbur ,h, 1788. 
Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind. 3 vols.. Dublin, 
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Reynolds, Sir Joshua: The Works of Sir' Joshua Reynolds. To which 
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Discourses delivered at the Royal Academy. 2 vols.. 1820. 
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Richardson, Jonathan: The forks of Jonathan Richardson....All corrected 
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Essay on the Theory of Painting. London, 1715. 2nd ed'n., 
1725. 
Two Discourses. I An Essay on the :xt of Criticism, as it 
relates to painti ng....II An Argument in behalf of the Science 
of a Connoisseur....2 parts. London, 1719. 
Robertson, Thomas: An Inquiry into the Fine Arts, vol. I. London, 1784 
No other volume was published. 
Roscoe, William: On the Comparative Excellence of the Sciences and Arts. 
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St. John, Henry; Lord Viscount Bolingbroke: Philosophical Works. 5 vols. 
London, 1754.* 
.avers, Frank: Disquisitions, Metaphysical and Literary. London, 1793.1` 
Scott, John Robert: A Dissertation on the Progress of the line Arts. 
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Shaftesbury, Third Earl of: see Cooper, Anthony Ashley. 
Sharp, Richard: On the Nature and Utility of Eloquence: ivl.L.P.S.MI. 
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Sharpe, William: A Dissertation upon Genius: London, 1755. 
Shenstone, William: Works in Poetry and Prose; 2 vols. 1764 Vol.I 
includes Essay on Elegy: vol. II consists of Essays on Mien, 
Manners, and Things. 
Sherlock, Martin: Letters on Several Subjects: 2 vols. London, 1781. 
Smith, Adam: The Theory of Moral Sentiments: London, 1759. Other ed'ns. 
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Spence, Joseph: Crito; A Dialogue on Beauty; by Sir Harry Beaumont: 
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Stack, Richard: An Essay on Sublimity of Writing: T.R.I.A.3 vol.I, 1787.* 
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Stedman, John: Laelius and Hortensia: or, thoughts on the nature and 
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Stewart, Dugald: Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind :(Vol.I, 
but not so entitled :) London, 1792. Other ed'ns., 1802, 1808, 1811, 
1814, etc.. Also in Works,i$547 60,: 
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Philosophical Essays: Edinburgh, 1810. Other ed'ns. 
1816, 1818; etc. 
Stubbes, George: A Dialogue on Beauty. In the manner of Plato: 
London, 1731: 
(Temple, Launcelot): see Lxmstrong, John. 
Temple, Sir William: Miscellanea. The second part. In four essays. 
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The Works of Sir William Temple....2 vols. London, 1720: 
Thomson, William: An Enquiry into the Elementary principles of Beauty 
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introductory Discourse on Taste. 1798. 
Tucker, Abraham: The Light of Nature Pursued, by Edward Search, Esq., 
London, 176. and ed'n., 1805 '(revised and corrected). 
Turnbull, George: A Treatise on Ancient Painting, containing 
observations on ti]e rise, progress, and decline of that art 
aamonLst the Greeks and Romans....London, 1740:` 
Twining, Thomas: Aristotle's Treatise on Poetry Translated, with 
notes on the translation and on the original, and two Dissertaä.ons 
on Poetical and Musical Tm;tation. 1789. 
Usher, James: Clio, or a Discourse on Taste. 1767, Other ed'ns., 
1770 (with large additions), 1803 (ed. J. Mathetiv); 
Warburton, William; Bishop of Gloucester: The Works of William Warburton. 
New ed'n. 12 vols. London, 1811: 
Webb, Daniel: An Inquiry into the Beauties of Painting and into the 
merits of the most celebrated Painters, ancient and modern. 
London, 1760. Other ed'ns., 1761, 1769, 1777. 
Observations on the Correspondence between Poetry and Music.... 
London, 1769. 
Welsted, Leonard: Epistles, Odes, etc. written on Various Subjects, to 
which is prefixed a Dissertation concerning the Perfection of the 
English Language, the state of poetry, etc....London, 1724. 
Young, Edward: Conjectures on Original Composition, in a letter to 
the author of Sir Charles Grandison. London, 1759. Another ed'n., 
ed. E. J. Morley, (Modern Language Texts, English Series) Manchester, 
1918: InclLides On Lyric Poetry (1728) 
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Athenian Gazette, or Casuistical Mercury, Resolving all the Most Nice and 
Curious Questions Proposed by the Ingenious. 1690. After first 
number, continued as the Athenian Mercury, 1690 -97. 
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7 
The Periodicals thus marked continued to appear after the last date here 
given, which shows the latest volume consulted. 
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CONTRIBUTORS TO THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA (2nd edition) 
I have not, unfortunately, had tir_.e to examine in detail many of the 
articles in the second edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. It is 
however very obvious that Lord Names was responsible for most of the 
contributions on aesthetic questions, and, as I have noted in the 
bibliography, was the author of the articles on architecture, art, beauty, 
congruity, criticism, language, novelty, and uniformity. i'his list does not 
claim to be exhaustive; and it is more than likely that Karnes was author 
of other articles. Uf the articles which I have noted, that on art is most 
interesting , as unlike the others it is not an almost verbatim reproduction 
of a passage from the Elements of Criticism. Some of it comes from his 
discussion of art in Sketches of the History of Man, but it is possible that 
most of the article was composed specially f,or the Encyclopaedia. If so, 
it has an obvious intrinsic interest, as Karnes has in his other works dealt with 
the subject of art in a less general manner. 
The article of poetry is taken from Beattiets essay On Poetry and Music, 
but once again I have not been able to make a detailed comparison of the 
texts concerned. There are however certainly long passages taken direct 
and without alteration from Beattiets earlier work. Whether or not this 
is Beattie's only contribution, I am again not in a position to say. But 
it is clear that it should not be too difficult to name the authors of 
certain other articles as well, and that the results might sometimes be 
interesting. 
